The Infrastructure We Don’t See: Aging Gas Systems, Hidden Risks, and the Case for Annual Accountability

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

It’s not if, but when!

Natural gas infrastructure is the most invisible—and therefore the most misunderstood—critical system in modern cities. Power lines are visible. Water mains announce themselves through pressure and flow. Roads crack and bridges age in plain sight. But gas lines remain buried, silent, and largely forgotten—until something goes wrong.

That invisibility is not benign. It creates a governance gap where responsibility is fragmented, risk is assumed rather than measured, and accountability is episodic instead of continuous. As cities grow denser, older, and more complex, that gap widens.

This essay makes a simple but demanding case: cities should require annual, technical accountability briefings from gas utilities and structured gas-safety evaluations for high-occupancy buildings—public and private—because safety is no longer assured by age, ownership boundaries, or regulatory compliance alone.

The ultimate question is not whether gas systems are regulated. They are.
The question is whether, at the local level, we are actually safer than we were a year ago.


I. The Aging Gas Network: A Technical Reality, Not a Hypothetical

Much of the U.S. gas distribution network was installed decades ago. While significant modernization has occurred, legacy materials—particularly cast iron and bare steel—still exist in pockets, often in the very neighborhoods where density, redevelopment, and consequence are highest.

These systems age in predictable ways:

  • Material degradation such as corrosion, joint failure, and metal fatigue
  • Ground movement from expansive soils, drought cycles, and freeze–thaw conditions
  • Pressure cycling driven by modern load variability
  • Construction interaction, including third-party damage during roadway, utility, and redevelopment projects

Technically speaking, aging is not a binary condition. It is a curve. Systems do not fail all at once; they fail where stress, material fatigue, and external disturbance intersect. Cities that approve redevelopment without understanding where those intersections lie are not managing risk—they are inheriting it.


II. Monitoring Is Better Than Ever—But It Is Not Replacement

Modern gas utilities deploy advanced leak detection technologies that did not exist a generation ago: mobile survey vehicles, high-sensitivity handheld sensors, aerial detection, and in some cases continuous monitoring.

Regulatory standards have improved as well. Leak surveys are more frequent, detection thresholds are lower, and repair timelines are clearer. From a technical standpoint, the industry is better at finding leaks than it was even a few years ago.

But monitoring is inherently reactive. It detects deterioration after it has begun. It does not restore structural integrity. It does not change the age profile of the system. It does not eliminate brittle joints or corrosion-prone materials.

Replacement is the only permanent risk reduction. And replacement is expensive, disruptive, and largely invisible unless cities require it to be discussed openly.


III. Why Annual Gas Utility Accountability Briefings Are Essential

Gas utilities operate under long-range capital replacement programs driven by regulatory approval, rate recovery, and internal prioritization models. Cities operate under land-use approvals, zoning changes, density increases, and redevelopment pressures that can change risk far faster than infrastructure plans adjust.

An annual gas utility accountability briefing is how those two worlds reconnect.

Not a promotional update. Not a general safety overview. But a technical, decision-grade briefing that allows city leadership to understand:

  • What materials remain in the ground
  • Where risk is concentrated
  • How fast legacy systems are being retired
  • Whether replacement is keeping pace with growth
  • Where development decisions may be increasing consequence

Without this, cities are effectively approving new intensity above ground while assuming adequacy below it.


IV. The Forgotten Segment: From the Meter to the Building

Most gas incidents that injure people do not originate in transmission pipelines or deep mains. They occur closest to occupied space—often in the short stretch between the gas meter and the building structure.

Legally, responsibility is clear:

  • The utility owns and maintains the system up to the meter.
  • The property owner owns everything downstream.

Assessment, however, is not.

Post-meter gas piping is frequently:

  • Older steel without modern corrosion protection
  • Stressed by foundation movement
  • Altered during remodels and additions
  • Poorly documented
  • Rarely inspected after initial construction

Utilities generally do not inspect customer-owned piping. Building departments see it only during permitted work. Fire departments respond after leaks are reported. Property owners often do not realize they own it.

