Population as the Primary and Predictable Driver of Local Government Forecasting

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

A technical framework for staffing, facilities, and cost projection

Abstract

In local government forecasting, population is the dominant driver of service demand, staffing requirements, facility needs, and operating costs. While no municipal system can be forecast with perfect precision, population-based models—when properly structured—produce estimates that are sufficiently accurate for planning, budgeting, and capital decision-making. Crucially, population growth in cities is not a sudden or unknowable event.

Through annexation, zoning, platting, infrastructure construction, utility connections, and certificates of occupancy, population arrival is observable months or years in advance. This paper presents population not merely as a driver, but as a leading indicator, and demonstrates how cities can convert development approvals into staged population forecasts that support rational staffing, facility sizing, capital investment, and operating cost projections.


1. Introduction: Why population sits at the center

Local governments exist to provide services to people. Police protection, fire response, streets, parks, water, sanitation, administration, and regulatory oversight are all mechanisms for supporting a resident population and the activity it generates. While policy choices and service standards influence how services are delivered, the volume of demand originates with population.

Practitioners often summarize this reality informally:

“Tell me the population, and I can tell you roughly how many police officers you need.
If I know the staff, I can estimate the size of the building.
If I know the size, I can estimate the construction cost.
If I know the size, I can estimate the electricity bill.”

This paper formalizes that intuition into a defensible forecasting framework and addresses a critical objection: population is often treated as uncertain or unknowable. In practice, population growth in cities is neither sudden nor mysterious—it is permitted into existence through public processes that unfold over years.


2. Population as a base driver, not a single-variable shortcut

Population does not explain every budget line, but it explains most recurring demand when paired with a small number of modifiers.

At its core, many municipal services follow this structure:

Total Demand=α+β⋅Population

Where:

  • α (fixed minimum) represents baseline capacity required regardless of size (minimum staffing, governance, 24/7 coverage).
  • β (variable component) represents incremental demand generated by each additional resident.

This structure explains why:

  • Small cities appear “overstaffed” per capita (fixed minimum dominates).
  • Mid-sized and large cities stabilize into predictable staffing ratios.
  • Growth pressures emerge when population increases faster than capacity adjustments.

Population therefore functions as the load variable of local government, analogous to demand in utility planning.


3. Why population reliably predicts service demand

3.1 People generate transactions

Residents generate:

  • Calls for service
  • Utility usage
  • Permits and inspections
  • Court activity
  • Recreation participation
  • Library circulation
  • Administrative transactions (HR, payroll, finance, IT)

While individual events vary, aggregate demand scales with population.

3.2 Capacity, not consumption, drives budgets

Municipal budgets fund capacity, not just usage:

  • Staff must be available before calls occur
  • Facilities must exist before staff are hired
  • Vehicles and equipment must be in place before service delivery

Capacity decisions are inherently population-driven.


4. Population growth is observable before it arrives

A defining feature of local government forecasting—often underappreciated—is that population growth is authorized through public approvals long before residents appear in census or utility data.

Population does not “arrive”; it progresses through a pipeline.


5. The development pipeline as a population forecasting timeline

5.1 Annexation: strategic intent (years out)

Annexation establishes:

  • Jurisdictional responsibility
  • Long-term service obligations
  • Future land-use authority

While annexation does not create immediate population, it signals where population will eventually be allowed.

Forecast role:

  • Long-range horizon marker
  • Infrastructure and service envelope planning
  • Typical lead time: 3–10 years

5.2 Zoning: maximum theoretical population

Zoning converts land into entitled density.

From zoning alone, cities can estimate:

  • Maximum dwelling units
  • Maximum population at buildout
  • Long-run service ceilings

Zoning defines upper bounds, even if timing is uncertain.

Forecast role:

  • Long-range capacity planning
  • Useful for master plans and utility sizing
  • Typical lead time: 3–7 years

5.3 Preliminary plat: credible development intent

Preliminary plat approval signals:

  • Developer capital commitment
  • Defined lot counts
  • Identified phasing

Population estimates become quantifiable, even if delivery timing varies.

