Do Republicans Still Want to Kill the Affordable Care Act?

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

A Comprehensive Analysis of the Law, the Politics, and the Reality

For more than a decade, the Affordable Care Act—Obamacare—was the most divisive domestic policy in American life. When Democrats passed the law in 2010 without a single Republican vote, the GOP responded with a unified identity-shaping mission: repeal and replace. For years, “repeal” was not merely a policy position; it was a pledge, a litmus test, and a rallying cry. The House voted more than fifty times to dismantle the ACA. In 2017, with a Republican president and full Republican control of Congress, the party came one dramatic vote away from delivering on that promise.

But the American political landscape of 2025 could not be more different. Today, Republicans do not truly want to kill the ACA—not politically, not strategically, and not practically. The repeal war has ended, not with a dramatic policy reversal, but with a quieter, deeper recognition: the ACA is now woven into the fabric of American life. To understand how this transformation occurred—and why Democrats’ claim that “Republicans have no plan” does not withstand scrutiny—one must examine the ACA itself, the early years of market turmoil, the evolution of public opinion, the GOP’s long list of proposed replacements, and the changing priorities of Republican voters.


I. What the ACA Actually Contains: The Architecture of the Law

The ACA reshaped the American health system through a combination of coverage rules, benefit requirements, financial subsidies, market reforms, and tax changes. Its design is not modular; it is integrated. This complexity makes it extraordinarily difficult to uproot.

The service side of the ACA rests on four pillars.

First, the law introduced guaranteed issue and community rating, which require insurers to accept all applicants regardless of pre-existing conditions and forbid charging sicker people more than healthier ones. This ended a decades-long practice of denying coverage to those who needed it most.

Second, the ACA established a national floor of essential health benefits: hospitalization, maternity care, mental health treatment, emergency services, prescription drugs, laboratory services, pediatric care, rehabilitative therapy, and preventive screenings. These requirements eliminated “junk plans” that appeared inexpensive but failed catastrophically when people became seriously sick.

Third, the law created the Health Insurance Marketplace, allowing consumers to compare standardized plans. Marketplace enrollees receive income-based subsidies that cap how much of their income they must spend on premiums, transforming coverage affordability for millions of low- and middle-income Americans.

Fourth, the ACA expanded Medicaid to low-income adults earning up to 138% of the federal poverty level. Though the Supreme Court made expansion optional, more than forty states ultimately adopted it. Medicaid expansion is now one of the most durable components of the law.

The fiscal side of the ACA includes a mix of taxes, fees, and Medicare savings. The law originally included an individual mandate to encourage healthy people to join the insurance pool. It imposed higher Medicare taxes and a net investment income tax on wealthy households. It added industry fees and reduced certain Medicare overpayments to help finance subsidies and Medicaid expansion. This combination of service and funding mechanisms forms a complex ecosystem—too interconnected to repeal without massive disruption.

While the ACA expanded coverage and standardized essential benefits, these improvements came with a real cost: premiums in the individual market rose sharply in the first several years. Insurers had to cover sicker populations and offer more comprehensive benefits, leading to substantial premium increases for unsubsidized middle-class families. This early cost shock fueled much of the political backlash against the ACA and helped energize the repeal movement.


II. Why Republicans Originally Opposed the ACA

Republicans opposed the ACA for both ideological and structural reasons. They viewed the law as an unprecedented federal intrusion into the health-care marketplace, one that forced insurers to offer government-standardized benefits and compelled individuals to purchase insurance through a mandate. Conservatives argued that these mandates distorted markets, raised premiums for the unsubsidized middle class, and expanded federal authority beyond traditional bounds.

Republicans also viewed Medicaid expansion as financially unsustainable and believed it would trap able-bodied adults in dependency. They argued that the ACA redistributed wealth through taxes on high earners and industries, created new entitlements through subsidies, and imposed costly regulations on employers. In short, to Republicans in the 2010s, the ACA was not a reform—it was an overreach.


III. The ACA’s Market Impact: Early Turbulence, Later Stabilization

The first several years of the ACA were marked by significant volatility. Insurers struggled to price plans because they lacked actuarial data on the newly guaranteed-issue population. Sick individuals enrolled in large numbers; healthy individuals enrolled more slowly. Premiums rose sharply between 2015 and 2017. Several major insurers left state marketplaces, and some rural counties faced the prospect of having only one insurer—or none at all.

The ACA attempted to stabilize markets through three mechanisms: risk corridors, risk adjustment, and reinsurance. But Congress underfunded the risk corridor program, resulting in insurer losses and lawsuits. Reinsurance helped temporarily but expired after three years. Risk adjustment continued to function, but not well enough to offset early turbulence.

However, after the initial shock, the markets stabilized. Premiums leveled off. Insurer participation returned. Marketplace enrollment grew steadily. The Congressional Budget Office reported normalized risk pools. The ACA marketplaces now operate more like mature, regulated utilities than experimental new systems, dramatically reducing the appetite for repeal.

Still, any honest assessment of the ACA must be set against the broader affordability crisis gripping the country. Healthcare and insurance premiums—especially in the individual market—remain among the fastest-rising household expenses in America. Even after the ACA’s markets stabilized, premiums and deductibles remain high for millions of middle-class families who earn too much to qualify for subsidies but too little to comfortably absorb $15,000–$20,000 in annual premiums and out-of-pocket costs. In an era when housing, childcare, transportation, and food are all rising faster than wages, healthcare operates as a second rent payment. The affordability squeeze—felt across red and blue states, among Democrats and Republicans alike—is why the national conversation has shifted from ideological battles over the ACA to a more universal demand for relief. The question shaping the next decade of healthcare will not be repeal or expansion, but whether either party can meaningfully reduce costs for ordinary Americans who feel increasingly crushed by the price of simply staying insured.


IV. Why Repeal Politics Collapsed

The failure of the 2017 repeal attempt marked a turning point. Public opinion had shifted. Millions of Americans now relied on ACA protections, Medicaid expansion, and marketplace subsidies. Parents kept adult children on their plans. Cancer survivors and diabetics could no longer be denied insurance. Small-business owners, gig workers, and early retirees used marketplace coverage as their primary insurance source.

Even deeply conservative states such as Idaho, Utah, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Missouri adopted Medicaid expansion through ballot initiatives—meaning Republican voters themselves demanded ACA benefits that Republican politicians had long opposed.

The political consequences were immediate. In the 2018 midterms, Republicans lost 41 House seats, driven largely by voters afraid of losing health protections. GOP strategists learned that healthcare repeal was electorally toxic. The repeal war ended not only because the ACA grew popular, but because repeal became a guaranteed losing issue.


V. Why Healthcare Is No Longer a GOP Base-Mobilizing Issue

The Republican Party’s priorities shifted dramatically in the post-2017 era. Voters who once mobilized around healthcare turned their focus toward immigration, inflation, crime, energy policy, foreign competition, and cultural issues. Healthcare—complex, technocratic, and incremental—lost its place as a galvanizing cause.

Many Republican voters now benefit from the ACA themselves. Millions rely on marketplace plans, Medicaid expansion, or pre-existing condition protections. Repealing the ACA would harm their own constituencies—something few Republican leaders are willing to risk.

Repeal also failed to inspire base voters in recent cycles. Unlike border policy or inflation concerns, healthcare does not produce the emotional intensity or visual impact that modern political communication depends on. This change in voter psychology removed the grassroots pressure that once energized repeal efforts.


VI. How Republicans Chip Away at the ACA Today

While Republicans no longer seek full repeal, they continue to reshape the ACA in targeted ways.

They push for broader state waivers that allow alternative benefit designs and relaxed regulatory standards. They promote short-term limited-duration plans and association health plans, which offer cheaper premiums by bypassing ACA benefit requirements. They favor Medicaid work requirements and expanded catastrophic insurance options. They advance large Health Savings Accounts and consumer-directed care models. And through regulatory and budgetary strategies, Republican administrations have adjusted subsidy rules, weakened employer mandates, and reduced ACA administrative infrastructure.

These actions do not dismantle the ACA. Instead, they create a parallel market—leaner, cheaper, and more flexible—that slowly shifts healthier consumers away from ACA-regulated plans, subtly weakening certain parts of the law without openly attacking its core.


VII. Republican Alternative Plans: The Record vs. the Myth

One of the most enduring political claims surrounding the ACA is the assertion that Republicans “never offered an alternative.” This narrative persists because the GOP failed to unify behind one plan, not because it lacked them. In reality, Republicans introduced a long list of comprehensive replacement frameworks.

In 2009, before the ACA passed, Senators Tom Coburn and Richard Burr, along with Representatives Paul Ryan and Devin Nunes, introduced the Patients’ Choice Act, which provided universal tax credits, large HSAs, interstate competition, and state-based high-risk pools.

Representative Tom Price followed with the Empowering Patients First Act, introduced in 2010, 2013, and 2015. This bill contained one of the most detailed conservative health architectures ever drafted—built on age-based tax credits, expanded HSAs, insurance deregulation, state innovation grants, and targeted support for high-cost patients.

Between 2013 and 2016, the Republican Study Committee proposed successive replacement models emphasizing catastrophic coverage, tort reform, association health plans, interstate competition, and state-level innovation. In 2015, Rep. Phil Roe introduced America’s Health Care Reform Act, co-sponsored by over 130 Republicans, combining age-based credits with insurance competition and liability reform.

In 2016, Speaker Paul Ryan unveiled A Better Way, the House GOP’s official healthcare blueprint, which proposed age-adjusted credits, Medicaid per-capita caps, and “continuous coverage” rules.

In 2017, the House passed the American Health Care Act—a full repeal-and-replace bill that would have restructured Medicaid, replaced subsidies with age-based credits, and created a large fund for high-risk pools and reinsurance. Though it failed in the Senate, it was a genuine replacement plan.

That same year, Senators Lindsey Graham and Bill Cassidy proposed a state block-grant system that would convert ACA funding into flexible state allocations, allowing states to design systems of their choosing.

Even after repeal failed, Republicans continued offering alternatives through regulatory reform: expanding short-term plans, association plans, price transparency rules, and catastrophic options. The Republican Study Committee later released its Framework for Personalized Health Care, and the developing 2025 “Freedom to Choose Healthcare” outline continues this lineage.

The historical record is clear: Republicans offered many replacement plans. What they lacked was internal consensus, not ideas.


VIII. The New Republican Reality: Reshape, Don’t Repeal

The Republican Party of 2025 accepts what was once unthinkable: the ACA is here to stay. Repeal is no longer desired, viable, or strategically wise. Instead, Republicans aim to bend the ACA toward a more market-driven system—one with broader choice, fewer mandates, more catastrophic options, expanded HSAs, and greater state control.

The battle that once defined the GOP has shifted. The question is no longer whether the ACA will survive, but how it will evolve.


Conclusion

The Affordable Care Act has moved from controversial experiment to enduring institution. Republicans who once sought its destruction now seek its modification and coexistence. The reasons are clear: the ACA’s benefits became popular, its markets stabilized, its protections hardened politically, Republican voters themselves came to rely on it, and other issues rose to dominate the party’s priorities. The GOP did not lose the repeal war because it lacked ideas. It lost because the ACA became too integrated into American life to uproot—and because no single conservative vision could unite the party.

Today, Republicans are not fighting to kill the ACA. They are fighting to influence what comes next. The battle has shifted from repeal to revision, from rejection to adaptation—a quieter, more pragmatic struggle over the future of American healthcare.

Cities at a Crossroads: Understanding the Findings of City Fiscal Conditions 2025

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

With Integrated Texas Analysis and Case Studies

Based on the National League of Cities Report (2025)
(Source: “City Fiscal Conditions 2025” PDF) 2025-City-Fiscal-Conditions-Rep…


Introduction

The City Fiscal Conditions 2025 report arrives at a moment when American cities are quietly but decisively transitioning into a new era of fiscal discipline. For several years after the pandemic, local governments benefited from an unusual combination of strong economic conditions and extraordinary federal aid. Revenue surged as consumers spent aggressively, home values climbed, and the job market reached historic strength. Cities responded by expanding public services, restoring depleted reserves, and tackling long-delayed projects.

But this report makes it clear that the “recovery period” is over. Growth has cooled, inflation remains persistent, and the federal support that once acted as a financial stabilizer is now winding down. The challenge for cities today is not collapse or crisis—it is how to regain balance in a world that feels more constrained, more expensive, and more uncertain than the one they just emerged from.