This creates a true orphaned asset class: high-consequence infrastructure with no lifecycle oversight.


V. Responsibility Alone Is Not Safety

Cities often take comfort in the legal distinction: “That’s private property.” Legally, that is correct. Practically, it is insufficient.

Gas does not respect ownership boundaries. A failure inside a school, apartment building, restaurant, or nursing home becomes a public emergency immediately.

Risk governance does not require cities to assume liability. It requires them to ensure that someone is actually evaluating risk in places where failure would have severe consequences.


VI. Required Gas-Safety Evaluations for High-Occupancy Properties

This is the missing pillar of modern gas safety.

Just as elevators, fire suppression systems, and boilers undergo periodic inspection, gas piping systems in high-occupancy buildings should be subject to structured evaluation—regardless of whether the building is publicly or privately owned.

Facilities warranting mandatory evaluation include:

  • Schools (public and private)
  • Daycares
  • Nursing homes and assisted-living facilities
  • Hospitals and clinics
  • Large multifamily buildings
  • Assembly venues (churches, theaters, gyms)
  • Restaurants and food-service establishments
  • High-load commercial and industrial users

These are places where evacuation is difficult, ignition sources are common, and consequences are magnified.

A gas-safety evaluation should assess:

  • Condition and material of post-meter piping
  • Corrosion, support, and anchoring
  • Stress at building entry points
  • Evidence of undocumented modifications or abandoned lines
  • Accessibility and labeling of shutoff valves

These evaluations need not be frequent. They need to be periodic, triggered, and credible.


VII. Triggers That Make the System Work

Cities can implement this framework without blanket inspections by tying evaluations to specific events:

  • Change of occupancy or use
  • Major remodels or additions
  • Buildings reaching certain age thresholds when work is permitted
  • Repeated gas odor or leak responses
  • Sale or transfer of high-occupancy properties

This approach focuses effort where risk is most likely to have changed.


VIII. Public vs. Private: One Standard of Care

A gas explosion in a public school is not meaningfully different from one in a private daycare or restaurant. The victims do not care who owned the pipe.

A city that limits safety evaluation requirements to public buildings is acknowledging risk—but only partially. The standard should be risk-based, not ownership-based.


IX. Are We Better or Worse Off Than a Year Ago?

Technically, the answer is nuanced.

We are better off nationally in detection capability and regulatory clarity. Technology has improved. Survey frequency has increased. Reporting is stronger.

But many cities are likely worse off locally in exposure:

  • Buildings are older
  • Density is higher
  • Construction activity is heavier
  • Post-meter piping remains largely unassessed
  • High-occupancy facilities rely on outdated assumptions

So the honest answer is this:

We are better at finding problems—but not necessarily better at eliminating risk where people live, work, and gather.


X. Governance Is the Missing Link

Gas safety is no longer only an engineering problem. It is a governance problem.

Cities already regulate:

  • Land use and density
  • Building permits and occupancy
  • Business licensing
  • Emergency response coordination

Requiring annual gas utility accountability briefings and targeted gas-safety evaluations does not expand government arbitrarily. It closes a blind spot that modern urban conditions have exposed.


Conclusion: Asking the Right Question, Every Year

The most important question cities should ask annually is not:

“Did the utility comply with regulations?”

It is:

“Given our growth, our buildings, and our infrastructure, are we actually safer than we were last year?”

If city leaders cannot answer that clearly—above ground and below—it is not because the answer is unknowable.

It is because no one has required it to be known.


**Appendix A

Model Ordinance: Gas Infrastructure Accountability and High-Occupancy Safety Evaluations**

This model ordinance is designed to improve transparency, situational awareness, and public safety without transferring ownership, operational control, or liability from utilities or property owners to the City.


Section 1. Purpose and Findings

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this ordinance is to:

  1. Improve transparency regarding the condition, monitoring, and replacement of gas infrastructure;
  2. Ensure that risks associated with aging gas systems are identified and reduced over time;
  3. Require periodic gas safety evaluations for high-occupancy buildings where consequences of failure are greatest;
  4. Strengthen coordination among gas utilities, property owners, and City emergency services; and
  5. Establish consistent, decision-grade information for City leadership.