Forecast role:

  • Medium-high certainty population
  • First stage for phased population modeling
  • Typical lead time: 1–3 years

5.4 Final plat: scheduled population

Final plat approval:

  • Legally creates lots
  • Locks in density and configuration
  • Triggers infrastructure construction
  • Impact Fees & other costs are committed

At this point, population arrival is no longer speculative.

Forecast role:

  • High-confidence population forecasting
  • Suitable for annual budget and staffing models
  • Typical lead time: 6–24 months

5.5 Infrastructure construction: timing constraints

Once streets, utilities, and drainage are built, population arrival becomes physically constrained by construction schedules.

Forecast role:

  • Narrow timing window
  • Supports staffing lead-time decisions
  • Typical lead time: 6–18 months

5.6 Water meter connections: imminent occupancy

Water meters are one of the most reliable near-term indicators:

  • Each residential meter ≈ one household
  • Installations closely precede vertical construction

Forecast role:

  • Quarterly or monthly population forecasting
  • Just-in-time operational scaling
  • Typical lead time: 1–6 months

5.7 Certificates of Occupancy: population realized

Certificates of occupancy convert permitted population into actual population.

At this point:

  • Service demand begins immediately
  • Utility consumption appears
  • Forecasts can be validated

Forecast role:

  • Confirmation and calibration
  • Not prediction

6. Population forecasting as a confidence ladder

Development StagePopulation CertaintyTiming PrecisionPlanning Use
AnnexationLowVery lowStrategic
ZoningLow–MediumLowCapacity envelopes
Preliminary PlatMediumMediumPhased planning
Final PlatHighMedium–HighBudget & staffing
Infrastructure BuiltVery HighHighOperational prep
Water MetersExtremely HighVery HighNear-term ops
COsCertainExactValidation

Population forecasting in cities is therefore graduated, not binary.


7. From population to staffing

Once population arrival is staged, staffing can be forecast using service-specific ratios and fixed minimums.

7.1 Police example (illustrative ranges)

Sworn officers per 1,000 residents commonly stabilize within broad bands depending on service level and demand, also tied to known local ratios:

  • Lower demand: ~1.2–1.8
  • Moderate demand: ~1.8–2.4
  • High demand: ~2.4–3.5+

Civilian support staff often scale as a fraction of sworn staffing.

The appropriate structure is:Officers=αpolice+βpolicePopulationOfficers = \alpha_{police} + \beta_{police} \cdot PopulationOfficers=αpolice​+βpolice​⋅Population

Where α accounts for minimum 24/7 coverage and supervision.


7.2 General government staffing

Administrative staffing scales with:

  • Population
  • Number of employees
  • Asset inventory
  • Transaction volume

A fixed core plus incremental per-capita growth captures this reality more accurately than pure ratios.


8. From staffing to facilities

Facilities are a function of:

  • Headcount
  • Service configuration
  • Security and public access needs

A practical planning method:Facility Size=FTEGross SF per FTEFacility\ Size = FTE \cdot Gross\ SF\ per\ FTEFacility Size=FTE⋅Gross SF per FTE

Typical blended civic office planning ranges usually fall within:

  • ~175–300 gross SF per employee

Specialized spaces (dispatch, evidence, fleet, courts) are layered on separately.


9. From facilities to capital and operating costs

9.1 Capital costs

Capital expansion costs are typically modeled as:Capex=Added SFCost per SF(1+Soft Costs)Capex = Added\ SF \cdot Cost\ per\ SF \cdot (1 + Soft\ Costs)Capex=Added SF⋅Cost per SF⋅(1+Soft Costs)

Where soft costs include design, permitting, contingencies, and escalation.