Texas cities illustrate these national trends with particular force. Their rapid population growth, heavy reliance on sales tax, and strict state revenue limitations make them a lens through which the pressures of this new era can be seen even more sharply.


I. From Rebound to Restraint: A New Phase of Municipal Budgeting

During FY2024, municipal general fund spending rose sharply—up 7.5 percent when adjusted for inflation. This increase was partly the result of postponed investments from the COVID years, when many cities limited expenditures and built reserves. It was also fueled by federal recovery programs such as the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), both of which infused substantial resources into local budgets.

By contrast, FY2025 reflects a deliberate slowing. Spending is still rising, but only by 0.7 percent, suggesting that cities are tightening operations and reassessing priorities. Revenue projections tell the same story: after a healthy 3.9 percent increase in FY2024, cities now expect a 1.9 percent decline for FY2025. This decline is driven largely by the tapering of federal relief funds and the normalization of consumer behavior after several years of unusually high spending.

Texas Context: Revenue Limits Under Rapid Growth

Texas cities feel this shift even more acutely. Most Texas municipalities rely heavily on sales tax revenues, which surged during the post-pandemic boom but have since flattened. When sales activity cools, city budgets weaken immediately because there is no corresponding income tax or other broad-based revenue source to cushion the decline. At the same time, the Texas 3.5 percent State Property Tax Revenue Cap prevents cities from increasing property tax collections to keep pace with population growth, even when new residents significantly increase service demand.

The combination of high growth and tight limits creates a unique challenge. Texas cities are being asked to do more—with policing, fire protection, streets, parks, utilities, and emergency services—while having less flexibility to raise the revenues needed to deliver these services. The national report identifies a slowdown; Texas turns that slowdown into a structural strain.


II. Public Safety: The Dominant and Growing Budget Pressure

Public safety remains the largest and most rapidly expanding area of municipal spending nationwide. In the average U.S. city, it now accounts for over 60 percent of the general fund, up from 54 percent just two years earlier. This includes police, fire, and emergency medical services, all of which have seen rising personnel costs, higher call volumes, increased equipment prices, and greater public expectations.

Other services—such as recreation, parks, culture, libraries, and general government—occupy a much smaller share of the municipal budget. Cities often want to invest in these quality-of-life functions, but the dominant weight of public safety makes this increasingly difficult.

Texas Context: A Perfect Storm of Public Safety Costs

Texas amplifies this national trend. Major Texas cities such as Dallas, Houston, Austin, Fort Worth, and San Antonio routinely spend 60 to 70 percent of their general funds on public safety. Several factors drive this. First, rapid population growth leads to higher 911 call volumes and more complex service demands. Second, Texas has faced serious police recruitment challenges since 2020, prompting cities to increase wages, offer signing bonuses, and add incentives to remain competitive with suburban agencies. Third, hospitals in many Texas metro areas struggle with capacity issues, causing local Fire/EMS departments to handle more medical emergency calls—including mental health-related incidents—which increases staffing and overtime costs.

Taken together, public safety becomes both essential and unavoidable. But it also pushes cities into a corner, leaving less room for parks, street maintenance, libraries, community programs, and long-term capital upkeep. The national report identifies public safety as the dominant expense; in Texas, it is the defining budget reality.


III. Fiscal Confidence Declines

Municipal finance officers across the country report declining confidence. In the survey, 52 percent say they feel better able to meet FY2025 needs than in the prior year—a noticeable drop from previous surveys. Looking ahead to FY2026, only 45 percent express optimism, down sharply from the 64 percent optimism reported a year earlier.
2025-City-Fiscal-Conditions-Rep…

Cities cite inflation, workforce costs, capital needs, and public safety demands as the primary drivers of this sentiment. Inflation has raised the price of everything from asphalt to ambulances. Recruiting employees—particularly equipment operators, utility technicians, IT personnel, police officers, and firefighters—requires higher wages. And a backlog of infrastructure projects, many delayed during the pandemic, continues to grow in scope and cost.

Texas Context: Growth Without Elasticity

Texas cities experience each of these pressures but with added difficulty because their revenue systems are less flexible. A city such as Frisco, McKinney, or Leander may grow by 5–10 percent annually, bringing thousands of new residents who need water, police protection, parks, and roads. Yet the property tax cap prevents revenue from rising at the same pace unless voters approve a tax increase—a difficult political hurdle. Meanwhile, sales taxes can fluctuate unpredictably depending on regional retail activity.

The result is a mismatch: demand expands rapidly, but revenue cannot. The national report describes growing financial caution; Texas cities describe a tightening vise.


Texas Case Studies: How National Trends Become Texas Realities

These case studies are woven here to illustrate the national themes and show how Texas cities embody them with exceptional clarity and scale.


Case Study 1: Dallas

Dallas faces the full spectrum of pressures described in the report. Its infrastructure backlog—including streets, drainage systems, and public facilities—has grown as construction costs rise due to inflation and tariffs. Public safety spending consumes over 60 percent of the general fund, leaving limited room for parks, libraries, and cultural services. In addition, the city’s relationship with Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) has placed new focus on cost allocation practices, as suburban cities question their share of contributions relative to the services they receive.

Taken together, Dallas demonstrates how the national transition from recovery to restraint becomes a difficult balancing act: maintaining essential services, planning long-term capital investments, and managing regional partnerships with limited financial headroom.


Case Study 2: Houston

Houston’s fiscal challenges reveal how structural issues magnify national trends. The city continues to manage large pension obligations for police, fire, and municipal employees—obligations that constrain budget flexibility. At the same time, Houston’s commercial tax base is unusually sensitive to office valuation cycles. Post-pandemic work changes have depressed office demand nationwide, and Houston, with one of the largest office markets in the country, is particularly vulnerable. Sales tax revenues also depend heavily on energy-sector cycles; when oil prices soften, household spending often does as well.

Houston illustrates the report’s warning that cities tied to volatile economic sectors face heightened revenue uncertainty during national fiscal cooling.


Case Study 3: Austin

Austin is one of the fastest-growing cities in the nation. Population growth brings economic strength, but it also drives up demand for water, roads, transit, and public safety faster than revenue can legally expand under Texas law. The city’s ambitious capital plans—including the long-term Project Connect transit system—are deeply affected by construction cost inflation and tariff-driven price increases. Meanwhile, Austin’s hiring environment requires competitive wages to attract talent in a city with a high cost of living.

Austin underscores one of the report’s central themes: rapid growth does not guarantee fiscal ease. In fact, growth can intensify financial pressure when infrastructure needs escalate faster than revenue authority.


Case Study 4: San Antonio

San Antonio has historically maintained one of the most stable fiscal profiles in Texas, but even its disciplined budget faces rising strain. Public safety consumes nearly two-thirds of the general fund, mirroring the national trend. Tourism-driven sales tax revenues softened as consumer habits returned to pre-pandemic patterns. As one of the most military- and federal-contract-dependent cities in the state, San Antonio must continuously monitor federal procurement and tax policy—including potential changes to the municipal bond tax exemption.

San Antonio demonstrates the report’s finding that even stable cities are preparing for leaner years ahead.


Case Study 5: Fort Worth

Fort Worth is the fastest-growing large city in America, and its infrastructure needs are enormous. New neighborhoods require water lines, fire stations, streets, schools, and parks. Inflation and tariffs have raised the cost of steel, heavy equipment, and construction services, making public works significantly more expensive. At the same time, the revenue cap restricts how quickly Fort Worth can scale up funding to match new demand. With sales taxes now flattening, a key engine of local revenue has slowed at exactly the moment the city needs it most.

Fort Worth illustrates the report’s broad conclusion: even cities with extraordinary growth cannot outpace the pressures of rising costs and declining federal support.


IV. Tariffs and Municipal Bond Policy: Watching for External Shocks

Nationally, cities report that tariffs are complicating procurement. Nearly half say tariffs have affected their ability to secure materials or equipment, and some describe major project delays. Tariffs raise the cost of steel, vehicles, water infrastructure components, public safety equipment, and construction materials. When these costs rise, cities often must delay projects, revise budgets, or seek alternative suppliers.

Cities are also closely watching federal discussions about the municipal bond tax exemption. Should the exemption be weakened, the cost of borrowing would rise sharply. Because cities rely heavily on debt to build long-lived infrastructure—roads, water systems, drainage, bridges—the financial impact would be significant.
2025-City-Fiscal-Conditions-Rep…

Texas Context: Higher Exposure

Texas cities—especially large, fast-growing metro areas—would be among the hardest hit by these changes. Their capital programs are enormous, covering everything from freeway interchanges and transit expansions to water treatment plants and flood control systems. If borrowing costs rise, Texas cities would be forced to trim projects, delay improvements, or seek new revenue sources in a system already marked by tight constraints.


V. Tax Sources and a Shifting Economic Base

The report highlights that property taxes are projected to grow modestly while sales taxes level off. Income taxes—where they exist—are expected to decline. Since property taxes lag real-time economic changes by one to three years, cities often experience fiscal conditions later than the private sector.
2025-City-Fiscal-Conditions-Rep…

Texas Context: High Volatility in a Sales-Heavy System

Texas cities, with no income tax option, are uniquely exposed to consumer spending shifts. When retail slows, so do city revenues. This exposure becomes even more pronounced when combined with declining commercial property valuations, which are emerging in major Texas metros as the office market softens. The state’s combination of cyclical industries, rapid development patterns, and legally restricted revenue capacity creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities that align closely with the national findings.


VI. The Broader Narrative: Resilience Through Adaptation

Across the nation, the report shows cities taking proactive steps to manage uncertainty. They are adjusting their budgets, building reserves, planning capital projects more cautiously, and monitoring federal policy developments. Many are exploring domestic supply alternatives, streamlining operations, and prioritizing essential services. The tone is neither pessimistic nor alarmist—it is grounded, realistic, and strategic.

Texas Context: Innovation as Necessity

Texas cities have long relied on creative financial tools to navigate their constrained revenue environment. These include Public Improvement Districts (PID), Tax Increment Reinvestment Zones (TIRZ), Municipal Management Districts (MMD), and Economic Development Corporations (EDC). These tools allow cities to capture value from growth and reinvest it into infrastructure, parks, roads, drainage, and redevelopment projects. Texas cities also maintain some of the strongest financial ratings in the nation due to disciplined reserve policies and long-term planning.

In other words, the very constraints that challenge Texas cities also push them to become some of the most innovative financial stewards in America.


VII. Conclusion: A New Era of Municipal Pragmatism

The City Fiscal Conditions 2025 report captures a decisive moment. Cities across the nation are transitioning from recovery to resilience—from a period defined by federal lifelines to one marked by local decision-making, capital discipline, and an unflinching look at long-term responsibilities. The post-pandemic boom has given way to a quieter, more demanding phase of municipal governance.

Texas cities exemplify this shift even more vividly. They face explosive growth, aging infrastructure, strict revenue constraints, and heavy public safety demands. Yet they continue to innovate and adapt, often serving as national models for fiscal management in high-growth environments.

As the report concludes, cities are not facing an imminent crisis—they are facing a long horizon of disciplined planning. The margin for error may be narrower than before, but the commitment to resilience, adaptability, and pragmatic leadership remains strong. Texas cities, with all their complexity and dynamism, reflect that spirit—and in many ways, illuminate the path forward for the rest of the country.

Key Aspects of School Funding in Texas

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

A Guide to How Schools Are Paid For, Why It Never Feels Like Enough, and the Big Debate Now at Texas’ Doorstep

Public education in Texas is both enormous and intimate. It is a system of more than 1,200 school districts serving nearly 5.5 million children. It is funded by formulas that even experienced administrators struggle to explain, yet it is felt every time a homeowner opens a property tax bill or a teacher receives a paycheck. It is rich in promise, strained by costs, and increasingly defined by political crosscurrents. Texas prides itself on flexibility, local control, and low taxes — but those values continually collide with the financial realities of running schools in a fast-growing, geographically massive state.

This essay maps the entire landscape of school funding in Texas: where the money comes from, how it is distributed, what the Legislature has changed in recent years, how vouchers and property-tax relief affect the system, and why Governor Greg Abbott has embraced the bold and controversial idea of eventually eliminating school property taxes altogether. Whether this vision becomes reality — and what shape the public-school system will take in the next decade — depends on understanding the architecture beneath it.

One truth stands out: Texas cannot fix teacher pay, student achievement, enrollment pressure, recapture, or facilities needs until it confronts the underlying structure of its finance system.