1.2 Findings

The City Council finds that:

  1. Natural gas infrastructure is largely underground and not visible to the public.
  2. Portions of the gas system—including customer-owned piping—may age without systematic reassessment.
  3. Increased density, redevelopment, and construction activity elevate the consequences of gas failures.
  4. Existing regulatory frameworks do not provide city-specific visibility into system condition or replacement progress.
  5. Periodic reporting and targeted evaluation improve public safety without assuming utility or private ownership responsibilities.

Section 2. Annual Gas Utility Accountability Briefing

2.1 Requirement

Each gas utility operating within the City shall provide an Annual Gas Infrastructure Accountability Briefing to the City Council or its designated committee.

2.2 Scope

The briefing shall address, at a minimum:

  • Pipeline materials and age profile;
  • Replacement progress and future plans;
  • Leak detection, classification, and repair performance;
  • High-consequence areas and impacts of development;
  • Construction coordination and damage prevention;
  • Emergency response readiness and communication protocols.

2.3 Format and Standards

  • Briefings shall include written materials, maps, and data tables.
  • Metrics shall be presented in a year-over-year comparable format.
  • Information shall be technical, factual, and suitable for governance decision-making.

2.4 No Transfer of Liability

Nothing in this section shall be construed to transfer ownership, maintenance responsibility, or operational control of gas facilities to the City.


Section 3. High-Occupancy Gas Safety Evaluations

3.1 Covered Facilities

Gas safety evaluations are required for the following facilities, whether publicly or privately owned:

  • Schools (public and private)
  • Daycare facilities
  • Nursing homes and assisted-living facilities
  • Hospitals and medical clinics
  • Multifamily buildings exceeding [X] dwelling units
  • Assembly occupancies exceeding [X] persons
  • Restaurants and commercial food-service establishments
  • Other facilities designated by the Fire Marshal as high-consequence occupancies

3.2 Scope of Evaluation

Evaluations shall assess:

  • Condition and materials of post-meter gas piping
  • Corrosion potential and structural support
  • Stress at building entry points and foundations
  • Evidence of undocumented modifications or abandoned piping
  • Accessibility, labeling, and operation of shutoff valves

3.3 Qualified Evaluators

Evaluations shall be conducted by:

  • Licensed plumbers,
  • Licensed mechanical contractors, or
  • Professional engineers with gas system experience.

3.4 Triggers

Evaluations shall be required upon:

  • Change of occupancy or use;
  • Major remodels or building additions;
  • Buildings reaching [X] years of age when permits are issued;
  • Repeated gas odor complaints or leak responses;
  • Sale or transfer of covered properties, if adopted by the City.

Section 4. Documentation and Compliance

4.1 Certification

Property owners shall submit documentation certifying completion of required evaluations.

4.2 Corrective Action

Identified hazards shall be corrected within timeframes established by code officials.

4.3 Enforcement

Non-compliance may result in:

  • Withholding of permits or certificates of occupancy;
  • Temporary suspension of approvals;
  • Administrative penalties as authorized by law.

Section 5. Education and Coordination

The City shall:

  • Provide educational materials clarifying ownership and safety responsibilities;
  • Coordinate with gas utilities on public outreach;
  • Integrate findings into emergency response planning and training.


**Appendix B

Annual Gas Utility Accountability Briefing — Preparation Checklist**

This checklist ensures annual briefings are consistent, measurable, and focused on risk reduction rather than general compliance.