9.2 Operating costs

Facility operating costs scale predictably with size:

  • Electricity: kWh per SF per year
  • Maintenance: % of replacement value or $/SF
  • Custodial: $/SF
  • Lifecycle renewals

Electricity alone can be reasonably estimated as:Annual Cost=SFkWh/SF$/kWhAnnual\ Cost = SF \cdot kWh/SF \cdot \$/kWhAnnual Cost=SF⋅kWh/SF⋅$/kWh

This is rarely exact—but it is directionally reliable.


10. Key modifiers that refine population models

Population alone is powerful but incomplete. High-quality forecasts adjust for:

  • Density and land use
  • Daytime population and employment
  • Demographics
  • Service standards
  • Productivity and technology
  • Geographic scale (lane miles, acres)

These modifiers refine, but do not replace, population as the base driver.


11. Why growth surprises cities anyway

When cities claim growth was “unexpected,” the issue is rarely lack of information. More often:

  • Development signals were not integrated into finance models
  • Staffing and capital planning lagged approvals
  • Fixed minimums were ignored
  • Threshold effects (new stations, expansions) were deferred too long

Growth that appears sudden is usually forecastable growth that was not operationalized.


12. Conclusion

Population is the primary driver of local government demand, but more importantly, it is a predictable driver. Through annexation, zoning, platting, infrastructure construction, utility connections, and certificates of occupancy, cities possess a multi-year advance view of population arrival.

This makes it possible to:

  • Phase staffing rationally
  • Time facilities before overload
  • Align capital investment with demand
  • Improve credibility with councils, auditors, and rating agencies

In local government, population growth is not a surprise. It is a permitted, engineered, and scheduled outcome of public decisions. A forecasting system that treats population as both a driver and a leading indicator is not speculative—it is simply paying attention to the city’s own approvals.


Appendix A

Defensibility of Population-Driven Forecasting Models

A response framework for auditors, rating agencies, and governing bodies

Purpose of this appendix

This appendix addresses a common concern raised during budget reviews, audits, bond disclosures, and council deliberations:

“Population-based forecasts seem too simplistic or speculative.”

The purpose here is not to argue that population is the only factor affecting local government costs, but to demonstrate that population-driven forecasting—when anchored to development approvals and adjusted for service standards—is methodologically sound, observable, and conservative.


A.1 Population forecasting is not speculative in local government

A frequent misconception is that population forecasts rely on demographic projections or external estimates. In practice, this model relies primarily on the city’s own legally binding approvals.

Population growth enters the forecast only after it has passed through:

  • Annexation agreements
  • Zoning entitlements
  • Preliminary and final plats
  • Infrastructure construction
  • Utility connections
  • Certificates of occupancy

These are public, documented actions, not assumptions.

Key distinction for reviewers:
This model does not ask “How fast might the city grow?”
It asks “What growth has the city already approved, and when will it become occupied?”


A.2 Population is treated as a leading indicator, not a lagging one

Traditional population measures (census counts, ACS estimates) are lagging indicators. This model explicitly avoids relying on those for near-term forecasting.

Instead, it uses development milestones as leading indicators, each with increasing certainty and narrower timing windows.

For audit and disclosure purposes:

  • Early-stage entitlements affect only long-range capacity planning
  • Staffing and capital decisions are triggered only at later, high-certainty stages
  • Near-term operating impacts are tied to utility connections and COs

This layered approach prevents premature spending while avoiding reactive under-staffing.


A.3 Fixed minimums prevent over-projection in small or slow-growth cities

A common audit concern is that per-capita models overstate staffing needs.

This model explicitly separates:

  • Fixed baseline capacity (α)
  • Incremental population-driven capacity (β)

This structure:

  • Prevents unrealistic staffing increases in early growth stages
  • Accurately reflects real-world minimum staffing requirements
  • Explains why per-capita ratios vary by city size

Auditors should note that this approach is more conservative than straight-line per-capita extrapolation.