I. Constitutional Foundation: What Texas Promised

All school-funding debates begin with the Texas Constitution, Article VII, which requires the Legislature to establish and maintain an “efficient system of public free schools.” The courts have consistently interpreted “efficient” to mean:

  • equitable across districts
  • fundamentally adequate
  • not dependent on extreme disparities in local wealth

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Edgewood v. Kirby decisions transformed Texas school finance. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that wide disparities between wealthy and poor districts violated the Constitution. To remedy this, the Legislature created recapture, often called “Robin Hood,” a system requiring wealthy districts to send excess local revenue back to the state.

This constitutional framework — equity, adequacy, and local autonomy — continues to shape every reform today.


II. The Three Revenue Streams: Local, State, Federal

Texas school districts rely on three primary revenue sources, but they play very different roles.

1. Local Property Taxes

These are the backbone of school funding. Districts levy:

  • Maintenance & Operations (M&O) tax rates for salaries and day-to-day operations
  • Interest & Sinking (I&S) tax rates for debt on buildings

Local revenue varies dramatically depending on the strength of the tax base.

2. State Funding

State dollars are distributed through the Foundation School Program (FSP). The system uses:

  • a Basic Allotment (BA)
  • adjustments for special-population students via Weighted Average Daily Attendance (WADA)
  • transportation allotments, small district adjustments, and more

If a district cannot raise enough locally to meet its entitlement, the state fills the gap.

3. Federal Funds

These make up roughly 10 percent of district revenue, supporting:

  • Title I
  • IDEA special education
  • school nutrition programs
  • and other targeted mandates

These funds help but are not the backbone of Texas school finance.


III. How Texas Calculates Funding: Tier I and Tier II

Texas uses a tiered structure.

Tier I — The Foundation Program

This ensures a minimum educational program for every student through:

  • Basic Allotment × WADA
  • special-population weights
  • transportation
  • small/midsize adjustments

Tier II — Local Enrichment

Districts can raise additional M&O pennies called golden pennies and copper pennies.

  • Golden pennies: high yield, not subject to recapture
  • Copper pennies: lower yield, recaptured above wealth thresholds

Most enrichment beyond the compressed rate requires voter approval through a VATRE.


IV. Recapture: The Equalizer Few Love but Courts Demand

Recapture exists because property values vary wildly across Texas. Districts with high property wealth per WADA (often due to mineral values or commercial tax bases) generate far more revenue per penny than property-poor districts.

The formula is simple:

When local wealth per WADA exceeds the Equalized Wealth Level, the surplus must be recaptured.

It is politically controversial but constitutionally necessary.

Districts like Austin ISD — wealthy tax bases but high needs — often pay recapture amounts far larger than their own programmatic flexibility would prefer. Meanwhile, rural or urban property-poor districts rely heavily on these equalized dollars.


V. Texas in the National Landscape

Texas educates one of the largest student bodies in the nation yet consistently ranks in the lower third for per-pupil spending. Factors include:

  • rapid population growth
  • inflation decreasing the value of the Basic Allotment
  • aging facilities in older districts
  • special-education obligations that exceed state reimbursement

The teacher-retention crisis reflects these funding pressures directly.


VI. Vouchers and Education Savings Accounts (ESAs)

The introduction of ESAs in 2025 marked a structural shift. These accounts divert state dollars to private education options. Crucially:

  • ESA dollars are removed before school-finance formulas operate
  • which reduces the total funding pool for public education
  • and increases the state’s long-term cost obligations

Supporters emphasize choice; critics highlight the impact on district resources.


VII. Tax Compression and Homestead Exemptions

Texas has repeatedly compressed school M&O tax rates — most dramatically in 2006 and again in 2019 under HB 3. Recent constitutional amendments increased homestead exemptions and compressed rates further.

This means:

  • homeowners feel relief
  • but the state must backfill more revenue
  • and state obligations grow exponentially over time

If the economy slows, the state may struggle to maintain these commitments.


VIII. Governor Abbott’s Proposal: Eliminate School Property Taxes

Governor Abbott has stated he wants Texas to eliminate school property taxes completely. This would shift the largest funding mechanism for public schools to:

  • sales taxes
  • consumption-based alternatives
  • growth revenue
  • or new statewide tax instruments

This raises critical questions:

  • How do we preserve local control?
  • How do we ensure equity across 1,200+ districts?
  • What happens in recessions?
  • How do ESAs interact with a fully state-funded system?

It is the most ambitious tax proposal in modern Texas history.


IX. Where Funding Pressures Are Felt Most

Teacher Pay

Texas trails the national average, especially in large urban districts.

Special Education

State funding does not cover true required costs; districts subsidize heavily.

Facilities

Older urban districts face major reinvestment needs, while fast-growth suburban districts must build rapidly.

Operational Costs

Inflation affects utilities, transportation, insurance, and program expenses.

Across Texas, educational needs are rising faster than revenue.


X. Adequacy and Equity in a Changing State

Texas is now more:

  • urban
  • suburban
  • economically diverse
  • demographically complex

than at any point in its history.

Equity concerns involve not just property wealth but:

  • disability status
  • rural decline
  • special-population needs
  • enrollment patterns

Ensuring adequacy will require updating the Basic Allotment and adjusting cost structures to reflect modern realities.


XI. What a Stable System Would Require

A modern, stable school finance system would include:

  • indexing the Basic Allotment to true local inflation (can be much higher than the national headline inflation!)
  • meaningful local discretion without destabilizing equity
  • predictable state funding even in downturns
  • sustainable integration of ESA costs
  • adequate support for special-population students
  • transparent outcomes and accountability

Without long-term structural reforms, Texas will continue to struggle with volatility.


XII. The Elephant in the Room

Every major issue — teacher pay, property taxes, recapture, ESAs, special education, enrollment shifts — all trace back to one fundamental question:

How does Texas choose to fund its schools?

Until the state updates this architecture for a 21st-century population, every subsequent debate will remain a patch on an aging foundation.


APPENDIX A — Key Definitions and Formula Explanations

Basic Allotment (BA): foundational per-student funding.
Weighted Average Daily Attendance (WADA): adjusts attendance for special-population weights.
M&O Tax Rate: used for daily operations.
I&S Tax Rate: used for bond repayment and facilities.
Tier I: baseline program funded by state and local revenue.
Tier II: enrichment funding through local discretion (golden and copper pennies).
Golden Pennies: high-yield pennies, free from recapture.
Copper Pennies: enrichment pennies subject to recapture.
Foundation School Program (FSP): state’s primary funding system.
Equalized Wealth Level (EWL): recapture threshold.
Recapture: excess local property wealth reclaimed by the state.
ESA: Education Savings Account for private schooling.
Tax Compression: state-mandated lowering of local M&O rates.


APPENDIX B — Major Historical Milestones in Texas School Finance

Late 1800s–1950s: Foundation of statewide public education; wide funding disparities.
1989–1995 (Edgewood era): Courts declare system unconstitutional; recapture created.
2006: HB 1 compresses tax rates after West Orange-Cove.
2019 (HB 3): Major reform expanding Tier II, adjusting weights, compressing M&O rates.
2023–2025: Homestead-tax changes; continued compression; ESAs approved; funding obligations expand.


APPENDIX C — Data Landscape & Current Funding Realities

Texas spends below the national average per pupil. Recapture exceeds $3 billion yearly.
Districts across Texas experience:

  • fast-growth facility pressures
  • rural staffing shortages
  • urban aging infrastructure
  • special education obligations beyond state reimbursement
  • recapture obligations that limit program flexibility

Teacher turnover is high, especially in high-need districts.

Despite GDP strength, education funding levels struggle to keep pace with demographic realities.


APPENDIX D — Policy Options, Trade-Offs, and Pathways Forward

1. Index the Basic Allotment to inflation

Maintains purchasing power and stabilizes district operations.

2. Reform recapture but preserve equity

Consider raising EWL thresholds or adjusting guaranteed yields
while still ensuring a constitutionally “efficient” system.

3. Provide recession-proof state support

Create rainy-day triggers that stabilize district budgets during economic downturns.

4. Integrate ESAs into long-term fiscal planning

Ensure private-education subsidies do not undermine district stability or local control.

5. Support special-population students adequately

Reevaluate weights for bilingual, special education, and compensatory education.

6. Rebalance state–local responsibility

Clarify long-term commitments given rapid local tax-base shifts.

7. Increase transparency and public accountability

Build trust in allocation decisions and avoid opaque formula adjustments.

APPENDIX E — Top 100 Districts Paying Recapture Amounts.

Rethinking Disaster Relief in America

Why States Can Absorb More—and Why the Federal Government Should Become a True Backstop

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

Introduction

For decades, disaster relief in America has operated under a familiar assumption: states cannot reliably handle the financial shock of natural disasters, so the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) must stand ready as the first and primary payer whenever storms, fires, floods, or earthquakes strike. This model dates back to 1979, when President Jimmy Carter created FEMA to consolidate civil defense and disaster-response functions into a single federal agency. After the attacks of September 11th, FEMA was folded into the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, broadening its responsibilities and cementing its role as the nation’s manager of both large and routine emergencies.

Yet the fiscal and operational landscape has changed sharply since those foundational decisions. States today maintain much stronger budgets, far deeper rainy-day reserves, more diversified revenue sources, and more mature emergency-management agencies than they had in the late twentieth century. Meanwhile, FEMA itself has grown increasingly bureaucratic, with administrative costs rising from around 9 percent of disaster spending in the early 1990s to roughly 18 percent between 1989 and 2011, and often exceeding its own internal cost targets. The agency has become indispensable in catastrophic cases but inefficient and slow in everyday ones.

This white paper examines whether FEMA must continue to function as a first-dollar payer, or whether a more modern system would assign routine responsibilities to states and reserve federal involvement for extreme, budget-threatening disasters. What emerges is a surprising conclusion backed by hard data: most states can, in fact, absorb the disaster costs FEMA typically covers, which ranged from 0.41 percent to 5.58 percent of state spending in the 2022–2024 period, with a national average of 1.19 percent. At the same time, states have median rainy-day reserves equal to 13–14 percent of their general-fund spending, and many maintain reserves far larger than that.

The implication is profound. FEMA is essential for rare catastrophic events—but its role as the payer of routine disaster bills imposes high overhead and creates slow, inefficient recovery cycles. This paper lays out a new model in which states pay their own ordinary disaster costs up to a clear percentage of their budgets, and the federal government becomes a streamlined, formula-driven backstop above that threshold. The goal is to reduce federal bureaucracy, preserve national capacity for massive events, and match responsibilities to the actual fiscal capabilities of states today.


I. FEMA’s Role and the Growth of Federal Disaster Spending

When FEMA was created in 1979, the federal government consolidated more than 100 disparate disaster- and civil-defense programs. Its newer home in the Department of Homeland Security expanded its remit, placing it at the center of national preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. Through its Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), FEMA has spent approximately $347 billion (in 2022 dollars) over the past three decades, with more than half of that total coming after 2005 as disasters increased in frequency and severity.

Despite the DRF’s historic role in major recovery efforts—Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Harvey, and Maria being among the most notable—the agency has become known for slow reimbursements, multi-year project closeouts, and a documentation system so complex that many counties wait months or even years to recover funds already expended. A single North Carolina county spent more on debris removal after Hurricane Helene than its entire annual budget and waited over a year without full reimbursement, a pattern familiar to many local governments.

Yet reliance on FEMA is not uniform across the country. Some states receive enormous federal aid in catastrophic years; others receive relatively little even across multiple years. It is only by understanding this distribution that a reformed model can be imagined.


II. How Dependent Are States on FEMA? Quantifying the Financial Exposure

The best picture of ongoing reliance comes from the 2022–2024 FEMA obligations dataset, which compared how much FEMA spent in each state to that state’s total expenditures. The findings provide a clear map of how deeply—or how little—states depend on the agency in routine years.

A. National Average

Across all fifty states, FEMA obligations equaled only 1.19 percent of total state spending. This means that for the average state, FEMA’s typical-year disaster role is fiscally small—a burden that could, in principle, be absorbed using normal budget tools without major restructuring.

B. Most FEMA-dependent states (recent years)

Though the national average is small, some states exhibit higher FEMA reliance:

  • Louisiana: 5.58% of total state spending
  • Florida: 4.39%
  • Montana: 3.91%
  • New York: 2.44%
  • Vermont: 2.14%
  • Virginia: 1.72%
  • Alaska: 1.71%
  • Rhode Island: 1.70%
  • Hawaii: 1.60%
  • Colorado: 1.58%

Importantly, even in these “higher exposure” states, the FEMA share of total expenditures remains well below the rainy-day reserves most states currently hold.

