A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI
(A revised article I wrote in 2007)
This isn’t another budget debate or partisan volley. It’s about speed — the speed at which the United States is piling on debt and the narrowing time we have to manage it.
I’ve pulled together data from Treasury’s Debt to the Penny database, the Monthly Statement of the Public Debt, the Federal Reserve’s cash-balance series, and the government’s own Financial Report. What they show is sobering — and I’m grateful to everyone who keeps these numbers public so we can study them together.
1. The Warning Is in the Speed, Not the Size
When we talk about a $38 trillion national debt, it’s hard for anyone to feel the difference between $36 trillion and $38 trillion. But here’s what matters: the U.S. added that last trillion in just 71 days.
Below is the table Treasury’s own data produces — the number of days it took to move from one trillion-dollar threshold to the next.
| From ($T) | To ($T) | From Date | To Date | Days Between |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | 5 | 1993-04-01 | 1996-02-23 | 1,058 |
| 5 | 6 | 1996-02-23 | 2002-02-26 | 2,195 |
| 6 | 7 | 2002-02-26 | 2004-01-15 | 688 |
| 7 | 8 | 2004-01-15 | 2005-10-18 | 642 |
| 8 | 9 | 2005-10-18 | 2007-08-31 | 682 |
| 9 | 10 | 2007-08-31 | 2008-09-30 | 396 |
| 10 | 11 | 2008-09-30 | 2009-03-16 | 167 |
| 11 | 12 | 2009-03-16 | 2009-11-16 | 245 |
| 12 | 13 | 2009-11-16 | 2010-06-01 | 197 |
| 13 | 14 | 2010-06-01 | 2010-12-31 | 213 |
| 14 | 15 | 2010-12-31 | 2011-11-15 | 319 |
| 15 | 16 | 2011-11-15 | 2012-08-31 | 290 |
| 16 | 17 | 2012-08-31 | 2013-10-17 | 412 |
| 17 | 18 | 2013-10-17 | 2014-11-28 | 407 |
| 18 | 19 | 2014-11-28 | 2016-01-29 | 427 |
| 19 | 20 | 2016-01-29 | 2017-09-08 | 588 |
| 20 | 21 | 2017-09-08 | 2018-03-15 | 188 |
| 21 | 22 | 2018-03-15 | 2019-02-11 | 333 |
| 22 | 23 | 2019-02-11 | 2019-10-31 | 262 |
| 23 | 24 | 2019-10-31 | 2020-04-07 | 159 |
| 24 | 25 | 2020-04-07 | 2020-05-05 | 28 |
| 25 | 26 | 2020-05-05 | 2020-06-09 | 35 |
| 26 | 27 | 2020-06-09 | 2020-10-01 | 114 |
| 27 | 28 | 2020-10-01 | 2021-03-01 | 151 |
| 28 | 29 | 2021-03-01 | 2021-12-16 | 290 |
| 29 | 30 | 2021-12-16 | 2022-01-31 | 46 |
| 30 | 31 | 2022-01-31 | 2022-10-03 | 245 |
| 31 | 32 | 2022-10-03 | 2023-06-15 | 255 |
| 32 | 33 | 2023-06-15 | 2023-09-15 | 92 |
| 33 | 34 | 2023-09-15 | 2023-12-29 | 105 |
| 34 | 35 | 2023-12-29 | 2024-07-26 | 210 |
| 35 | 36 | 2024-07-26 | 2024-11-21 | 118 |
| 36 | 37 | 2024-11-21 | 2025-08-11 | 263 |
| 37 | 38 | 2025-08-11 | 2025-10-21 | 71 |
It used to take years to add a trillion. Now it takes weeks. That’s the real warning light on the dashboard.
2. Shorter Maturities, Smaller Margin
Back in 1993 the average maturity of Treasury debt was roughly 12½ years.
Today it’s about 6 years, and roughly 22 percent of all marketable debt matures within one year.
Shorter maturities look smart when short-term rates are low, but they force the Treasury back to the market more often — like refinancing your mortgage every few months instead of every decade. If investors ever hesitate, even briefly, there’s an avalanche of maturing debt right behind it.
3. Why It Behaves Like a Ponzi — Even Though It Isn’t One
This isn’t fraud; it’s math.
Every month, new Treasury borrowing pays off old Treasury borrowing and covers the interest on what’s left. As long as new buyers keep showing up, the machine runs smoothly.
That’s also what keeps a Ponzi scheme alive — until confidence fades or inflows slow. The difference is that the U.S. government can tax, print, and regulate. But even governments can’t repeal arithmetic: if debt grows faster than income and the refinancing window gets shorter, confidence becomes the currency.