A.4 Service standards are explicit policy inputs, not hidden assumptions

Population does not automatically dictate staffing levels. Staffing reflects policy decisions.

This model requires the city to explicitly state:

  • Response time targets
  • Service frequency goals
  • Coverage expectations
  • Hours of operation

As a result:

  • Changes in staffing can be clearly attributed to either population growth or policy change
  • Council decisions are transparently reflected in forecasts
  • The model separates “growth pressure” from “service enhancements or reductions”

This clarity improves accountability rather than obscuring it.


A.5 Facilities and capital projections follow staffing, not speculation

Another concern raised by reviewers is that population forecasts may be used to justify premature capital expansion.

This model deliberately enforces a sequencing discipline:

  1. Population approvals observed
  2. Staffing thresholds reached
  3. Facility capacity constraints identified
  4. Capital expansion triggered

Facilities are not expanded because population might grow, but because staffing—already justified by approved growth—can no longer be accommodated.

This mirrors best practices in asset management and avoids front-loading debt.


A.6 Operating cost estimates use industry-standard unit costs

Electricity, maintenance, custodial, and lifecycle costs are estimated using:

  • Per-square-foot benchmarks
  • Historical city utility data where available
  • Conservative unit assumptions

These are not novel or experimental methods. They are the same unit-cost techniques commonly used in:

  • CIP planning
  • Facility condition assessments
  • Energy benchmarking
  • Budget impact statements

Auditors should view these estimates as planning magnitudes, not precise bills—and that distinction is explicitly stated in the model documentation.


A.7 The model is testable and falsifiable

A major strength of this approach is that it can be validated against actual outcomes.

As certificates of occupancy are issued:

  • Actual population arrival can be compared to forecasts
  • Staffing changes can be reconciled
  • Utility consumption can be measured

This allows:

  • Annual recalibration
  • Error tracking
  • Continuous improvement

Models that can be tested and corrected are inherently more defensible than opaque judgment-based forecasts.


A.8 Why this approach aligns with rating-agency expectations

Bond rating agencies consistently emphasize:

  • Predictability
  • Governance discipline
  • Forward planning
  • Avoidance of reactive financial decisions

This framework demonstrates:

  • Awareness of growth pressures well in advance
  • Phased responses rather than abrupt spending
  • Clear linkage between approvals, staffing, and capital
  • Conservative treatment of uncertainty

As such, population-driven forecasting anchored to development approvals should be viewed as a credit positive, not a risk.


A.9 Summary for reviewers

For audit, disclosure, and governance purposes, the following conclusions are reasonable:

  1. Population growth in cities is observable years in advance through public approvals.
  2. Using approved development as a population driver is evidence-based, not speculative.
  3. Fixed minimums and service-level inputs prevent mechanical over-projection.
  4. Staffing precedes facilities; facilities precede capital.
  5. Operating costs scale predictably with assets and space.
  6. The model is transparent, testable, and adjustable.

Therefore:
A population-driven forecasting model of this type represents a prudent, defensible, and professionally reasonable approach to long-range municipal planning.


Appendix B

Consequences of Failing to Anticipate Population Growth

A diagnostic review of reactive municipal planning

Purpose of this appendix

This appendix describes common failure patterns observed in cities that do not systematically link development approvals to population, staffing, and facility planning. These outcomes are not the result of negligence or bad intent; they typically arise from fragmented information, short planning horizons, or the absence of an integrated forecasting framework.

The patterns described below are widely recognized in municipal practice and are offered to illustrate the practical risks of reactive planning.


B.1 “Surprise growth” that was not actually a surprise

A frequent narrative in reactive cities is that growth “arrived suddenly.” In most cases, the growth was visible years earlier through zoning approvals, plats, or utility extensions but was not translated into staffing or capital plans.

