Tag: guns

Sydney Australia: An Updated Case Study on Two Previous Essays regarding a Serious Topic

.Reading time 8 minutes.

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

Public tragedies have a way of collapsing time. Old debates are reopened as if they were never had. Long-standing policies are treated as provisional. And political reflexes reassert themselves with a familiar urgency: something must be done, and whatever is done must be fast, visible, and legislative.

A recent Reuters report describing a mass shooting at a beachside gathering in Australia illustrates this pattern with uncomfortable clarity. The event itself was horrifying. The response was predictable. Within hours, political leaders were discussing emergency parliamentary sessions, tightening gun licensing laws, and revisiting a firearm regime that has been in place for nearly three decades.

What makes this episode especially instructive is not that it occurred in Australia, but that it occurred despite Australia’s reputation for having among the strictest gun control laws in the world. The country’s post-1996 framework—created in the wake of the Port Arthur massacre—has long been cited internationally as a model of decisive legislative action. Yet here, after decades of regulation, registration, licensing, and oversight, the instinctive answer remains the same: more law.

This essay treats the Australian response not as an anomaly, but as a continuation—and confirmation—of two arguments I have made previously: one concerning mass shootings as a systems failure rather than a purely legal failure, and another concerning what I have called “one-page laws”—the belief that complex social problems can be solved by concise statutes and urgent press conferences.

The Reuters Story, Paraphrased

According to Reuters, a deadly shooting at a public gathering in Bondi shocked Australians and immediately raised questions about whether the country’s long-standing firearms regime remains adequate. One of the suspects reportedly held a legal gun license and was authorized to own multiple firearms. In response, state and federal officials suggested that parliament might be recalled to consider reforms, including changes to license duration, suitability assessments, and firearm ownership limits.

The article notes that while Australia’s gun laws dramatically reduced firearm deaths after 1996, the number of legally owned guns has since risen to levels exceeding those prior to the reforms. Advocates argue that this growth, combined with modern risks, requires updated legislation. Political leaders signaled openness to acting quickly.

What the article does not do—and what most post-tragedy coverage does not do—is explain precisely how additional laws would have prevented this specific act, or how such laws would be meaningfully enforced without expanding surveillance, discretion, or intrusion into everyday life.

That omission is not accidental. It reflects a deeper habit in public governance.

The First Essay Revisited: Mass Shootings as Systems Failures

In my earlier essay on mass shootings, I argued that these events are rarely the result of a single legal gap. Instead, they emerge from systemic breakdowns: failures of detection, communication, intervention, and follow-through. Warning signs often exist. Signals are missed, dismissed, or siloed. Institutions act sequentially rather than collectively.

The presence or absence of one additional statute does little to alter those dynamics.

The Australian case reinforces this point. The suspect was not operating in a legal vacuum. The system already required licensing, registration, and approval. The breakdown did not occur because the law was silent; it occurred because law is only one input into a much larger human system.

When tragedy strikes, however, it is far easier to amend a statute than to admit that prevention depends on imperfect human judgment, social cohesion, mental health systems, community reporting, and inter-agency coordination. Laws are tangible. Systems are messy.

The Second Essay Revisited: The Illusion of One-Page Laws

My essay on one-page laws addressed a related but broader problem: the temptation to treat legislation as a substitute for governance.

One-page laws share several characteristics:

  • They are easy to describe.
  • They signal moral seriousness.
  • They create the appearance of action.
  • They externalize complexity.

The harder questions—Who enforces this? How often? With what discretion? At what cost? With what error rate?—are deferred or ignored.

The Australian response fits this pattern precisely. Proposals to shorten license durations or tighten suitability standards sound decisive, but they conceal the real burden: reviewing thousands of existing licenses, detecting future risk in people who have not yet exhibited it, and doing so without violating basic principles of fairness or due process.

The law can authorize action. It cannot supply foresight.

Where the Two Essays Converge

Taken together, these two arguments point to a shared conclusion: legislation is often mistaken for resolution.