C. Least FEMA-dependent states

At the other end:

  • Nevada: 0.41% of state spending
  • Wyoming: 0.48%
  • Oklahoma: 0.58%

For these states, FEMA’s role is nearly negligible as a share of governmental revenue.

D. The catastrophic-year exception

These routine-year percentages mask an important truth: when disasters like Katrina or major multi-storm years hit, federal aid can reach staggering proportions. Pew’s long-term analysis showed that Louisiana’s federal disaster aid approached 19 percent of its general-fund spending in one extreme year. Such rare events are the moments where federal backstop capacity is crucial.

The real message in the data is this: states can handle the predictable; they cannot self-insure the catastrophic.


III. States’ Rainy-Day Funds: A Strong Foundation for a New Model

As federal disaster costs have grown, so too has state fiscal strength. Over the last decade, state rainy-day funds—formally called Budget Stabilization Funds—have reached historic highs.

  • Total U.S. state rainy-day funds (FY 2024): $158 billion
  • Total general-fund spending (FY 2024): $1.29 trillion
  • Median rainy-day balance: ~13–14 percent of general-fund expenditures
  • Some states far exceed that median:
    • Texas holds reserves equal to ~18 percent of annual general-fund spending.
    • Wyoming holds reserves equal to nearly 70 percent.
    • California’s reserve system in 2022 accounted for nearly half of all rainy-day dollars nationwide.

These figures dwarf the routine-year FEMA exposure numbers. For example, Florida’s FEMA dependence at 4.39 percent of spending is overshadowed by its double-digit rainy-day reserves. Montana’s 3.91 percent figure fits comfortably against the national 13–14 percent median. Even Louisiana, at 5.58 percent, can theoretically cover such costs with existing reserves in a typical year.

This means that the primary fiscal justification for FEMA as a first-dollar payer has largely evaporated; states now have mature financial defenses that simply did not exist decades ago.


IV. FEMA’s Bureaucracy Cost: The Inefficient Load-Bearing Wall

The financial problem with FEMA is not simply the cost of disaster payments—it is the cost of administering them. GAO’s multi-decade analyses show a clear historical trend:

  • In the early 1990s, FEMA’s administrative costs averaged about 9 percent of disaster spending.
  • From 1989 to 2011, the average nearly doubled to around 18 percent.
  • Many small- and medium-scale disasters exceeded FEMA’s own internal administrative-cost targets—which ranged from 8 percent to 20 percent depending on disaster size.

These numbers mean that for every $1 billion in disaster assistance, taxpayers may be funding $120 million to $180 million in federal overhead.

This inefficiency is not due solely to waste; it is structural. The current FEMA reimbursement system:

  • requires extensive documentation for thousands of separate projects;
  • demands eligibility reviews, re-reviews, appeals, closeouts, and audits;
  • relies on multi-year case management;
  • burdens counties that must front millions of dollars;
  • often requires several rounds of resubmission for small technical errors.

The system is built for granular reimbursement, not for speed, clarity, or administrative efficiency.

Any serious reform must begin with this reality: FEMA’s overhead is too high for routine work but entirely justified for rare catastrophic events.


V. A New Structure: State-First Responsibility with a Federal Safety Net Above a Threshold

The empirical question—whether states can absorb FEMA’s typical yearly costs—has been answered by the data: yes, they can. What states cannot absorb are the extreme, once-in-a-generation events that create fiscal shocks exceeding 10–20 percent of a budget year.

A modernized system should reflect this difference.

A. States handle their own disaster costs up to a fixed percentage of their budget

A clear and uniform rule could be adopted nationwide:

A state must cover disaster-related costs up to 3 percent of its prior-year general-fund expenditures before federal aid begins.

This threshold is intentionally set:

  • above the national FEMA-reliance average (1.19%);
  • above most moderate-exposure states’ reliance;
  • below the high-exposure states’ routine-year experience (3.91–5.58%);
  • and well within median rainy-day capacity.

This requirement is neither punitive nor unrealistic. It simply aligns responsibility with the fiscal strength states have already built.

B. States rely on rainy-day reserves and disaster accounts first

States already use a mix of rainy-day funds, disaster funds, supplemental appropriations, and budget flexibility to manage emergencies. In a reformed model, these existing tools would be applied in a structured, predictable sequence—not in political improvisation after the fact.

C. The federal government acts only as a high-threshold backstop

Once a state’s disaster costs exceed the 3 percent trigger, the federal government intervenes. For truly catastrophic years—costs exceeding 10 or 15 percent of state general-fund spending—the federal share could increase to 90 or even 95 percent.

This preserves national solidarity for the events no state can manage alone, while eliminating unnecessary federal entanglement in predictable, lower-level disasters.

D. Federal overhead is reduced dramatically

Under the backstop model, the federal government would only process a small number of large, formula-based payments rather than tens of thousands of reimbursement claims. This change alone could reduce federal overhead from the current 13–18 percent range to 3–5 percent, freeing substantial tax dollars for actual recovery work.


VI. Why a State-First, Federal-Backstop Model Is the Right Path Forward

A system in which states handle ordinary disasters and the federal government protects against the extraordinary aligns perfectly with the fiscal and operational realities of the 2020s.

For states, this model restores autonomy and incentivizes better land-use planning, improved mitigation, and more responsible financial preparation. It also removes the long bureaucratic delays associated with FEMA reimbursements, which often burden local governments more than the disasters themselves.

For the federal government, the model offers clarity and efficiency. Instead of struggling to administer thousands of granular projects—including small-dollar repairs that should never have been federalized—the national government can focus its resources on high-impact events, surge capacity, interstate coordination, and macro-level resilience.

For taxpayers, the new model promises a better mix of value and protection. Money that once funded administrative overhead can instead flow to recovery. At the same time, Americans maintain confidence that when the unimaginable occurs—a Katrina, a California megaquake, a Category 5 storm impacting two states simultaneously—the nation remains ready.


Conclusion

The debate around eliminating FEMA has often been framed as a choice between total federal withdrawal and the continuation of an increasingly bureaucratic status quo. The data, however, points to a more balanced and responsible path. Most states rely on FEMA for only 1 to 2 percent of their total spending in typical disaster years. Even the states with higher exposure—Louisiana at 5.58 percent, Florida at 4.39 percent, and Montana at 3.91 percent—retain rainy-day reserves far larger than these amounts. With median rainy-day balances now reaching 13 to 14 percent of general-fund spending, the financial capacity to absorb routine disaster costs already exists at the state level.

At the same time, the extreme years—the years where total federal disaster aid climbs into double digits as a share of a state’s budget—prove unequivocally that a national safety net remains essential. No state can self-fund a shock approaching one-fifth of its general fund, as Louisiana once experienced. In those moments, the federal government must still be the guardian of last resort.

The most effective reform lies in between: eliminate FEMA’s role as the payer of first resort and reshape the federal role into a streamlined backstop triggered only when a state’s disaster costs exceed a fixed percentage of its budget—3 percent being the most logical threshold. This shift would dramatically reduce federal overhead, accelerate recovery timelines, clarify responsibilities, reward mitigation, and ensure that the nation’s full strength remains available when true catastrophe strikes.

In short, the future of American disaster management should not be FEMA everywhere or FEMA nowhere. It should be FEMA where it matters most, and a state-first model where it does not. This approach honors both fiscal responsibility and national solidarity, and it reflects the actual capabilities of states today—capabilities strong enough to shoulder their own burdens, and a nation still strong enough to stand with them when those burdens become too great.

The One-Page Fix That Costs a Thousand Pages to Execute:

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

Why Good Intentions Make Bad Laws When Enforcement Is an Afterthought

Every society faces moments of shock: a fire that traps a family behind burglar bars, a child injured by a defective product, a tragedy on a highway that could have been prevented. In the aftermath, the public demands that leaders take action. Elected officials, caught between moral responsibility and political pressure, reach for the fastest tool available — a new law. Something must be done. And too often, that “something” becomes a one-page ordinance drafted in the heat of the moment, written more out of outrage than out of careful design.

The universal political problem is not that lawmakers lack compassion or sincerity. The problem is the widespread illusion that a simple rule on paper automatically translates into a solution in real life. The moment we shift from the writing of a law to the carrying out of it, the entire landscape changes. Costs appear. Complexity expands. Enforcement becomes slow, difficult, and expensive. The people whom the rule was meant to protect often end up carrying financial or administrative burdens that no one anticipated. And the government itself becomes vulnerable when it fails to follow through.


The Fire, the Burglar Bars, and the One-Page Rule

A tragic fire in a home offers a perfect example. Smoke fills a hallway, flames rise, and a family cannot escape because the house has fixed burglar bars welded into place decades earlier. The heartbreak is immediate and raw. City leaders respond swiftly. Within days, a simple new ordinance is passed requiring that all burglar bars have an interior quick-release mechanism. The rule is one sentence long. It seems humane, obvious, and urgent.

But the unseen consequences emerge almost immediately. Many older homes have bars so firmly welded that retrofitting them requires grinding, re-cropping, and re-anchoring — a major metalworking project that costs far more than homeowners expect. Thousands of residences suddenly need professional work, and installation prices spike because demand overwhelms supply. Inspectors who were already stretched thin must now visit property after property, unsure whether they should enforce the rule retroactively, gradually, or with some form of grace period. Elderly residents, fixed-income families, and absentee landlords all face the same problem: they cannot comply quickly, and in many cases, they cannot afford to comply at all.

What began as a compassionate one-page fix turns into a months- or years-long administrative and enforcement burden. The good intention remains, but the machinery required to turn that intention into reality simply was not considered.

And this same pattern repeats itself in city halls across the country.


Other Cases Where a Simple Rule Created Complex Enforcement

Consider smoke detector mandates, which often follow a fatal fire. The ordinance usually states that all homes must have working smoke detectors in certain locations. It sounds like a straightforward safety measure. But in older houses without existing wiring, even a basic battery-powered unit may not be enough to meet the fire code. Landlords must retrofit dozens of apartments at their own expense, often discovering that chirping detectors lead tenants to remove the batteries, leaving the owner liable. Inspectors, already responsible for restaurant checks, rental registrations, and fire lane reviews, suddenly face a tripled workload just to verify compliance. A rule that looked effortless on paper becomes a citywide logistical challenge.

A similar situation arises with ADA-compliant handicap parking spaces at older businesses. A short ordinance may require every business to provide at least one properly sized and striped space. On paper, it is a hallmark of accessibility and fairness. But many small storefronts built decades ago have parking lots too narrow to meet the required dimensions without removing all other usable parking. Simple striping becomes an expensive project involving repaving, regrading, and reconfiguring the entire lot. Small business owners, already struggling with rent and utilities, find themselves facing thousands of dollars in unplanned costs. The city, meanwhile, must process waves of variance requests, appeals, and inspections — none of which were contemplated in the original vote.

Short-term rental regulations — the Airbnbs and VRBOs of the world — also illustrate this point well. Cities often pass two-page ordinances requiring hosts to register, meet safety standards, and pay a modest fee. But enforcement becomes a technological and legal minefield. Identifying unregistered properties requires ongoing web-scraping, sophisticated tracking tools, and interdepartmental coordination. Noise complaints surge. Neighborhoods push back. Large corporate rental companies hire attorneys to challenge citations. What seemed like a simple licensing rule becomes a multi-year enforcement project that consumes far more staff time than anticipated.

Plastic bag bans follow the same pattern. A half-page ordinance prohibits thin plastic bags at retail counters. It appears clean and elegant. But stores quickly switch to thicker bags that still count as plastic, just technically meet the law. Small retailers struggle with the cost of paper or reusable bags. Inspectors must decide which kinds of plastic sleeves, produce bags, and delivery packaging are exempt — a process that often requires issuing clarifying memos and amendments. A symbolic environmental gesture becomes a regulatory tangle.

Even texting-while-driving laws, which seem universally logical, reveal the same problem. Officers must determine whether a driver was texting, dialing, using GPS, or simply holding the phone. Proving intent becomes a courtroom battle. Defense attorneys argue privacy issues, argue that GPS use is protected, or claim the driver was simply moving the phone out of the sun. The law, though well-intentioned, is far easier to write than to enforce fairly.

Fire sprinkler retrofit mandates in older apartment complexes are another classic case. After a tragic fire, a city requires that all older buildings install sprinklers. But the cost per unit can run between six and ten thousand dollars, a financial shock that owners cannot absorb without raising rent sharply or closing the property. Inspectors cannot keep up with the inspections, owners beg for extensions, and cities often quietly delay or soften the rule because the housing market cannot handle the immediate impact. Again, the intent is noble; the implementation is overwhelming.