Common indicators:

  • Approved subdivisions not reflected in operating forecasts
  • Development tracked only by planning staff, not finance or operations
  • Population discussed only after occupancy

Consequences:

  • Budget shocks
  • Emergency staffing requests
  • Loss of credibility with governing bodies

B.2 Knee-jerk staffing reactions

When growth impacts become unavoidable, reactive cities often respond through hurried staffing actions.

Typical symptoms:

  • Mid-year supplemental staffing requests
  • Heavy reliance on overtime
  • Accelerated hiring without workforce planning
  • Training pipelines overwhelmed

Consequences:

  • Elevated labor costs
  • Increased burnout and turnover
  • Declining service quality during growth periods
  • Inefficient long-term staffing structures

B.3 Under-sizing followed by over-correction

Without forward planning, cities often alternate between two extremes:

  1. Under-sizing due to conservative or delayed response
  2. Over-sizing in reaction to service breakdowns

Examples:

  • Facilities built too small “to be safe”
  • Rapid expansions shortly after completion
  • Swing from staffing shortages to excess capacity

Consequences:

  • Higher lifecycle costs
  • Poor space utilization
  • Perception of waste or mismanagement

B.4 Obsolete facilities at the moment of completion

Facilities planned without reference to future population often open already constrained.

Common causes:

  • Planning based on current headcount only
  • Ignoring entitled but unoccupied development
  • Failure to include expansion capability

Consequences:

  • Expensive retrofits
  • Disrupted operations during expansion
  • Shortened facility useful life

This is one of the most costly errors because capital investments are long-lived and difficult to correct.


B.5 Deferred capital followed by crisis-driven spending

Reactive cities often delay capital investment until systems fail visibly.

Typical patterns:

  • Fire stations added only after response times degrade
  • Police facilities expanded only after overcrowding
  • Utilities upgraded only after service complaints

Consequences:

  • Emergency procurement
  • Higher construction costs
  • Increased debt stress
  • Lost opportunity for phased financing

B.6 Misalignment between departments

When population intelligence is not shared across departments:

  • Planning knows what is coming
  • Finance budgets based on current year
  • Operations discover impacts last

Consequences:

  • Conflicting narratives to council
  • Fragmented decision-making
  • Reduced trust between departments

Population-driven forecasting provides a common factual baseline.


B.7 Overreliance on lagging indicators

Reactive cities often rely heavily on:

  • Census updates
  • Utility consumption after occupancy
  • Service call increases

These indicators confirm growth after it has already strained capacity.

Consequences:

  • Persistent lag between demand and response
  • Structural understaffing
  • Continual “catch-up” budgeting

B.8 Political whiplash and credibility erosion

Unanticipated growth pressures often force councils into repeated difficult votes:

  • Emergency funding requests
  • Mid-year budget amendments
  • Rapid debt authorizations

Over time, this leads to:

  • Voter skepticism
  • Council fatigue
  • Reduced tolerance for legitimate future investments

Planning failures become governance failures.


B.9 Inefficient use of taxpayer dollars

Ironically, reactive planning often costs more, not less.

Cost drivers include:

  • Overtime premiums
  • Compressed construction schedules
  • Retrofit and rework costs
  • Higher borrowing costs due to rushed timing

Proactive planning spreads costs over time and reduces risk premiums.


B.10 Organizational stress and morale impacts

Staff experience growth pressures first.

Observed impacts:

  • Chronic overtime
  • Inadequate workspace
  • Equipment shortages
  • Frustration with leadership responsiveness

Over time, this contributes to:

  • Higher turnover
  • Loss of institutional knowledge
  • Reduced service consistency

B.11 Why these failures persist

These patterns are not caused by incompetence. They persist because:

  • Growth information is siloed
  • Forecasting is viewed as speculative
  • Political incentives favor short-term restraint
  • Capital planning horizons are too short

Absent a formal framework, cities default to reaction.