Mass violence is not primarily a legislative failure; it is a detection and intervention failure. One-page laws feel comforting because they compress complexity into moral clarity. But compression is not the same as control.

Australia’s experience underscores a difficult truth: once a society has implemented baseline restrictions, further legislative tightening produces diminishing returns. The remaining risk lies not in legal gaps, but in human unpredictability. Eliminating that last fraction of risk would require levels of monitoring and preemption that most free societies rightly reject.

This is the trade-off no emergency session of parliament wants to articulate.

Why the Reflex Persists

The rush to legislate after tragedy is not irrational—it is political. Laws are visible acts of leadership. They reassure the public that order is being restored. Admitting that not every horror can be prevented without dismantling civil society is a harder message to deliver.

But honesty matters.

Governance is not the art of passing laws; it is the discipline of building systems that function under stress. When tragedy is followed immediately by legislative theater, it risks substituting symbolism for substance and urgency for effectiveness.

Conclusion

The Bondi shooting is not evidence that Australia’s gun laws have failed in some absolute sense. Nor is it proof that further legislation will succeed. What it is is a case study—one that reinforces two prior conclusions:

First, that mass violence persists even in highly regulated environments because it arises from human systems, not statutory voids.

Second, that one-page laws offer emotional relief but rarely operational solutions.

Serious problems deserve serious thinking. Not every response can be reduced to a bill number and a headline. And not every tragedy has a legislative cure.

The real challenge is resisting the comforting illusion that lawmaking alone is governance—and doing the slower, quieter, less visible work of strengthening the systems that stand between instability and catastrophe.

Mass Shootings in America

.Reading time 33 minutes.

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

Hard Lessons, Real Stories, and the Ground-Level Solutions Law Enforcement Says Actually Work

Mass shootings in America have become a recurring national nightmare: predictable yet unpredictable, familiar yet devastating, common yet individually shattering. The politics surrounding them often emphasize blame, ideology, or emotion. What receives far less attention is the actual investigative DNA of these attacks — the timelines, the warnings, the coordination failures, and the moments when someone did intervene and stopped a massacre before it began.

To understand what truly works, we must look at the cases, not the slogans. The lives lost — and the lives saved — tell us more than any press conference or political tweet.

This essay explores the problem the way police, detectives, and federal threat-assessment specialists see it: case by case, pattern by pattern, weakness by weakness, and success by success.

I. What Mass Shootings Look Like Through Law Enforcement Eyes

Ask any detective with experience in threat assessment, and they will tell you a truth that ordinary Americans rarely hear:

“We almost always know who’s spiraling long before the shooting happens.
The problem is — nobody acts fast enough, firmly enough, or in sync.”

The datasets from the FBI, Secret Service, ATF, and state fusion centers show several common threads:

  • Shooters leak intent.
  • They study previous attacks.
  • They experience years of decline — socially, mentally, financially, emotionally.
  • They accumulate grievances.
  • Someone always notices something.

Law enforcement doesn’t describe these as “senseless crimes.”
They describe them as interceptable crises.

II. Real Cases That Reveal How Systems Fail — and Could Have Succeeded

These examples are not chosen to support any ideology.
They are simply the clearest windows into reality.

**1. SUTHERLAND SPRINGS, TX (2017)

A tragedy by bureaucracy — 26 killed, 22 injured**

  • Shooter convicted of domestic violence in the Air Force
  • Legally prohibited from firearm ownership
  • Air Force never uploaded the conviction into NICS
  • He passed background checks he should have failed

A church full of families was devastated because a clerk in a military office did not submit a form.

Law enforcement conclusion:
“Fix the reporting system and this shooter never gets a gun.”

**2. UVALDE, TX (2022)

Dozens of warnings — none acted on in time**

  • Multiple students reported terrifying social media posts
  • The shooter had photos of weapons, threats, violent messages
  • Friends said he was “spiraling”
  • A near-complete mental health collapse went unaddressed

The tragedy in Uvalde was compounded by a catastrophic police response — but the earlier failures are equally important: warning signs ignored, red flags dismissed, no early intervention team engaged.