I. System Inventory & Condition

☐ Total pipeline miles within city limits (distribution vs. transmission)
☐ Pipeline miles by material type
☐ Pipeline miles by decade installed
☐ Location and extent of remaining legacy materials
☐ Identification of oldest segments still in service


II. Replacement Progress

☐ Miles replaced in the previous year (by material type)
☐ Five-year replacement plan with schedules
☐ Funded vs. unfunded replacement projects
☐ Year-over-year reduction in legacy materials
☐ Explanation of changes from prior plans


III. Leak Detection & Repair Performance

☐ Total leaks detected (normalized per mile)
☐ Leak classification breakdown
☐ Average and maximum repair times by class
☐ Repeat leak locations identified and mapped
☐ Root-cause analysis of recurring issues


IV. Monitoring Technology

☐ Detection technologies currently deployed
☐ Survey frequency achieved vs. required
☐ Use of advanced or emerging detection tools
☐ Known limitations of monitoring methods


V. High-Consequence Areas

☐ Definition and criteria for high-consequence zones
☐ Updated risk maps
☐ Impact of new development on risk profile
☐ Trunk lines serving rapidly densifying areas


VI. Construction & Damage Prevention

☐ Third-party damage incidents
☐ 811 ticket response performance
☐ High-risk project types identified
☐ Coordination procedures with City capital projects


VII. Emergency Response Readiness

☐ Incident response timelines
☐ Coordination with fire, police, and emergency management
☐ Date and scope of last joint exercise or drill
☐ Public communication and notification protocols


VIII. Customer-Owned (Post-Meter) Piping

☐ Incidents involving post-meter piping
☐ Common failure materials or conditions
☐ Customer education and outreach efforts
☐ Voluntary inspection or assistance programs


IX. Forward-Looking Risk Assessment

☐ Top unresolved risks
☐ Areas of greatest concern
☐ Commitments for the next 12 months
☐ Clear answer to:
“Are we safer than last year—and why?”


Closing Note

A briefing that cannot complete this checklist is not incomplete—it is revealing where risk remains unmanaged.

That visibility is the purpose of accountability.

Data Centers in Texas: Peak Math, Success, Failures, and How to Keep Residents Off the Hook

AI Reponses to Questions Posed by Lewis McLain

Introduction

It was exciting to me when I joined the City of Garland in the early 1970s. Working in municipal government was not something I had considered when I received my BBA in Accounting. I never really wanted to be an accountant. My true love was Budgeting and Cost Accounting. The gift I really received was the introduction to Utility Rate Making. Garland not only had Water & Sewer Utilities, but the city also had an Electric Utility. I was also fortunate to work with excellent outside Rate Consultants. The big present wrapped with a nice bow was the concept of Peak Demand vs Average Demand in utility systems. From there, I realized the concept applied to roadways and many other aspects of municipal services. LFM

The Quick Math (so this posting makes sense)

Every discussion about data centers and electricity should begin with two simple metrics: load factor and peak demand.

  • Load factor (LF) = Average demand ÷ Peak demand.
  • Peaking factor (the inverse) = Peak ÷ Average = 1/LF.

Example (same annual energy, different load factors):
Suppose a data center averages 50 MW (megawatts or one million watts) of demand across the year. The perfect situation would be if there were businesses with a 100% load factor, meaning a business used the same amount of power every single hour (actually every minute) of the year.

  • At 50% LF, the peaking factor is 2.0. That means Peak = 100 MW.
  • At 75% LF, the peaking factor is 1.333. That means Peak ≈ 66.7 MW.

Takeaway: By raising the load factor from 50% to 75%, the required peak capacity falls by about 33% while delivering the same yearly energy.

And here’s why that matters: Texas utilities and ERCOT must size substations, feeders, and generation to meet the peak, not the average.

Homes conversion rule of thumb:

  • 1 MW ≈ 250 Texas homes at summer peak (based on ~4 kW per home).
  • 1 MW ≈ 625 homes on an annual-energy basis (average load ~1.6 kW per home).

So a 100 MW campus is the equivalent of a new mid-sized city landing on your grid overnight.


The Perfect Story and Outcome

Now picture the ideal case. A fast-growing tech firm proposes a 100 MW data campus in Texas. Instead of rushing, city leaders and the utility sit down with the company at the start and insist on clear answers. The questions are simple but critical:

  • What will your peak demand be, and how will you manage it during the state’s hottest afternoons?
  • Who pays for the new substation and feeders, and who carries the risk if you scale back or leave?
  • How do we ensure your taxable value stays meaningful even after your servers depreciate?
  • What tangible benefits will our community see, beyond the building itself?