B.12 Summary for governing bodies

Cities that do not integrate development approvals into population-driven forecasting commonly experience:

  1. Perceived “surprise” growth
  2. Emergency staffing responses
  3. Repeated under- and over-sizing
  4. Facilities that age prematurely
  5. Higher long-term costs
  6. Organizational strain
  7. Reduced public confidence

None of these outcomes are inevitable. They are symptoms of not using information the city already has.


B.13 Closing observation

The contrast between proactive and reactive cities is not one of optimism versus pessimism. It is a difference between:

  • Anticipation versus reaction
  • Sequencing versus scrambling
  • Planning versus explaining after the fact

Population-driven forecasting does not eliminate uncertainty. It replaces surprise with preparation.


Appendix C

Population Readiness & Forecasting Discipline Checklist

A self-assessment for proactive versus reactive cities

Purpose:
This checklist allows a city to evaluate whether it is systematically anticipating population growth—or discovering it after impacts occur. It is designed for use by city management teams, finance directors, auditors, and governing bodies.

How to use:
For each item, mark:

  • Yes / In place
  • ⚠️ Partially / Informal
  • No / Not done

Patterns matter more than individual answers.


Section 1 — Visibility of Future Population

C-1 Do we maintain a consolidated list of annexed, zoned, and entitled land with estimated buildout population?

C-2 Are preliminary and final plats tracked in a format usable by finance and operations (not just planning)?

C-3 Do we estimate population by development phase, not just at full buildout?

C-4 Is there a documented method for converting lots or units into population (household size assumptions reviewed periodically)?

C-5 Do we distinguish between long-range potential growth and near-term probable growth?

Red flag:
Population is discussed primarily in narrative terms (“fast growth,” “slowing growth”) rather than quantified and staged.


Section 2 — Timing and Lead Indicators

C-6 Do we identify which development milestone triggers planning action (e.g., preliminary plat vs final plat)?

C-7 Are infrastructure completion schedules incorporated into population timing assumptions?

C-8 Are water meter installations or equivalent utility connections tracked and forecasted?

C-9 Do we use certificates of occupancy to validate and recalibrate population forecasts annually?

C-10 Is population forecasting treated as a rolling forecast, not a once-per-year estimate?

Red flag:
Population is updated only when census or ACS data is released.


Section 3 — Staffing Linkage

C-11 Does each major department have an identified population or workload driver?

C-12 Are fixed minimum staffing levels explicitly separated from growth-driven staffing?

C-13 Are staffing increases tied to forecasted population arrival, not service breakdowns?

C-14 Do hiring plans account for lead times (recruitment, academies, training)?

C-15 Can we explain recent staffing increases as either:

  • population growth, or
  • explicit policy/service-level changes?

Red flag:
Staffing requests frequently cite “we are behind” without reference to forecasted growth.


Section 4 — Facilities and Capital Planning

C-16 Are facility size requirements derived from staffing projections, not current headcount?

C-17 Do capital plans include expansion thresholds (e.g., headcount or service load triggers)?

C-18 Are new facilities designed with future expansion capability?

C-19 Are entitled-but-unoccupied developments considered when evaluating future facility adequacy?

C-20 Do we avoid building facilities that are at or near capacity on opening day?

Red flag:
Facilities require major expansion within a few years of completion.


Section 5 — Operating Cost Awareness

C-21 Are operating costs (utilities, maintenance, custodial) modeled as a function of facility size and assets?

C-22 Are utility cost impacts of expansion estimated before facilities are approved?

C-23 Do we understand how population growth affects indirect departments (HR, IT, finance)?

C-24 Are lifecycle replacement costs considered when adding capacity?

Red flag:
Operating cost increases appear as “unavoidable surprises” after facilities open.


Section 6 — Cross-Department Integration

C-25 Do planning, finance, and operations use the same population assumptions?

C-26 Is growth discussed in joint meetings, not only within planning?

C-27 Does finance receive regular updates on development pipeline status?

C-28 Are growth assumptions documented and shared, not implicit or informal?

Red flag:
Different departments give different growth narratives to council.