Law enforcement conclusion:
“If someone had been empowered to intervene early, this kid never reaches that school door.”

**3. MIDLAND–ODESSA, TX (2019)

He failed a background check — then bought a weapon privately**

  • Shooter tried to buy a gun from a licensed dealer
  • He FAILED the background check
  • He then purchased a rifle through a private sale with no check
  • He spiraled, snapped during a traffic stop, and killed 7 people

Texas DPS and FBI called this case the “perfect storm of loopholes.”

Law enforcement conclusion:
“A failed background check should trigger a welfare follow-up.
Nobody checked on him.”

**4. FORT HOOD, TX (2009)

A shooter telegraphed his radicalization — nothing done**

  • Major Nidal Hasan repeatedly communicated extremist ideology
  • Colleagues reported him
  • Concerns were dismissed to avoid accusations of bias

This case shows what law enforcement calls “hesitation risk” — institutions afraid to act decisively.

**5. LAS VEGAS, NV (2017)

The outlier — almost no warning signs**

This shooter is the exception that proves the rule.
Law enforcement found:

  • no threats,
  • no manifesto,
  • no social media trail,
  • no extremist network.

He was wealthy, isolated, and meticulous.

Conclusion:
A tiny percentage of cases will bypass all prevention systems.
Most will not.

III. The Cases Where Mass Shootings Were Prevented — Proof That Prevention Works

These are not theories.
These are real, documented saves.

1. Richmond, VA (2022) — A July 4th massacre stopped cold

A man overheard a conversation about an attack planned on a holiday celebration.
He reported it.
Police uncovered weapons, plans, and a manifesto.

Lives saved: potentially hundreds.

2. Lubbock, TX (2021) — A 13-year-old stopped before carrying out school attack

The student had:

  • a detailed map
  • a written kill list
  • weapons ready
  • a manifesto

His grandmother found the notebook and reported him immediately.

Law enforcement conclusion:
“Family vigilance prevented mass casualties.”

3. Daytona Beach, FL (2019) — Threat assessment works

A student posted online:
“I’m going to shoot up the school.”

A classmate reported it.
Within hours:

  • police arrived
  • family cooperated
  • weapons were secured
  • boy received psychiatric evaluation

A textbook intervention.

4. Washington State (2015) — School attack prevented by a friend’s courage

A 15-year-old planned a Columbine-style attack.
He shared part of his plan with a friend.
The friend reported it, despite fear of social backlash.

Police discovered:

  • an AK-47
  • detailed plans
  • written threats

Friendship and courage saved a school.

5. Plano, TX Workplace Attack Prevented (2016)

A disgruntled employee expressed violent intent toward coworkers.
HR flagged it.
The company called police.
He was interviewed, weapons removed, and evaluated.

No attack occurred.

IV. What Law Enforcement Says Actually Works (Not Ideology — Evidence)

After decades of analysis, police agencies, FBI profilers, Secret Service behavioral specialists, and state threat-assessment units consistently identify five high-impact, realistic solutions.

Not bans.
Not fantasies.
Not slogans.

Real solutions grounded in actual casework.

1. Fix the Data — The Fastest Way to Save Lives

Cases like Sutherland Springs and Midland–Odessa show the role of:

  • missing convictions
  • unfiled restraining orders
  • unreported mental-health rulings
  • incorrect identifiers

Law enforcement calls this:

“The invisible failure that kills.”

The fix:
mandatory reporting audits and penalties for noncompliance.

2. County-Wide Threat Assessment Teams (The Best Tool We Have)

Teams combining:

  • sheriff’s office
  • schools
  • mental health
  • prosecutors
  • social workers

These teams already exist in:

  • Virginia (after Virginia Tech)
  • Florida (after Parkland)
  • Utah (statewide)
  • North Texas school districts

And they work.