4. The “Trust-Fund” Holders — Borrowed from Ourselves
A surprising amount of the debt isn’t owed to the public at all — it’s owed to ourselves. About $7½ trillion of today’s $38 trillion total is intragovernmental debt: money that one part of the government has lent to another.
The biggest lenders:
| Rank | Trust Fund / Account | Holdings ($ B) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Other government accounts (aggregate) | 2,675 |
| 2 | Social Security – OASI Trust Fund | 2,466 |
| 3 | Federal Employees Retirement Funds | 904 |
| 4 | Medicare Trust Funds (HI + SMI) | 447 |
| 5 | Social Security – DI Trust Fund | 211 |
| 6 | Unemployment Trust Fund | 98 |
| 7 | Highway Trust Fund | 88 |
| 8 | Deposit Insurance Fund (FDIC) | 109 |
| 9 | Federal Housing Administration (FHA) | 165 |
| 10 | Smaller & legacy funds (Post Office, Airport & Airway, Railroad Retirement, etc.) | < 60 each |
Each fund holds special-issue Treasury securities — assets on its books, liabilities on the Treasury’s. They don’t have cash in vaults; they have receivables from the Treasury. When benefits are due, the Treasury must come up with cash — through taxes or by borrowing again from the public.
5. True Operating Cash — The Real Checkbook
So how much money does the federal government actually have to operate on?
Treasury’s Operating Cash Balance (OCB) — its checkbook at the Federal Reserve — tells us:
| Era | Typical Operating Cash Balance |
|---|---|
| 2000–2007 | $20–50 B |
| 2008–2014 | $100–300 B |
| 2015–2019 | $300–400 B |
| 2020 (COVID peak) | $1.6 T |
| 2021–2022 | $700–900 B |
| 2023–2025 | $450–950 B fluctuating |
The FY 2024 Financial Report listed $871 B in operating cash, while the Fed’s own TGA series showed about $940 B in early November 2025.
That sounds large — until you remember it sits beside $38 trillion in total debt.
It’s not solvency; it’s a buffer measured in weeks.
6. What the Speed Means
Here’s how the pattern looks through time:
| Era | Avg. Days per $1 T | Typical WAM | Character |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1990s | 1 000–2 000 days | 12 years | Predictable growth |
| 2000–2008 | ~650 days | 7–8 years | Moderate deficits |
| 2009–2016 | 160–600 days | 5–6 years | Crisis & recovery |
| 2017–2019 | 200–330 days | 6 years | Late-cycle looseness |
| 2020–2025 | 28–263 days | 5–6 years | Acceleration, pandemic, politics |
The system now borrows faster and must refinance sooner — two lines on the same graph, both curving downward toward zero.
7. Why the Trust Funds Don’t Save Us
Social Security, Medicare, and federal pensions hold trillions, but they hold them as special Treasuries. When those are redeemed to pay retirees, the Treasury must find cash. That means the same public borrowing that funded the rest of government. In short, we have IOUs to ourselves — promises backed by the same overworked credit card.
8. Cash Flow, Confidence, and Collapse Risk
Operating cash around $800 B seems comfortable until you realize that roughly $8 trillion of marketable debt will mature within a year. That means Treasury is always just a few bad auctions away from a scramble — not because of insolvency, but because of timing. In financial systems, timing failures can look like insolvency long before real default occurs.
9. Shared Credit Where It’s Due
Much of this analysis builds on open Treasury and Federal Reserve data —
the Debt to the Penny dataset, the Monthly Statement of the Public Debt, the Financial Report of the United States Government, and the FRED time series for the Treasury General Account. Every citizen can look at the same numbers and come to their own conclusions. My goal here — and I hope yours too — is to keep those facts visible before they blur together.
10. The Takeaway
Debt itself is not immoral. It built our highways, won our wars, and carried us through a pandemic. But when the speed of borrowing outruns the time to repay, we trade stability for convenience.
In 1993, the U.S. had an average debt maturity of twelve years and a trillion-dollar increase every few years. Today, maturities average six years and a trillion arrives every couple of months.
That’s not a cliff yet — but it’s a downhill grade with failing brakes.
The danger isn’t only the size of the debt. It’s the speed at which it is accumulating.
Data sources: U.S. Department of the Treasury – Debt to the Penny, Monthly Statement of the Public Debt (Table FD-3, June 2025), Daily Treasury Statement, Financial Report of the U.S. Government (FY 2024), and Federal Reserve FRED series WTREGEN (Treasury General Account).
This is fantastic, Lewis! I will definitely keep this email and refer to it often!
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Thank you so much. Your words always mean a lot to me.
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