Even drought-triggered lawn-watering restrictions illustrate the same dynamic. A simple rule allows watering only on certain days. But enforcing the rule requires inspectors driving around at dawn or dusk, when sprinklers actually run. Complex irrigation systems malfunction. Elderly residents forget their watering day and unintentionally violate the rule. Neighbors call code enforcement on each other. What seems like a routine drought-management law turns into a delicate exercise in neighborhood diplomacy and enforcement discretion.


The Biggest Cost of All: When the City Gets Sued for Not Enforcing Its Own Laws

Beyond installation costs, administrative burdens, and inspector workloads lies an even greater consequence — one so significant that cities often hesitate to speak of it openly. When a city passes a law and then fails to monitor or enforce it, the government can find itself in the middle of lawsuits alleging negligence, indifference, or failure to uphold its own safety standards.

Courts sometimes treat a safety ordinance as a kind of promise. When a city requires smoke detectors, quick-release bars, ADA access, sprinkler systems, or short-term rental safety checks, it creates a public expectation that these rules will not merely exist on paper but will be enforced. When tragedy occurs — a fire in a unit the city never inspected, a crime at a short-term rental the city never registered, an accident in a business that never complied with parking mandates — attorneys do not hesitate to include the city in the lawsuit.

The legal cost of defending these cases can dwarf the cost of implementing the rule in the first place. Years of depositions, expert testimony, and appeals drain city budgets. Settlements are quietly negotiated because the cost of fighting is even higher. And the political consequences are severe. Newspaper headlines do not say, “City Struggled With Limited Staff Resources.” They say, “City Failed to Enforce Safety Law Before Deadly Fire.” Even when enforcement lapses are rooted in budget constraints or administrative overload, the public sees only that the city wrote a rule it did not uphold.

This is the deepest irony: the cost of not enforcing an ordinance can be higher — sometimes exponentially higher — than the cost of enforcing it.


Why Governments Keep Repeating This Mistake

This dynamic repeats itself across time and geography. The reason is simple. Writing a law is fast; enforcing it is slow. Writing a law is cheap; enforcing it is expensive. Writing a law is politically satisfying; enforcing a law is administratively difficult. And writing a law happens at the height of emotion, when a tragedy is fresh and the public clamors for action, whereas enforcement occurs quietly, day after day, long after public attention has moved on.

Legislators legislate. Administrators administer. Budgets lag. And the machinery required to implement a rule rarely matches the emotion that produced it. The one-page fix becomes a long-term burden, often borne by people who were never considered in the original debate.


What Good Governance Would Require

A better, healthier way of governing would pair every urgent rule with a sober and realistic analysis of what it will take to make that rule real. That means identifying who will carry out the inspections, how long the work will take, what it will cost residents and businesses, how the city will fund the enforcement, how exceptions will be handled, and how the rule will be revisited after the initial surge of compliance. Good policy demands a slower, steadier rhythm than the rapid political impulse that produces these one-page solutions. It requires clarity, patience, and a willingness to acknowledge complexity.


The Universal Lesson

Whether the issue is burglar bars, smoke detectors, ADA parking, short-term rentals, sprinkler systems, plastic bags, or drought-time watering schedules, the pattern is the same. The simpler the law looks on paper, the more complicated it becomes in the real world. The true work of government is not the drafting of a sentence but the building of the machinery behind that sentence.

Until policymakers take the time to consider the cost, the complexity, the staff workload, and the legal exposure that follow every new ordinance, we will continue to pass rules that feel good in the moment yet falter when confronted with the realities of implementation. A tragedy may demand action, but action must be grounded in humility — the humility to recognize that real-world solutions require more than good intentions. They require the discipline to think through the entire life cycle of a law, from its birth in crisis to its long-term enforcement in the quiet, everyday life of a city.

When a Reopening Bill Isn’t Really a Reopening Bill (Updated Nov 10th)

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI


I. The Headlines vs. the Fine Print

When the Shutdown Fairness Act (S. 3012) first appeared on news tickers, it sounded like the long-awaited solution to the nation’s longest government shutdown on record. “Senate Moves to Restore Federal Pay,” the headlines proclaimed, and for a moment, optimism broke through weeks of gridlock. Markets climbed, pundits nodded, and weary federal employees allowed themselves a cautious breath of hope.

But headlines have a way of simplifying what the legislative text complicates. Once the fine print emerged, it became clear: this bill didn’t reopen the government — it merely papered over the pain.


II. What the Bill Actually Does

The Shutdown Fairness Act, introduced in October 2025, provides appropriations for pay and allowances of “excepted employees” — those federal workers already required to report to duty during a lapse in funding (TSA agents, border patrol, air traffic controllers, etc.).

It also extends coverage to certain contractors who directly support those workers, a gesture meant to include the unseen workforce that keeps critical operations running during crises. On paper, that’s progress. But beneath that headline, several key limitations emerge:

  1. It doesn’t fund the government. Agencies remain closed, programs remain suspended, and the rest of the workforce remains furloughed.
  2. It transfers discretion to executive branch appointees — the bill empowers each agency head to determine who qualifies as “excepted,” effectively giving the President sweeping authority to decide who gets paid and who doesn’t.
  3. It blurs accountability. By easing the pressure on both parties while keeping the government officially shut, the bill risks normalizing shutdowns as a recurring political tactic rather than a national emergency.

In short, it treats the symptoms without curing the disease.


III. The Politics Behind the Vote

On November 8, 2025, the Senate voted 53 to 43 to advance the bill — seven votes short of the 60 needed to overcome the filibuster.

Republicans uniformly supported it, framing the legislation as an act of compassion for unpaid federal workers. Democrats, however, largely opposed it, citing both structural and ethical concerns. They argued that the bill gave too much unilateral power to the executive branch and failed to address the broader shutdown itself.

Still, a few cracks appeared in the Democratic wall.

  • John Fetterman (D-PA), who had already sided with Republicans in calling for a “clean reopening,” stayed consistent with his prior votes.
  • Raphael Warnock and Jon Ossoff (both D-GA) and Ben Ray Luján (D-NM) broke ranks for the first time, voting yes. Their explanation: the prolonged hardship on federal workers and contractors in their states had become intolerable.

These defections didn’t change the outcome, but they did change the temperature. For the first time in over a month, the Senate’s political map showed visible strain.


IV. Why the Bill Fell Short

The problem wasn’t the intention; it was the architecture.

While restoring pay for “excepted employees” sounds reasonable, the bill’s narrow scope meant that most of the government would remain frozen. Museums would stay dark. Grant reviews would stay paused. Routine operations — from the EPA to housing vouchers — would stay idle.

Worse, by selectively paying some workers, the bill threatened to dull the political urgency that historically forces compromise. If the pain of a shutdown is eased but not ended, there’s less incentive for lawmakers to fix the underlying appropriations impasse. In effect, it could have turned a temporary failure into a tolerable new normal.

That’s why Democrats — even many moderate ones — balked. Supporting the bill might have looked compassionate, but it risked legitimizing shutdowns as a viable governing tool.


V. The Market Misread

Wall Street, as usual, traded first and read later.

Stock futures jumped after headlines announced “Senate Votes to Restore Federal Pay.” The S&P 500 futures rose about 0.5%, the Nasdaq 0.7%, and the Dow about 135 points — all on the hope that this meant a full reopening was near.

But the fine print cooled that optimism. Analysts realized the Shutdown Fairness Act wasn’t a reopening bill at all; it was a partial relief measure. By Sunday evening, futures flattened, and analysts described the move as “hope without foundation.”

Markets crave certainty, not theater — and the Senate had offered more of the latter than the former.


VI. What This Reveals About Governance

The deeper story isn’t just about one bill. It’s about how governing by crisis has become the new normal. Each year, shutdowns are handled less like emergencies and more like bargaining tools. And each time Congress tries to mitigate their effects without fixing their cause, the precedent hardens.

The Shutdown Fairness Act offered temporary fairness — but at the cost of long-term accountability. It tried to make a shutdown less painful instead of making one less possible.


VII. A Final Thought

Sometimes the measure of good governance is not what’s easy to pass, but what’s honest to reject. Senators who voted no weren’t denying workers their pay; they were resisting a bill that risked institutionalizing dysfunction.

The Shutdown Fairness Act was born of good intentions and bad timing. It addressed hunger without restoring work, anxiety without restoring trust.

The government doesn’t need another half-measure; it needs a full reopening and a return to the quiet, unglamorous work of budgeting like adults. Until then, the shutdown may end, but the crisis of governance continues.


Appendix: A Realistic but Positive Scenario for Full Reopening

If this standoff ultimately leads to a genuine reopening, the most realistic yet hopeful path looks something like this:


1. A Face-Saving Compromise That Works

Both sides inch toward a short-term continuing resolution (45–60 days) to reopen government fully. Republicans agree to move the health-insurance subsidy debate to a separate track, while Democrats accept temporary funding without policy riders. Each side can claim victory: Republicans restore normal operations; Democrats protect core programs.


2. Confidence and Functionality Return

  • Federal employees get their paychecks and dignity back.
  • Markets rebound as predictability returns.
  • Public sentiment steadies as Washington finally behaves like Washington used to — imperfect but functional.

3. Structural Reform Momentum

In the aftermath, moderates on both sides revive shutdown-prevention proposals:

  • Automatic continuing resolutions to prevent future lapses.
  • No budget, no pay for lawmakers who fail to act.
  • Transparency rules requiring agencies to publish contingency plans.

These modest but meaningful steps make shutdowns rarer and shorter.


4. Economic Recovery and Civic Reset

As contracts resume and delayed data flows again, the economy catches its breath. Federal projects restart, local grants flow, and household spending normalizes.
The political temperature cools just enough for leaders to reconsider governing as service rather than spectacle.


5. The Quiet Victory

A reopened government, a calmer public, and a Congress reminded of its duty — that’s the attainable, not utopian, win.

The crisis will have hurt, but it will also have humbled.

If lawmakers learn from it, the Shutdown Fairness Act might ultimately be remembered not for what it failed to do, but for what it forced others to finally fix.


Update — November 10, 2025

In the days since this essay was written, the Senate advanced a continuing resolution (CR) by a 60–40 vote — the first credible step toward ending the historic shutdown. The measure would fund the government through January 30, 2026, while granting full-year appropriations for a few essential agencies such as Veterans Affairs and Agriculture. In return, Republicans agreed to schedule a separate December vote on extending the Affordable Care Act subsidies — the core Democratic demand that helped trigger the impasse in the first place.

For now, this deal signals relief: agencies could reopen, workers could return, and markets have already priced in a modest rebound. But it’s still a temporary armistice, not a peace treaty. The same structural fragilities remain — partisan brinkmanship, dependence on continuing resolutions, and a budgeting system that governs by countdown clock.

If the CR passes both chambers and is signed, the lights will come back on in Washington — but they may flicker again soon. By early 2026, Congress will once more face another funding cliff, another negotiation, and another test of will.

In other words, this crisis may be ending — but the next one is already on the calendar.

The Socialist Experiment in New York City: Vision Meets Fiscal Reality

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

Introduction

The election of a mayor in New York City who identifies as a democratic socialist signals a dramatic shift in the city’s political narrative. Proposals such as fare-free public transit, universal childcare, city-run grocery stores, and rent freezes have energized supporters who see them as necessary correctives to inequality and high living costs.

Yet beneath that enthusiasm lies a more sobering arithmetic: the city’s finances are already tight, its labor and pension obligations immense, and its economy increasingly dependent on a shrinking number of high-income taxpayers. The balance between compassion and solvency — between vision and viability — will determine whether this new era becomes an urban renewal or a fiscal unraveling.


I. New York City’s Financial Context

The latest Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (FY 2025) shows that the city closed the year with revenues of $117.66 billion and expenditures of $117.69 billion — essentially a balanced budget achieved by drawing modestly from restricted funds. After adjustments, a small $5 million surplus was credited to the Rainy Day Fund, raising it to $1.97 billion.

This appears healthy until one examines the trend lines. The City Comptroller and State Comptroller both forecast out-year deficits of $2.6 billion in FY 2026, widening to $7–10 billion by FY 2028–29. Pension obligations remain enormous despite an 89 percent funded ratio, labor costs are escalating, and COVID-era federal funds have largely expired.

In other words, New York is balancing its budget in a good year with almost no margin for error. A downturn, a real-estate correction, or an over-ambitious spending spree could easily tip it back into the red.