They have stopped dozens of planned attacks by:

  • interviewing individuals
  • securing weapons temporarily
  • offering services
  • coordinating follow-up
  • de-escalating crises

This is the single most successful prevention method America has.

3. Mandatory Follow-Up on Credible Threat Reports

This is not punitive.
It is welfare-based intervention, used worldwide.

Every credible threat triggers:

  • a home visit
  • mental-health assessment
  • background check review
  • firearm-safety conversation (or temporary transfer if warranted)
  • follow-up plan

This would have intervened in:

  • Parkland
  • Uvalde
  • Santa Fe
  • Highland Park
  • El Paso
  • Dayton

Law enforcement overwhelmingly supports this.

4. Hardening Soft Targets — Without Militarizing Them

Realistic, non-intrusive upgrades:

  • shatter-resistant glass
  • classroom doors that lock from inside
  • unified communications (so responders hear the same thing)
  • interior safe zones
  • trained voluntary armed staff (Texas Guardian Program)
  • real-time law enforcement access to building layouts
  • festival/event perimeter redesigns

These upgrades prevented casualties in:

  • West Freeway Church of Christ, White Settlement, TX (armed volunteer stopped shooter in seconds, 2019)
  • Arvada, CO store attack (2021)
  • multiple school attacks where locked classrooms saved children

5. Breaking Adult Isolation — The Hidden Variable

Law enforcement notes a growing pattern: older, isolated, grievance-driven adults.

Examples:

  • Half Moon Bay (2023)
  • Buffalo supermarket shooter lived in complete isolation for years
  • Dayton shooter with obsessive ideation
  • Midland–Odessa shooter living alone in a squalid shack

Effective interventions:

  • workplace threat reporting
  • veteran wellness checks
  • aging men’s mental health programs
  • community navigator teams
  • training employers to recognize decompensation

These are low-cost and high-impact.

V. The Most Underreported Factor: Courage of Bystanders

Again and again, the preventions happened because someone —

  • a coworker
  • a teacher
  • a classmate
  • a grandmother
  • a friend
  • a roommate

— chose to speak up.

Law enforcement calls this:

“The single most important variable in preventing mass violence.”

Bystanders save more lives than laws.

VI. The Moral Imperative: Replace Hopelessness With Method

Mass shootings aren’t random.
They aren’t unpredictable.
And they aren’t unsolvable.

What we need isn’t a perfect solution — it’s a functional system.

  • Competent reporting
  • Seamless coordination
  • Early intervention
  • Community eyes
  • Physical barriers that buy seconds
  • Adults who refuse to look away

These are the realistic, proven, workable solutions that law enforcement supports because they have watched them succeed in the field.

Conclusion: A Country That Can Change — If It Wants To

America doesn’t have to choose between freedom and safety.
It must choose between chaos and coordination.

The truth is painful but hopeful:

Most mass shootings are preventable.
Not with bans.
Not with magic.
But with systems that work and communities that care.

This is not a political argument.
It is a practical one — written in blood and proven by the cases where tragedy was avoided.

The question now is whether the country is willing to move beyond slogans and toward the solutions that actually save lives.

**APPENDIX

Texas Mass Violence Prevention Framework (2025 Edition)**
A State-Specific Policy, Law-Enforcement, and Case-Based Reference

I. Texas Case Studies (Successes and Failures)

Texas provides a uniquely large dataset for examining mass shootings: rural, suburban, urban, along the border, in oilfield regions, in major metros. These cases reveal consistent system gaps.

A. When the System Failed

1. Sutherland Springs (2017) — Data Failure

  • Domestic violence conviction not reported by the Air Force
  • Shooter passed background checks he should have failed
  • 26 dead, 22 wounded

Gap identified: Failure to report disqualifying convictions to NICS.
Texas impact: Dozens of counties still fail to upload mental-health adjudications consistently.

2. Santa Fe High School (2018) — No Warning System

  • 10 killed, 13 injured
  • Shooter had written violent fantasies, wore trench coat daily, showed disturbing art
  • None of it triggered intervention under existing school policies

Gap identified: Lack of integrated school threat-assessment teams pre-Parkland-style reforms.