On the grid:
The company commits to a high load factor and pledges to curtail 20–30 MW during ERCOT’s four summer peaks. The new substation and feeders are paid through contribution in aid of construction (CIAC), so residents will never face stranded costs like the costly investment itself.

On the finances:
Abatements are milestone-based—tied to actual MW energized, not just breaking ground. Valuation floors lock in a taxable base for servers and electrical gear, guaranteeing a predictable $5–10 million per year for schools, police, and parks.

On jobs and training:
The campus directly employs about 60 skilled staff for operations. But the developer also funds a community-college training pipeline in IT and electrical trades, seeding hundreds of local careers. The construction phase delivers hundreds of short-term jobs for two years.

On resources:
The data hall commits to water-efficient cooling, capped at a set gallon-per-MW threshold with quarterly reporting. A community benefit fund supplements fire protection and road upgrades near the campus.

On politics:
Hearings are calm because everything is transparent. Residents know in plain English that their bills won’t rise, because the project carries its own risk.

Outcome:
Five years later, the facility hums steadily, the schools are flush with additional tax revenue, and the city is recognized as a model for how to land high-tech investment without burdening households or small businesses.


What Could Go Wrong? (Case Narratives)

Of course, not every story ends this way. Around the country, major data-center projects have stumbled, been cancelled, or backfired in ways that offer hard lessons for Texas communities.

Corporate pullback after big promises — Microsoft

In 2025, Microsoft canceled or walked away from about 2,000 MW of planned data center capacity in the U.S. and Europe. Analysts cited oversupply compared with near-term demand. Utilities and communities that had already been preparing for those loads were left with planning costs and the risk of stranded substations.

Lesson for Texas: Even blue-chip firms are not risk-free. Cities must require CIAC, minimum bills, demand ratchets, and parent guarantees so residents aren’t forced to backfill the shortfall if plans change.


Court voids approvals after years of work — Prince William County, Virginia

In August 2025, a Virginia judge voided the rezonings for the “Digital Gateway” project—37 data centers on 1,700 acres—citing legal defects in notice and hearings. Years of planning collapsed overnight.

Lesson for Texas: Keep zoning and notice airtight. Add regulatory failure clauses in agreements so if courts unwind approvals, the city isn’t on the hook.


Political rejection at the finish line — College Station, Texas

On September 11, 2025, the College Station City Council unanimously rejected a proposed 600 MW data campus after residents raised concerns about grid strain, noise, water use, and meager job counts. The rejection stopped the project before construction—but it revealed how quickly sentiment can flip.

Lesson for Texas: Require peak-hour commitments (4CP curtailment), publish MW timelines, and cap water usage. Transparency eases public concerns and avoids last-minute backlash.


Industry-wide pauses — Meta redesigns for AI

Between 2022 and 2024, Meta paused more than a dozen U.S. projects to redesign for artificial intelligence. Sites like Mesa, Arizona slipped years behind schedule. Communities banking on near-term tax revenue saw gaps in their budgets.

Lesson for Texas: Tie abatements to energized MW milestones. If load slips, abatements pause until actual demand materializes.


Subsidy blow-ups — Texas and beyond

By 2025, Texas’ data center sales-tax exemptions ballooned from $157 million to more than $1 billion per year in foregone revenue. Other states saw similar overruns as projects multiplied faster than expected.

Lesson for Texas: Model depreciation and appeals honestly. Use valuation floors in agreements, and don’t oversell the net gain at ribbon-cuttings.


Local backlash stalls projects — Central Texas

In Central Texas, residents have already forced pauses or redesigns of major projects, citing water stress, noise, and grid strain. CyrusOne and others adjusted timelines under pressure.

Lesson for Texas: Put MW forecasts, curtailment commitments, and water-use data in plain English. Opaqueness breeds opposition.