II. The Socialist Policy Agenda

The mayor’s policy wish-list targets affordability at its roots:

  • Free or low-cost mass transit
  • Universal childcare and pre-K
  • City-operated grocery stores in food deserts
  • Expanded tenant protections and rent freezes
  • Greater municipal ownership of infrastructure

Each of these goals carries moral appeal. But together, they represent billions of dollars in recurring obligations that will persist long after political enthusiasm fades. Implementing even half of these programs without new recurring revenues would expand the city’s structural deficit dramatically.


III. Revenue, Tax Base, and Business Climate

The proposed funding approach — raising taxes on high-income residents, large corporations, and real-estate speculation — will face both political and economic resistance.

  • Political resistance: Many of these measures require approval from Albany, where state lawmakers must balance suburban and upstate constituencies less receptive to urban redistribution.
  • Economic resistance: Roughly 1 percent of taxpayers provide nearly 40 percent of personal income-tax revenue in NYC. Even modest out-migration among high earners or firms could erase the expected gains from new tax rates.
  • Market perception: Wall Street, real-estate developers, and major employers watch credit outlooks closely. Higher taxes and heavy regulation could depress hiring, slow construction, and weaken commercial-property values — already under pressure from remote work and high vacancies.

These effects don’t occur overnight, but over several budget cycles they can hollow out the very tax base needed to sustain social programs.


IV. Bond Ratings and Borrowing Capacity

At present, New York City’s credit ratings remain high — Aa2 from Moody’s, AA from S&P, and AA from Fitch — all with stable outlooks. These ratings assume continued budget discipline, strong tax collections, and access to credit markets.

Should the city run persistent multi-billion-dollar deficits or fund recurring programs with one-time revenues, that stability could erode. Even a single-notch downgrade would increase borrowing costs by tens of millions of dollars per issuance. Plus, rating changes usually apply to all outstanding issues, meaning the largest consistency for all governments will get equally stiffed. Given the city’s dependence on annual borrowing of $12–14 billion for capital projects, that would quickly compound into hundreds of millions in added interest.


V. Legal Liabilities and Operational Costs

The city already pays roughly $1.4–1.5 billion annually in legal claims — police misconduct, labor disputes, civil-rights cases, and infrastructure accidents. A socialist administration likely to push faster hiring, expanded benefits, and new regulations may unintentionally increase exposure to lawsuits and administrative complexity.

These are not hypothetical: NYC’s risk portfolio is vast, and new programs create new compliance risks. Legal settlements and overtime overruns have quietly strained the budget for years — issues any mayor, socialist or not, must confront.


VI. The Broader Economic Setting

Even without policy shocks, New York’s economy is fragile in several sectors:

  • Office occupancy remains below pre-pandemic levels, reducing property-tax growth.
  • Hospitality and retail have recovered unevenly.
  • Finance and tech, the city’s fiscal engines, are cost-sensitive to regulatory or tax changes.

Layering aggressive redistribution atop those fragilities could dampen hiring or investment. While not catastrophic immediately, the cumulative effect would be slower growth, fewer jobs, and ultimately lower tax receipts — precisely when the city’s spending commitments rise.


VII. The National Ripple Effect

Other progressive cities — Chicago, Seattle, Boston, perhaps Austin — may watch New York closely. They will adopt pieces of this agenda (municipal grocery pilots, partial transit-fare relief) if results seem favorable. But few will gamble their bond ratings or business ecosystems on full replication.

In this sense, New York’s mayor becomes both pioneer and cautionary tale: admired for ambition, judged by execution.


VIII. The Realistic Risks Ahead

A sober appraisal must acknowledge what can realistically go wrong:

  1. Revenue Shortfall Spiral: If tax hikes trigger out-migration or weak compliance, revenues could decline even as spending rises. Once bond markets sense erosion of the tax base, borrowing costs climb and confidence wanes.
  2. Program Cost Overruns: City-run enterprises and free-service models are historically prone to inefficiency. Without strict oversight, projected costs could double, as seen in past housing and transit initiatives.
  3. Labor and Pension Escalation: Expanding public programs often means expanding payrolls. Each new civil-service position brings long-term pension liabilities the city cannot easily reverse.
  4. State Disputes: If Albany resists authorizing new taxes or programs, the city could face legal stalemates that delay funding while political promises remain unmet.
  5. Economic Shock: A recession, commercial real-estate correction, or major loss in Wall Street profits could instantly erase the city’s narrow surplus and expose the fragility of its social agenda. Recessions are not if but when the next one occurs.
  6. Credit Downgrade: Persistent deficits or fiscal gimmicks would lead rating agencies to shift outlooks to negative, forcing the city to cut spending, raise taxes further, or both — a cycle that can quickly turn populism into austerity. They are the only independent entity that cares not just about today but how the future bondholders are going to get paid.

IX. The Most Likely Scenario

The most realistic projection is a politically energized but fiscally constrained administration. The mayor will likely succeed in implementing a handful of visible programs — perhaps expanded childcare and targeted transit subsidies — but larger ambitions will stall amid budget shortfalls, business pushback, and credit scrutiny.

The public narrative may celebrate “bold change,” but the spreadsheets will show a city juggling rising obligations, marginal surpluses, and deepening long-term gaps.

In short: the dream will proceed, but only as far as the balance sheet allows.


X. The Black Swan Scenario — The Wrong Time for New York, the Right Time for Texas

While New York experiments with costly new commitments, Texas is quietly building the next great financial center. The Texas Stock Exchange (TXSE), headquartered in Dallas, is preparing to launch with backing from major investors such as BlackRock and Citadel Securities. Goldman Sachs is constructing a campus for 5,000 employees; JPMorgan Chase already employs more people in Texas than in New York; Nasdaq has announced a regional headquarters there.

If a black swan event hits — a financial-market crash, a sudden collapse in NYC commercial real-estate values, or a capital-gains exodus triggered by new taxation — the balance of power could shift rapidly. Texas, with no personal income tax, lower costs, abundant housing, and an open regulatory climate, would absorb the outflow of capital and talent. Texas could be the black swan event!

The timing could not be more opposite for the two states. New York is entering a period of fiscal experimentation with razor-thin margins, while Texas is in a period of economic expansion and institutional investment. A severe downturn would strike New York when it can least afford it — saddled with new spending and declining revenues — but it would strike Texas at a moment when it can capture opportunity.

In that worst-case but plausible scenario:

  • Wall Street decentralizes as firms expand or relocate to Texas, eroding NYC’s tax base.
  • Bond markets lose confidence and demand higher yields on NYC debt.
  • Layoffs and migration accelerate, reducing both population and purchasing power.
  • Property values decline, cutting the city’s largest revenue source.
  • Austerity returns, undoing the very social ambitions that inspired the movement.

It would be, in essence, a black swan reversal of roles — Texas ascending as New York falters, the right place meeting the right time while the old capital of finance learns how quickly vision can collide with math.


Conclusion: Vision Without Solvency Defies Common Sense

New York City’s socialist experiment will test whether progressive ideals can coexist with fiscal realism. The mayor’s heart may be with the working poor, but numbers are stubborn things: every new entitlement must be paid for in perpetuity, not just proclaimed at a press conference.

Without disciplined budgeting, credible revenue streams, and cooperation from the state, even noble ambitions could accelerate the city toward financial distress. Remember 1975? The world’s financial capital cannot thrive if it loses the confidence of those who fund it, employ it, or lend to it.

History teaches that great cities fall not from bold ideas but from ignoring basic arithmetic. Unless ideology bends to economic gravity, the risk is not revolution — it is regression.

The Shutdown That Won’t End: How America’s Fiscal Stalemate Became a Test of Creditworthiness

And Why the Bond Rating Agencies May Hold the Only Key to Ending It

By Lewis F. McLain, Jr.


I. The Standoff That Never Ends

Another fiscal year, another government shutdown.
The United States now governs by brinkmanship — running on a series of temporary spending bills that barely prevent collapse but never deliver stability. Each new “continuing resolution” buys only weeks of political truce.

In Washington, they call it negotiation. Everywhere else, it looks like a nation living paycheck to paycheck. It is actually worse than that. The U.S. has gotten by only by putting most of its excess on a credit card to the tune of $35,598,000 or $324,100 per taxpayer!

These short-term fixes, designed to “keep the lights on,” have become the defining symbol of America’s fiscal dysfunction. Lawmakers boast of avoiding disaster while guaranteeing the next one. The cost is not measured in missed paychecks alone, but in lost credibility — both with citizens and with the global markets that finance the republic.


II. Why the “Big Beautiful Bill” Didn’t Fix the Problem

When Congress passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) earlier this year, it was hailed as the long-awaited cure to America’s budget ills.
It was indeed a sweeping structural law — extending key tax cuts, revising welfare programs, and reshaping federal-state funding formulas.

But OBBBA was a policy framework, not an appropriations bill. It set the rules for how money could be spent but didn’t actually fund the government. The twelve annual spending bills that keep every agency running — from Defense to Education — remain incomplete.

Thus, the government shut down not because it lacked a vision, but because it lacked a functioning process. Even the worst person for financial management on planet earth could do better than the U.S. Government.


III. The Politics of Delay

Short-term CRs are not bureaucratic accidents; they are political strategy.

  1. They Preserve Leverage.
    A short CR allows each side to claim the next cliff as bargaining power.
  2. They Manufacture Urgency.
    By setting artificial deadlines, Congress ensures every debate becomes a crisis.
  3. They Diffuse Blame.
    Everyone claims partial credit for “keeping government open,” while no one takes responsibility for its paralysis.

This cycle — a patchwork of temporary lifelines — has become normalized. Yet in any other organization, such repeated failure to adopt a budget would be grounds for a downgrade, a leadership change, or both.


IV. The Rating Agencies: Watchful, But Timid

The major rating agencies — Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P — continue to issue cautious statements, but their restraint now borders on abdication. One must remember that they charge a fee to the governmental entity being rated, they represent the bondholders! The bondholders are the greatest constituency to be found. There are 350 billion U.S. citizens. Compare that to the $37 trillion “constituents” they represent.

  • Fitch warns that shutdowns “highlight governance challenges” but sees no immediate rating impact.
  • Moody’s, more decisive, already downgraded the U.S. from Aaa to Aa1 in May 2025, citing deficits and political dysfunction.
  • S&P notes that each week of shutdown could shave up to 0.2% from GDP growth but stops short of taking further action.
  • Scope Ratings in Europe calls the shutdowns a “negative signal of democratic decay.”

They are not wrong — just toothless.

Bond rating agencies are worthless when they only rattle sabers, if that.
Warnings without enforcement invite complacency, not reform. If a sovereign borrower can repeatedly risk default on its own operations without consequence, the rating system itself becomes performative — an echo chamber of polite disapproval.


V. The Garland Precedent: When Ratings Spoke Loudly

There is precedent for courage I am aware of. In the 1970s, the bond rating agency visited the City of Garland, Texas in person — not to offer advice, but to deliver a direct warning message.

The message was simple: “Stop playing tough on fiscal decisions. Balance your budget responsibly or face a likely immediate downgrade.”

The City Council took the warning seriously. By the next meeting, they had adopted corrective measures, and the city’s fiscal health stabilized. The visit worked not because Garland Council feared markets, but because it respected accountability.

It’s a story quietly echoed in other cities of that era, I’m sure — times when rating agencies acted like stewards of discipline, not commentators on chaos.


VI. The Case for Action Now

If such resolve worked in a Texas city half a century ago, imagine its effect on Washington today.
Bond rating agencies have the authority — and arguably the duty — to intervene decisively.

They could collectively declare this message before October 1:

“The United States has two weeks to fully reopen and fund the government, or face a downgrade of more than one notch.”

That single sentence would do what months of posturing cannot. Markets would react within hours.
Treasury yields would rise, the White House and congressional leaders would receive immediate pressure from financial institutions and state treasurers, and public attention would snap to the true cost of dysfunction. By the way, do you know how much of the $37 trillion is owned by foreign investors? What happens if the day comes for their $9 trillion in holdings to mature, they take the money, and decide to invest elsewhere? Go to http://www.debtclock.org to appreciate how fast it takes to rack up another $1 trillion in debt!

It would no longer be a debate about ideology — but about national credit survival.


VII. Why This Matters

Bond markets are not emotional. They reward stability and punish delay.
The United States retains its privileged position — as issuer of the world’s reserve currency — largely because investors still believe in its reliability.
But belief is not infinite. Every short-term CR and every unending shutdown erodes the myth of American infallibility.