3. El Paso Walmart Attack (2019) — Ideology, Isolation, and Online Radicalization

  • Shooter posted manifesto 20 minutes before attack
  • Family saw increasing withdrawal but did not see a way to intervene legally
  • 23 killed, 22 injured

Gap identified: No statewide reporting mechanism for family concern + lack of early intervention infrastructure.

4. Midland–Odessa (2019) — Failed Check + No Follow-Up

  • Shooter failed a background check
  • Still obtained rifle via private sale
  • Escaped all follow-up and monitoring
  • 7 killed, 25 injured

Gap identified: Texas has no “background check failure follow-up” protocol for welfare checks.

5. Uvalde (2022) — Warnings but No Coordinated Response

  • 30+ warning signs in digital posts
  • Peers alarmed
  • Threat assessment not mobilized
  • Failed command, failed entry, failed radios, failed leadership

Gaps identified:

  • early intervention
  • communication systems
  • unified command
  • school hardening
  • law-enforcement coordination

B. When the System Worked (Successful Texas Preventions)

1. Lubbock (2021) — Grandmother Stops School Attack

  • 13-year-old with kill list, weapons, and plans
  • Grandmother reported him immediately
  • Police confiscated weapons, intervened, managed mental-health services

Success factor: Courageous family reporting + rapid police response + cooperative mental health team.

2. Plano Workplace Threat (2016)

  • Employee threatened violence after disciplinary action
  • HR flagged it
  • Plano PD intervened
  • Shooter’s plan was disrupted without arrest

Success factor: Employer training + HR protocols + law enforcement follow-through.

3. White Settlement Church (2019)

  • Shooter killed two people during service
  • Armed volunteer neutralized the shooter within 6 seconds
  • Attack ended before a second reload

Success factor: Legitimated armed volunteer program (“Guardian”-style model) + training + mental readiness.

4. North Texas High School Plots Disrupted (Multiple 2020–2024)

School districts in Denton, Collin, and Tarrant Counties thwarted more than a dozen serious plots because of:

  • school resource officers
  • student tips
  • routine digital threat monitoring
  • counseling interventions
  • multi-party threat assessment teams

Success factor: Post-Parkland statewide reforms requiring threat assessment teams in ISDs.

II. Texas Law Enforcement Consensus (Interviews, Briefings & Reports)

Across:

  • Texas Police Chiefs Association
  • County Sheriffs
  • DPS briefings
  • Texas School Safety Center
  • Fusion centers
  • Large-city PDs (Houston, Dallas, San Antonio, Austin, Fort Worth)

The consistent message is this:

“Almost every mass shooting is preventable if someone can act early —
but the system doesn’t empower people to act.”

Their concerns fall into five categories:

1. Lack of Consequences for Non-Reporting

Agencies that fail to upload disqualifying records face no meaningful penalties.
Sheriffs say:

“If reporting is optional, tragedy is inevitable.”

2. Fragmented Threat Assessment

Texas has strong school systems, but adult threat assessment is weak.

DPS Colonel Steven McCraw has repeatedly said:

“Adult shooters fall completely outside school safety structures.”

3. Soft Targets and Weak Facilities

Sheriffs in rural counties often point out:

“Our churches, fairs, festivals, and schools were built before the era of mass violence.”

Meaning: physical layouts are outdated.

4. Too Many Lone, Isolated, Angry Adults

Texas PDs say they increasingly deal with:

  • divorced, isolated adult men
  • untreated mental illness
  • workplace grievances
  • housing-insecure individuals
  • online radicalization across the spectrum

This is the modern offender profile — not simply youth shooters.

5. No Statewide Mechanism for “Background Check Failures”

Law enforcement consistently recommends:

“If someone fails a background check, they should receive a welfare check.
Not to seize weapons — but to understand the risk.”

This one reform would have prevented Midland–Odessa.