Who Pays When a Big Customer Leaves?

In Texas, fixed delivery costs don’t vanish if a large customer fails or exits. Unless safeguards are in place, those costs roll into the next rate case and land on residents and small businesses.

Protective tools include:

  • CIAC: Customer funds all dedicated substations/feeders.
  • Facilities charges: Monthly fees for customer-specific assets.
  • Contract demand and minimum bills: Revenue stability even if load shrinks.
  • Demand ratchets: If they ever peak high once, they pay a portion of that demand for future months.
  • Parent guarantees or letters of credit: Real money backing early-exit costs.
  • Peak-hour curtailment covenants: Written commitments to reduce load during ERCOT’s four summer peaks.

These tools are standard in Texas utility practice. The only mistake is failing to insist on them.


Bringing It Home to Collin & Denton (DFW)

The Dallas–Fort Worth market is growing fast: nearly 600 MW operating and another 600 MW under construction, almost all pre-leased. In Collin and Denton counties, just two or three large campuses can rival the load of an entire mid-size city.

That’s why development agreements must:

  • Stage energization in MW blocks,
  • Require 4CP curtailment reporting, and
  • Hard-wire CIAC plus facilities charges so no “stranded substation” ever lands on residents.

Conclusion: Planning With Eyes Wide Open

Data centers are the backbone of cloud computing, e-commerce, and artificial intelligence. For Texas, they promise billions in private investment and hundreds of millions in taxable value. But their true footprint is measured in megawatts, not headcount.

Handled well—with CIAC, ratchets, valuation floors, and peak-hour curtailment—they can be stable anchors of local finance. Handled poorly, they can leave residents paying for stranded substations, foregone tax revenue, and empty server halls.

The “perfect story” shows it can be done right. The failures across the country show what happens when it isn’t. For Texas cities, the path forward is clear: land the investment, but make the project carry the risk—not your ratepayers.


Contract terms cities and utilities should insist on (plug-and-play list)

  • CIAC for all dedicated facilities (feeders, substation bays, transformers).
  • Facilities charge (monthly) on any utility-owned dedicated equipment.
  • Contract demand with a minimum bill and demand ratchet.
  • Parent guarantee / letter of credit sized to cover early exit and decommissioning.
  • Peak-hour curtailment targets (spell out dates/hours and telemetry).
  • Milestone-based incentives (abatement pauses if MW milestones slip).
  • Valuation floors for server personal property and clear depreciation schedules.
  • Quarterly public reporting: MW online, curtailment at peaks, water usage if relevant.

DFW planning checklist (Collin & Denton emphasis)

  1. Get the MW ramp (Year 1–5), contract demand, and minimum bill in writing.
  2. Require CIAC + facilities charges so bespoke assets aren’t rate-based on everyone.
  3. Bake in peak-hour curtailment commitments (the four summer peaks).
  4. Tie local incentives to energized MW, not just building permits.
  5. Set valuation floors and independent appraisal rights.
  6. Secure credit support (parent guarantee or LOC) sized for the dedicated build.
  7. Publish quarterly progress (MW online and peak reductions) to keep trust with residents.

Sources (selected)

  • Corporate pullback: Microsoft cancellations ≈ 2,000 MW (TD Cowen). Reuters+1
  • Court reversal: Prince William “Digital Gateway” rezonings voided (Aug. 2025). Data Center Dynamics+1
  • Political rejection: College Station votes down 600 MW sale (Sept. 2025). Data Center Dynamics+1
  • Industry-wide pause/redesign: Meta paused >12 builds; Mesa AZ delay to 2025. Tech Funding News+1
  • Subsidy growth: Texas data-center tax costs > $1 B/yr; spikes across states. Good Jobs First+1
  • DFW market scale and pre-leasing: CBRE market profiles and releases (H1/H2 2024–2025). CBRE+2CBRE+2
  • Central-Texas pushback (CyrusOne pause noted): Austin American-Statesman review (Sept. 2025). Statesman