A bold, time-bound ultimatum from the rating agencies would instantly clarify what is at stake:
that U.S. governance, not solvency, is now the chief risk to U.S. credit.


VIII. The Moral of the Shutdown Era

The nation’s fiscal problem is not a shortage of dollars — it is a shortage of discipline.
The Treasury and Federal Reserve can print money; it cannot print credibility.

Congress treats shutdowns as leverage. Presidents treat them as bargaining stages.
And the bond market, by refusing to act, has become the enabler of dysfunction.

The rating agencies have a choice: to remain cautious chroniclers of decline, or to be the mirror that forces reform. Their ratings are not just financial metrics — they are moral verdicts on governance.


IX. Conclusion: The Rating That Could Save a Republic

“Credit,” wrote Alexander Hamilton, “is the soul of a nation’s economy.”
But in our age, it may also be the conscience of a government that has lost its will to govern.

The bond rating agencies can end this stalemate — not by writing reports, but by drawing a line.
Two weeks. No more delays.
Reopen the government fully or face a downgrade severe enough to awaken both Wall Street and Main Street.

If they have the courage to act — as they once did in Garland, Texas — they could remind America that accountability still matters.

Because credibility, once lost, cannot be borrowed back.


Lewis is a municipal finance expert living in McKinney, Texas. While semi-retired (after 52 years), he was once the Garland Budget Director, the Dallas County Budget Officer (first in Texas) and then a VP in Public Finance for First National Bank in Dallas (now Bank of America). After his first ten years, he started consulting for local governments (about 40).

He still consults with about 16 entities such as DART, Brazoria County and the cities of Denton, Groves, Highland Village, Killeen, Leander, McKinney, Midland, Pearland, Richardson, Southlake, Stafford, Victoria and Wichita Falls. He has written several hundred articles, essays and blogs, most of which can be found at citybaseblog.net. He has also given hundreds of presentations at workshops all over Texas and other states, including a training session for young bond rating analysts in NYC years ago.

He was the Executive Director for the Government Finance Officers of Texas years ago and had an Ethics Award created in his name.

When Washington Stops, Cities Keep Going

Suggested by Jessica Williams, Written by Lewis McLain & AI

A Local Government Perspective on Federal Shutdowns

When the federal government grinds to a halt, television cameras point toward Washington, D.C. — toward empty offices, barricaded monuments, and finger-pointing press conferences. But the deeper story unfolds far from the Capitol. It takes place in city halls and neighborhoods where the real consequences of a shutdown ripple through families, local economies, and municipal balance sheets. While the federal government pauses, cities and towns must continue to serve, balancing fiscal prudence, compassion for affected residents, and the unshakable expectation that local government never stops.



I. The Federal-to-Local Connection

Local governments rarely make national headlines during a shutdown, yet their dependence on federal flow-throughs and reimbursements is significant. From Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) to HOME housing programs, from FAA airport reimbursements to FEMA disaster claims, federal funds support many city functions. The design of these programs compounds the risk: they are usually reimbursement-based rather than prepaid. When federal employees are furloughed, reimbursements stall — leaving cities to advance money from their own cash reserves to keep projects on track.

For instance, a housing rehabilitation program may already have contractors in the field and invoices pending. A delayed reimbursement from HUD can suddenly force a city to choose between advancing local dollars or halting work. Likewise, infrastructure projects tied to the FAA or Department of Transportation can stall midstream when the federal payment machinery freezes. Cities are left managing not only projects but expectations — of residents, contractors, and partner agencies.

Well-managed municipalities rely on robust fund balance policies and the ability to make interfund transfers. Yet even well-prepared finance directors find themselves navigating uncharted waters when multiple federal programs stop simultaneously. The lesson is clear: local governments bear real exposure to national political stalemates, even when they have done nothing wrong.


II. The Human Face of a Shutdown

A city’s greatest concern during a federal shutdown is not a spreadsheet but its people. In many communities, a meaningful share of the population works directly or indirectly for the federal government — postal workers, TSA agents, defense employees, and contractors. The economic fabric of a local government entity like McKinney, DART, or New Braunfels Utilities is interwoven with residents whose livelihoods depend on those paychecks.

When those checks stop, the impact is immediate and personal. Utility payments slow. Grocery budgets tighten. Local restaurants and retailers feel the chill. Within a week or two, the effects reach City Hall: rising delinquent water accounts, increased calls for payment extensions, and growing demand at local food pantries and nonprofits. The impact is felt across neighborhoods and income levels — from young families with mortgages to retirees on fixed incomes who supplement with part-time federal contract work.

Cities, being the most visible and accessible level of government, often absorb the frustration of residents caught in the crossfire. Even though the city did not cause the shutdown, it becomes the government people can still reach by phone or in person.


III. The Timing Challenge: Between Tax Deadlines and Utility Bills

Federal shutdowns often strike at awkward moments in the local fiscal cycle. In many Texas cities, property tax bills are just now being mailed as the federal government shutters. Most of the revenue from those bills will arrive over the next 90 days, which represents the most significant single inflow of cash for the entire year.

Fortunately, mortgage escrow requirements create a buffer. Because most homeowners make monthly escrow payments throughout the year, their mortgage servicers will remit property taxes to the city or county on schedule even if a federal shutdown temporarily disrupts their paychecks. This structural safeguard prevents an immediate collapse in property tax collections.

Yet not every taxpayer is escrowed. Small business owners, landlords, and those who pay directly can still delay payments — or struggle to meet their obligations if a shutdown drags into multiple months. For cities that rely heavily on prompt collections, this can create minor but measurable shortfalls that affect cash flow, particularly if compounded by reduced sales tax receipts and slowed utility payments.

Sales tax receipts, which arrive monthly, may dip if federal workers and contractors cut spending. The decline might not show up for several months, but the slowdown starts immediately in local commerce. At the same time, cities face delayed federal reimbursements and stable or rising service demand.

This combination stresses cash flow precisely when flexibility is most limited. For finance directors, this becomes a daily balancing act: ensuring payroll is met, capital projects stay funded, and reserves are used strategically without overreaction. A short-term shutdown may require little more than internal adjustments, but a prolonged one tests every line item in the budget.


IV. Managing the Municipal Response

During a shutdown, the most important city management function is communication. City managers and finance directors begin by identifying which programs rely on federal funds. Do those programs have enough local cash to bridge a temporary gap? Are any critical contracts or grants about to expire?

Departments review ongoing projects with federal reimbursements — airports, housing, transit, public safety, and disaster recovery. Some may need to slow their pace or reassign staff to prevent idle costs. Payroll and benefit obligations continue uninterrupted, of course, since city workers are paid locally.

At the same time, cities must consider how to support residents who suddenly face hardship. Utility departments might create temporary payment plans or defer disconnection notices for furloughed workers. Libraries, recreation centers, and community development offices may become gathering points for information and assistance. Some cities coordinate with local churches and nonprofits to help with rent and groceries.

The critical leadership challenge is tone: balancing fiscal discipline with empathy. Citizens need to see that their city understands their struggle — not through rhetoric, but through quiet, practical help.


V. The Broader Civic Consequences

Shutdowns carry a subtle but lasting cost to public trust. To the average citizen, “government” is a single concept — not layers of jurisdiction. When Washington falters, many lose confidence in all levels of government, including their city hall. This is unfair but inevitable.

Local government, therefore, has an opportunity and responsibility to demonstrate stability. Police still patrol, fire crews still respond, sanitation trucks still roll at dawn. This continuity becomes a visible reminder that while national politics may polarize, local service endures.

City leaders who communicate clearly — explaining which programs are affected and which are not — reinforce that trust. A well-crafted message from a mayor or city manager can calm uncertainty: “Your trash will still be picked up. Your water will keep running. City services are funded by your local taxes, not federal dollars.”

This reassurance may seem simple, but it strengthens the bond between residents and their local government at a time when faith in public institutions is fragile.


VI. The Financial Resilience Playbook

Each shutdown teaches cities to be more resilient. Smart local governments now build contingency plans much like those used for hurricanes or ice storms. The cause may be political, but the preparation is financial.

Key strategies include:

  • Building robust reserves. Fund balance policies that cover 90 to 120 days of operations give cities the flexibility to absorb delayed reimbursements or revenue slowdowns.
  • Diversifying revenue sources. Relying less on intergovernmental transfers and more on local revenue ensures stability.
  • Tracking exposure. Maintaining a database of all grants tied to federal agencies helps finance staff quickly assess risk when a shutdown begins.
  • Cross-training staff. If a federally funded program is paused, reassigned employees can temporarily assist in other departments, minimizing disruption.
  • Communicating with regional partners. Cities coordinate with counties, school districts, and COGs to align messages and pool resources for affected residents.

In Texas, where home-rule cities maintain broad authority, these actions demonstrate the spirit of local self-reliance that has long characterized municipal governance.



VII. The Emotional and Moral Dimension

Beyond numbers and policies lies the moral core of local government — compassion for neighbors. A shutdown reminds city employees why they serve. The clerk extending a payment plan to a furloughed resident, the firefighter delivering groceries to a struggling family, the librarian helping a laid-off contractor update a résumé — these quiet moments of service define a city’s heart.

They also embody what national politics often forgets: governance is not just the art of policy but the practice of care. Cities, precisely because they are close to the people, reflect the best instincts of government — to listen, to adapt, and to keep going.


VIII. Lessons for the Future

Each federal shutdown exposes the fragile seams of interdependence between national and local governments. For cities, the lesson is not merely to survive the next one, but to plan as though it were inevitable.

Cities should:

  1. Review and update financial contingency plans annually.
  2. Maintain relationships with federal and state partners to receive timely information.
  3. Incorporate shutdown scenarios into their cash-flow modeling.
  4. Develop citizen assistance programs that can be quickly activated.
  5. Use the experience as a teaching moment for civic education — showing residents how local finances truly work.

Ultimately, resilience is not only financial but cultural. A city that knows its role, understands its resources, and trusts its people will weather any temporary political storm.


IX. Conclusion – The Quiet Strength of Local Government

When Washington stops, cities keep going.
They pick up the trash, respond to fires, issue building permits, and answer 911 calls. They balance budgets in real time, not by ideology but by necessity. They hold the public trust not in headlines but in streetlights that stay on and water that keeps flowing.

The fiscal rhythm of a city continues — property tax bills just mailed, escrowed payments coming in from mortgage companies, and sales tax checks arriving monthly. The federal stalemate may cast a shadow, but local governments remain the steady pulse of everyday life.

A federal shutdown reveals more than dysfunction; it reveals the quiet strength of local government. It reminds citizens that the most dependable form of government is the one closest to home. Cities are the steady heartbeat of a nation whose higher powers may occasionally stumble.

And when the federal lights go out, it is the glow of City Hall that assures people the republic still stands — one water bill, one payroll, one act of service at a time.


Appendix A – Common-Sense Local Resilience Checklist

For Finance and Budget Officers

  1. Cash-Flow Modeling: Immediately model 30-, 60-, and 90-day liquidity scenarios assuming delayed federal reimbursements.
  2. Property Tax Timing: Track escrow remittances and direct-payer delinquencies separately to spot early stress points.
  3. Reserve Triggers: Define thresholds for when fund balance use requires council notification or resolution.
  4. Federal Program Audit: Identify active grants, agency contacts, and next reimbursement cycles.
  5. Deferred Spending: Postpone discretionary purchases and travel until normal operations resume.

For City Management and Departments
6. Communication Plan: Prepare clear public statements explaining what is and isn’t affected by the shutdown.
7. Utility Assistance: Create temporary payment plans for furloughed federal employees and contractors.
8. Community Coordination: Link with local churches, food banks, and nonprofits to share information and avoid duplication of aid.
9. Employee Flexibility: Reassign staff from federally funded projects to core services where possible.
10. After-Action Review: Once the shutdown ends, conduct a debrief and document lessons learned for future preparedness.

For City Leadership and Elected Officials
11. Maintain Calm Visibility: Hold briefings to assure residents that city services continue uninterrupted.
12. Avoid Partisanship: Keep communications focused on service continuity and citizen support, not blame.
13. Celebrate Resilience: Acknowledge employees who help residents through financial or emotional hardship.


Final Thought:
A federal shutdown may freeze the nation’s highest offices, but it cannot stop the heartbeat of a city. Local government remains the living proof that public service is not dependent on politics, but on people — the quiet guardians of continuity who keep faith, finance, and community moving forward.