III. Concrete State-Level Solutions (Non-Ideological and Realistic)

These are politically feasible, budget-achievable, and supported by law enforcement.

1. Mandatory Reporting Compliance Audits

Texas should audit:

  • county clerks
  • JP courts
  • district courts
  • mental-health orders
  • protective orders

Goal: ensure all disqualifying convictions enter NICS/DPS within 24–72 hours.

Cost: low
Impact: high

2. “Texas Adult Threat Assessment Teams” (T-ATAT)

Modeled after school threat teams but focused on adults.

Teams would include:

  • Sheriff’s office
  • Constables
  • Mental health mobile crisis units
  • Prosecutors
  • Social workers
  • Veteran services
  • Employers (optional)

Focus:

  • early intervention
  • de-escalation
  • temporary safety plans
  • coordinated follow-up

This responds to half the Texas shooter profile, which is adult male isolation.

3. Background Check Failure Protocol (Welfare Check + Mental Health Screen)

If a Texan:

  • fails a background check
  • attempts an illegal straw purchase
  • makes “alarmingly specific” threats

…then DPS notifies the sheriff in that county.

Sheriff conducts:

  • welfare check
  • mental-health referral (if needed)
  • firearm safety conversation
  • case documentation

No confiscation required.
No criminal charge required.

Simply breaking the isolation saves lives.

4. Realistic Target Hardening for Schools, Churches & Events

Low-cost priorities:

  • shatter-resistant entry glass
  • interior locking mechanisms
  • campus-wide communication systems
  • unified law enforcement radio channels
  • updated maps accessible digitally to responders
  • controlled-access vestibules
  • volunteer security programs

These already saved lives at:

  • White Settlement church
  • West Texas schools where locked classrooms stopped entry
  • multiple thwarted school plots

5. Community Navigator Teams for Isolated Adults

Texas sheriffs strongly endorse pilot programs in:

  • rural counties
  • oilfield regions
  • borderside colonias
  • veteran-dense areas

Navigators perform:

  • wellness checks
  • reconnecting individuals to family, church, social services
  • employment referrals
  • mental health connection
  • regular follow-up

This is cheap and effective.

6. Employer Training Statewide (especially in high-stress industries)

Texas mass violence often emerges from:

  • trucking
  • energy sector
  • distribution warehouses
  • food processing plants
  • call centers

Employers need:

  • threat-recognition training
  • HR escalation pathways
  • connections to sheriff’s offices

This prevented the Plano case.

IV. “What Good Intervention Looks Like” — Texas Examples

Case A: North Texas High School Plot Stopped (2023)

  • Student posted detailed shooting threat
  • Classmates reported immediately
  • Threat team met same day
  • Parents cooperated
  • Police conducted home visit
  • Weapons removed temporarily
  • Student entered crisis counseling
  • No criminal record created

Outcome:
No violence.
Family relieved.
School safe.
Child receives long-term care.

Case B: Rural West Texas Veteran (2020)

  • Veteran in crisis making alarming comments
  • Neighbor reported
  • Sheriff’s deputy and veteran liaison responded
  • Weapons temporarily transferred to brother
  • Veteran placed in VA crisis stabilization program
  • Follow-up by navigator team

Outcome:
Incident avoided.
Veteran stabilized.
No arrests.
Family grateful.

Case C: Dallas-Area Workplace (2022)

  • Worker said he wanted to “take out” supervisors
  • HR trained under Texas Workplace Safety Pilot Program
  • HR called police
  • PD interviewed, implemented voluntary safety plan
  • Mental health assistance provided
  • Employer changed his job assignment

Outcome:
No violence.
Employee recovered, remained employed.

V. Statewide Recommended Implementation Plan

Year 1 (Fast Wins)

  • NICS reporting audits
  • Texas Adult Threat Assessment Teams (pilot in 8 major counties)
  • DCFS and mental health reporting refreshers
  • Standardized threat reporting hotline

Year 2 (Scalable Programs)

  • statewide employer training
  • community navigator expansion
  • school physical-security retrofits
  • integrated law enforcement communications

Year 3 (Long-Term Infrastructure)

  • full digital courthouse → DPS transmission
  • unified statewide threat-assessment database
  • mental-health telecrisis network across rural counties

VI. “Texas Principles” for Mass Violence Prevention

Law enforcement leaders often summarize what works into three Texas-style principles:

**1. “If it’s predictable, it’s preventable.”

Almost every attacker reveals intent.

**2. “You can’t fix what you don’t see.”

Isolation breeds violence — intervention disrupts it.

**3. “Don’t wait for perfect. Act when something seems wrong.”

Prevention happens early or not at all.

VII. Conclusion of Appendix

Texas is poised to lead the nation with non-ideological, realistic, enforceable policies that:

  • honor the Second Amendment
  • respect local control
  • prioritize law enforcement input
  • rely on early intervention, not confiscation
  • strengthen communities, not weaken them
  • save lives without dividing the country

Mass violence is not an unsolved mystery.
It is a coordination problem, a communication problem, and at its core, a human connection problem.

Texas can fix these.
Texas has the tools.
Texas has the cases.
And now, Texas has the blueprint.

**APPENDIX B

“What I’ve Learned After 20 Years Responding to Mass Violence”
A Law Enforcement Perspective

I’ve worn a badge in Texas for more than two decades. I’ve seen quiet towns shaken by unspeakable violence, and I’ve seen ordinary citizens step up to prevent tragedies the public will never hear about. I’ve walked through crime scenes that will stay with me until the day I retire, and I’ve sat at kitchen tables with parents who have no words left except, “Why?”

After all this time, I’ve learned that nearly everything the public argues about is only a sliver of the truth. Mass violence doesn’t happen because one law wasn’t passed or because one political side is right and the other is wrong. It happens because systems fail, people look away, warnings go unreported, and institutions are afraid to act when someone is spiraling.

This is what it looks like from where I stand.

I. “We Almost Always Know”

The hardest truth is this:

In most cases, the shooter was on someone’s radar long before they opened fire.

I’m not talking about clairvoyance.
I’m talking about patterns.

In case after case, we’ve seen:

  • threats posted online
  • violent fantasies shared with friends
  • domestic disturbances
  • histories of grievance and obsession
  • escalating isolation
  • coworker concerns
  • school warnings
  • welfare checks that never happened
  • mental health breaks that went untreated

We call these “pre-incident indicators.”
They’re real. They’re measurable. And they’re almost always present.

The tragedy is not that we don’t know —
it’s that we don’t act fast enough or in sync enough.

II. “It’s Not the Gun — It’s the Spiral”

I’ve taken more guns off the street than I can remember. Hunting rifles. Handguns. A few illegally modified weapons. And yes, rifles with large magazines.

But here’s the truth you learn after 20 years:

It’s never the gun in isolation.
It’s the downward slide no one interrupts.

Shooters are rarely “snapped” individuals.
They are individuals who decline over months or years.

We see:

  • isolation
  • job loss
  • family collapse
  • grievance accumulation
  • untreated depression
  • anger fixation
  • obsession with previous shooters
  • social withdrawal
  • personality change

By the time they act violently, they’ve been at the bottom of a well for a long time—and no one lowered a rope.

If you want to know what law enforcement believes will make the biggest difference, it’s this:

Catch the spiral before the crash.

III. “Families Know First”

I wish the public understood how many times a parent, sibling, spouse, or grandparent has quietly whispered to me:

“I’m scared of what he might do.”
“He’s not the same person anymore.”
“He talks about violence.”

But they didn’t know what to do.
They didn’t want their family member arrested.
They didn’t want to “ruin his life.”
They didn’t know if it was serious.
Sometimes they were embarrassed.

Here’s what I want every Texan to know:

Calling us doesn’t automatically mean a criminal charge.
Most of the time, early intervention means:

  • mental-health evaluation
  • voluntary firearm transfer
  • crisis services
  • counseling
  • follow-ups
  • family coordination

The public imagines a SWAT raid.
What usually happens is a conversation at the kitchen table.