Antifa, Funding Issues, and the Psychology of Crowd Violence

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

Introduction

The word “Antifa” has become one of the most polarizing terms in American politics. For some, it calls to mind images of masked demonstrators confronting police or smashing windows. For others, it represents grassroots resistance to racism and authoritarianism – or the perception of them. Making sense of Antifa requires more than soundbites. We must sift historical facts from rumors, distinguish lawful dissent from criminal acts, and weigh psychology alongside law. Above all, as Christian conservatives, we must seek truth, reject hysteria, and offer a constructive path forward that upholds both justice and peace.


What Fascism Is — and Why Comparisons Matter

To understand Antifa’s self-description, we must first clarify what fascism means. A standard dictionary definition describes fascism as “a political philosophy, movement, or regime that exalts nation and often race above the individual, with a centralized autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, severe economic and social regimentation, and forcible suppression of opposition.”

Historically, fascism referred to the regimes of Benito Mussolini in Italy and Adolf Hitler in Germany, both of which combined dictatorship, militarism, racism, and brutal suppression of dissent. It is essential to emphasize that America today is not Nazi Germany. However divided our politics, we continue to function under constitutional law, contested elections, and protected civil liberties. Modern Antifa rhetoric often invokes “fascism” as if it were at the doorstep, but this comparison is disproportionate. Real fascism was a genocidal system, not the messy disagreements of a pluralistic democracy.


What Fascists and Nazis Actually Did in the 1930s

When modern groups invoke the language of “fascism,” we must remember what it actually meant in the 1930s. The brutality was not rhetorical, not symbolic — it was physical, bloody, and state-organized.

Nazi Germany

  • Opening of Dachau (1933): Within weeks of seizing power, the Nazis established Dachau, the first concentration camp. Communists, Social Democrats, and union leaders were dragged off the streets, beaten with rifle butts, lashed until skin tore, and thrown into barracks with little food. Many prisoners were executed or worked to death. Torture was routine: prisoners hung by their wrists until shoulders dislocated, starved until skeletal, or shot during “escape attempts” staged by guards.
  • The Night of the Long Knives (June 30–July 2, 1934): Hitler unleashed the SS against his rivals, especially leaders of the SA stormtroopers. Men were dragged from their beds in the night, pistol-whipped, and shot at close range. Some were stabbed repeatedly with bayonets before being dumped in shallow graves. Estimates of the dead range from 85 to over 400. Blood soaked the floor of Gestapo headquarters in Berlin. Hitler had ordered it personally, and it showed the German people that dissent could be answered with murder.
  • Kristallnacht (November 9–10, 1938): This pogrom was a nationwide orgy of violence against Jews. Synagogues burned with Torah scrolls thrown into the flames. Jewish shopkeepers were clubbed unconscious in front of their shattered storefronts; children were beaten with fists and boots in the streets. At least 100 were killed outright in the chaos. Thousands more were rounded up, battered with rifle butts, and shipped to camps like Dachau and Buchenwald, where many perished from beatings, exposure, or starvation. Broken glass glittered across Germany — not just from windows but from the teeth of victims smashed against the pavement.
  • Sterilizations and Killings of the Disabled (1933–1939): Under the “Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring,” over 300,000 Germans were forcibly sterilized. The operations were often botched, leaving women torn and bleeding or men maimed and in chronic pain. By 1939, the Nazis escalated into the T4 “euthanasia” program, luring parents to hand over disabled children “for care.” Instead, they were strapped to gurneys and given lethal injections, or starved until they died in agony. Witnesses reported piles of tiny corpses waiting for cremation. Adults with disabilities were herded into sealed rooms and gassed with carbon monoxide — the test runs for the death camps to come.

Fascist Italy

  • Blackshirt Violence: Mussolini’s paramilitary “squadristi” terrorized opponents throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. Their signature humiliation was forcing enemies to drink castor oil mixed with gasoline — inducing vomiting, diarrhea, internal bleeding, and sometimes death. Opponents were stripped, beaten with truncheons until bones cracked, and left crippled in ditches.
  • Assassination of Giacomo Matteotti (1924, still emblematic in the 1930s): Matteotti, a socialist MP, was kidnapped, stabbed multiple times with daggers, and left in a shallow grave for daring to denounce fascist violence. His murder warned every Italian that opposition could be met with knives and silence.
  • Colonial Atrocities in Ethiopia (1935–1936): Fascist Italy’s invasion brought barbarity to Africa. Italian planes dropped mustard gas on soldiers and civilians alike. Victims stumbled blind and blistered, skin sloughing off, lungs burning until they drowned in their own blood. Priests were shot for preaching resistance. Entire villages were machine-gunned. Ethiopian resistance fighters were captured, beaten, and hanged in public squares as warnings. Tens of thousands died under chemical clouds and fascist bullets.

Why This Matters

By the end of the 1930s, before the Second World War fully erupted, fascism had already left a trail of maiming, sterilization, torture, and outright mass murder. This was not merely heated rhetoric or “culture war.” It was broken bodies, charred synagogues, and children starved to death in hospitals.

That history underscores why comparisons today must be careful. However divided our politics, America in the 2020s is not Germany or Italy in the 1930s. When Christians and conservatives hear the word “fascism” hurled about, we must remember what it really meant: not simply political disagreement, but a system of organized, state-directed brutality that bathed whole nations in blood.


Historical Roots of Antifa

The term Antifa traces to interwar Germany. In 1932, the Communist Party launched Antifaschistische Aktion, with its now-famous twin-flag emblem. Around the same time, the Social Democratic coalition known as the Iron Front popularized the Three Arrows symbol, designed to overpaint swastikas in public spaces. Both movements were born in a desperate climate: the Weimar Republic was collapsing, and Nazi power was rising fast.

Modern activists adopt these symbols to claim continuity with that resistance. Yet the comparison is strained. Antifa of the 1930s fought fascism seizing state power; today’s Antifa is a marginal protest current within a functioning democracy. The symbolism is potent, but the contexts are not equivalent.


What Antifa Is Today

Contemporary Antifa in the United States is not a centralized organization but a loose network of activists and affinity groups. There is no national leadership, no membership rolls, and no dues. Small collectives in various cities operate independently, sometimes sharing tactics but rarely coordinating beyond local networks.

Antifa is also reactive, not proactive. Its activity spikes in moments of confrontation. Sometimes this means mobilizing far-right (real or perceived) groups that attempt rallies or demonstrations. However, just as often in recent years, Antifa has directed its energy toward law enforcement agencies as they carry out their duties. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities have been frequent targets, with protesters hurling objects at officers or vandalizing property under the banner of opposing “fascism.” Unfortunately, the “resistance” has escalated to shootings at ICE officials. Police departments in cities like Portland have faced recurring clashes, as Antifa-affiliated demonstrators portray officers as instruments of authoritarian repression. In these settings, the men and women attacked were not extremists but sworn officers enforcing democratically enacted laws.

Some Antifa activists focus on research and exposure of extremist networks; others on mutual aid or community defense. A smaller subset embraces direct confrontation, which can escalate into vandalism, assaults, or clashes with police. For conservatives, the key is not to overstate Antifa’s size or permanence—it is not an underground army. But it is equally important not to understate its disruptions or the fact that many of its battles are now with the very agencies tasked with keeping civic order.


Mob Mentality and Crowd Psychology

Crowd psychology explains why protests sometimes spiral out of control.

When individuals mask their faces and merge into a bloc, they experience deindividuation, lowering inhibitions and accountability. Emotions spread quickly through crowds; emotional contagion turns fear into panic and anger into rage. Groups often become more extreme than their average member, a phenomenon called group polarization.

This is not unique to Antifa. The same dynamics are visible in right-wing rallies, sports riots, or even church history when mobs gathered in anger. But in Antifa’s case, these dynamics reinforce a confrontational image: groups that see themselves as defensive often look aggressive once mob psychology takes hold. The line between legal protests and illegal brutality is razor thin.


Rumors of Funding and Paid Agitators

One of the most persistent claims is that Antifa is secretly bankrolled by billionaires, most often George Soros. Fact-checkers consistently find no evidence of Soros—or his Open Society Foundations (OSF)—directly funding Antifa groups or paying masked demonstrators. No checks to “Antifa” exist in the public record.

But critics rightly frame the suspicion differently: “It is not Soros directly, but his nonprofits.” This is the logical pathway if such funding were to exist—through NGOs and nonprofit grant networks. OSF is among the largest in the world, distributing billions to civil-society organizations that support democracy, minority rights, bail funds, and advocacy. These grants are transparent and traceable. But once money flows into NGOs, subgrants, or affiliated nonprofits, it becomes more difficult to track how funds are used locally.

This is why congressional inquiries and watchdog groups sometimes investigate: to test whether nonprofit dollars intended for civil-rights work might be diverted to militant activity. So far, documentation shows adjacency, not intent—support for nonprofits that operate in the same ecosystem as protest movements, but no proof of deliberate financing of Antifa violence.

The rumor persists because it is plausible in theory and because real-world practices—like bail funds, mutual aid networks, and protest logistics—often do receive nonprofit money. But proximity is not proof. Without intent and direction, suspicion remains speculation, even though evidence may be forthcoming as investigations continue. The most accurate statement today is this: Soros’s foundations fund civil-society organizations, not masked street fighters directly. Again, investigators continue to test whether NGO pathways could ever blur that line.


Documented Cases of Gear Distribution

While grand funding conspiracies remain unproven, there are documented cases of organized gear distribution.

In Los Angeles, June 2025, television cameras filmed a pickup truck unloading boxes of “Bionic Shield” face shields to protesters. Federal prosecutors indicted Alejandro Orellana, alleging he conspired to aid and abet civil disorder by distributing equipment after an unlawful assembly was declared. Defense lawyers countered that the gear was protective, not offensive. Local news footage confirmed masked individuals handing out riot shields and gas masks, while national outlets like Newsweek and New York Post reported the same incident.

These events prove that gear drops do occur and sometimes lead to charges under civil disorder laws. But they remain localized and small-scale. They do not prove a vast, centrally funded operation. They illustrate how local actors can escalate protest dynamics, sometimes blurring lawful protection with unlawful facilitation of unrest.


What the Law Says

American law distinguishes between lawful support and criminal incitement.

The Anti-Riot Act (18 U.S.C. §2101) makes it a crime to use interstate travel or facilities with intent to incite or promote a riot. The Civil Disorder statute (18 U.S.C. §231) penalizes acts that interfere with law enforcement during unrest. Conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting charges apply when someone provides gear or funding with intent to support violence.

The dividing line is intent. Providing food, water, or legal aid is lawful. Providing protective gear is gray, depending on timing and purpose. Paying people to commit violence is clearly illegal. Prosecutors must prove intent, not mere association. That distinction is central to a Christian-conservative view of justice: fairness requires evidence, not guilt by rumor.


Where This Leads

The trajectory of Antifa is not toward permanent institutions but diffusion. Its brand may fade, while its tactics—counter-mobilizations, black bloc, research collectives—are absorbed into broader activist culture. Violent flare-ups will recur when extremist groups mobilize, because Antifa is reactive. Rumors of billionaire funding will persist because they are politically useful and superficially plausible. But the enduring challenge is mob mentality, which can transform protests—left or right—into destructive crowds.


A Christian-Conservative Response

For Christians and conservatives, a balanced response requires moral clarity and careful restraint.

We must insist on truth over rumor. Repeating unproven funding myths undermines credibility. We must support and uphold the rule of law: prosecuting crimes firmly, but not criminalizing dissent. We must care for communities harmed by violence, providing aid and pastoral care. We must strengthen civic institutions, so extremism finds less fertile ground. And we must model discernment and peace. The Apostle Paul told us to “test everything; hold fast what is good” (1 Thess. 5:21). In a culture awash with rumor, that admonition is urgently needed.


Conclusion

Antifa is not a monolithic army but a loose collection of activists and tactics. Its roots lie in the desperate resistance to 1930s fascism, but America today is not Nazi Germany. Rumors of billionaire funding circulate widely, and while NGOs are the logical pathway for covert financing, the evidence so far suggests proximity, rather than proof. Proof could be forthcoming as investigations continue. Documented cases—such as the Los Angeles gear drop—demonstrate a real escalation but remain local and situational.

The Christian-conservative response must be balanced: uphold law with fairness, refuse exaggeration, care for the wounded, and protect civil society. We should not minimize the harm Antifa can cause, nor should we inflate it into a phantom army. Instead, we must respond with truth, order, compassion, and faith in Christ, who remains the Prince of Peace.