IV. “Threat Assessment Teams Work — Better Than Anything Else We’ve Tried”

The best tool we have isn’t complicated:

Get the right people around the same table before someone gets hurt.

A threat assessment team — the way we run them in parts of Texas — includes:

  • detectives
  • school representatives
  • mental-health clinicians
  • prosecutors
  • social service partners
  • sometimes clergy or veterans’ liaisons

When these teams function, they catch things that no single agency would ever catch alone.

I’ve seen teams:

  • talk a teenager out of a violent plan
  • get an unstable adult into treatment
  • mediate workplace grievances
  • defuse domestic crises
  • remove firearms voluntarily
  • help families reconnect
  • stop ideologically motivated plots

And the public never knows because nothing bad happened.

I can tell you without hesitation:

Threat assessment has prevented more mass shootings than any law ever passed.

V. “Follow-Up Saves Lives”

One of the biggest failures in this country is the belief that if someone doesn’t break the law, there’s nothing we can do.

That’s false.

We can:

  • check on them
  • talk to them
  • bring mental-health professionals
  • involve the family
  • secure weapons voluntarily
  • create a safety plan
  • follow up again and again

The cases that haunt me are the ones where the warning signs were clear, someone called, and then the file sat on a desk — or was never shared with the people who could act.

The most effective thing we can do is simple:

If a credible threat comes in, someone must check on that person within 24 hours.

Not to arrest.
To assess.
To intervene early.

VI. “You Don’t Need to Militarize a School to Make It Safe”

I’ve been inside dozens of Texas schools.
Some built in the 1960s with glass doors that could be breached by a lawn chair.
Some built after 2018 with lockdown doors, radio repeaters, and secure vestibules.

You know what helps?

  • classroom doors that lock from the inside
  • shatter-resistant glass
  • clear communication systems
  • unified law enforcement radio channels
  • controlled access
  • trained school staff who know what to do

You know what doesn’t help?

  • finger-pointing
  • slogans
  • political theater

Small, inexpensive improvements save more lives than any sweeping overhaul.

VII. “We Need Community, Not Just Cops”

People assume mass violence is a police problem.
It isn’t.

It’s a community problem.

The most important actors in prevention are:

  • families
  • coworkers
  • HR officers
  • school counselors
  • pastors
  • friends
  • neighbors

You see the cracks before we do.
You see the shift in behavior.
You hear the disturbing comment.
You watch the decline.

And when you call us, you give us a chance to help before the damage is done.

VIII. “The Truth No One Wants to Admit”

I’ve seen evil.
I’ve seen pain.
I’ve seen things I won’t describe in a public essay.

But I’ve also seen:

  • a grandmother save a school
  • a coworker prevent a workplace massacre
  • a pastor de-escalate a veteran in crisis
  • a teacher stop a tragedy with one phone call
  • a church security volunteer act in six seconds to end a deadly attack

The truth is this:

Mass shootings are not unstoppable.
They are unaddressed.
There’s a difference.

We can fix this.
We know how.
We have the tools.
We just have to use them consistently.

IX. My Message to Texans

If you want to save lives, don’t start with Congress.
Start with:

  • local coordination
  • early intervention
  • better reporting
  • stronger families
  • human connection
  • courage when something feels wrong

Texas has already stopped attacks because the right person spoke up.
And Texas has suffered attacks because the right person stayed silent.

We can change that.

X. Final Word

I’ve carried children out of classrooms.
I’ve stepped over shell casings in churches.
I’ve held the hands of grieving parents.
I’ve watched communities heal with patience, courage, and love.

I don’t want to see another town go through this.
And we don’t have to.

Not if we act early.
Not if we act together.
Not if we see the warning signs and refuse to ignore them.

Most shooters are preventable long before a trigger is ever pulled.
Our job is to step in before someone reaches the point of no return.

And that is something Texas can lead the nation in doing — not through division, but through determination.