Section 7 — Governance and Transparency

C-29 Can we clearly explain to council why staffing or capital is needed before service failure occurs?

C-30 Are population-driven assumptions documented in budget books or CIP narratives?

C-31 Do we distinguish between:

  • growth-driven needs, and
  • discretionary service enhancements?

C-32 Can auditors or rating agencies trace growth-related decisions back to documented approvals?

Red flag:
Growth explanations rely on urgency rather than evidence.


Section 8 — Validation and Learning

C-33 Do we compare forecasted population arrival to actual COs annually?

C-34 Are forecasting errors analyzed and corrected rather than ignored?

C-35 Do we adjust household size, absorption rates, or timing assumptions over time?

Red flag:
Forecasts remain unchanged year after year despite clear deviations.


Scoring Interpretation (Optional)

  • Mostly ✅ → Proactive, anticipatory city
  • Mix of ✅ and ⚠️ → Partially planned, risk of reactive behavior
  • Many ❌ → Reactive city; growth will feel like a surprise

A city does not need perfect scores. The presence of structure, documentation, and sequencing is what matters.


Closing Note for Leadership

If a city can answer most of these questions affirmatively, it is not guessing about growth—it is managing it. If many answers are negative, the city is likely reacting to outcomes it had the power to anticipate.

Population growth does not cause planning problems.
Ignoring known growth signals does.


Appendix D

Population-Driven Planning Maturity Model

A framework for assessing and improving municipal forecasting discipline

Purpose of this appendix

This maturity model describes how cities evolve in their ability to anticipate population growth and translate it into staffing, facility, and financial planning. It recognizes that most cities are not “good” or “bad” planners; they are simply at different stages of organizational maturity.

Each level builds logically on the prior one. Advancement does not require perfection—only structure, integration, and discipline.


Level 1 — Reactive City

“We didn’t see this coming.”

Characteristics

  • Population discussed only after impacts are felt
  • Reliance on census or anecdotal indicators
  • Growth described qualitatively (“exploding,” “slowing”)
  • Staffing added only after service failure
  • Capital projects triggered by visible overcrowding
  • Frequent mid-year budget amendments

Typical behaviors

  • Emergency staffing requests
  • Heavy overtime usage
  • Facilities opened already constrained
  • Surprise operating cost increases

Organizational mindset

Growth is treated as external and unpredictable.

Risks

  • Highest long-term cost
  • Lowest credibility with councils and rating agencies
  • Chronic organizational stress

Level 2 — Aware but Unintegrated City

“Planning knows growth is coming, but others don’t act on it.”

Characteristics

  • Development pipeline tracked by planning
  • Finance and operations not fully engaged
  • Growth acknowledged but not quantified in budgets
  • Capital planning still reactive
  • Limited documentation of assumptions

Typical behaviors

  • Late staffing responses despite known development
  • Facilities planned using current headcount
  • Disconnect between planning reports and budget narratives

Organizational mindset

Growth is known, but not operationalized.

Risks

  • Continued surprises
  • Internal frustration
  • Mixed messages to council

Level 3 — Structured Forecasting City

“We model growth, but execution lags.”

Characteristics

  • Population forecasts tied to development approvals
  • Preliminary staffing models exist
  • Fixed minimums recognized
  • Capital needs identified in advance
  • Forecasts updated annually

Typical behaviors

  • Better budget explanations
  • Improved CIP alignment
  • Still some late responses due to execution gaps

Organizational mindset

Growth is forecastable, but timing discipline is still developing.

Strengths

  • Credible analysis
  • Reduced emergencies
  • Clearer governance conversations

Level 4 — Integrated Planning City

“Approvals, staffing, and capital move together.”

Characteristics

  • Development pipeline drives population timing
  • Staffing plans phased to population arrival
  • Facility sizing based on projected headcount
  • Operating costs modeled from assets
  • Cross-department coordination is routine

Typical behaviors

  • Hiring planned ahead of demand
  • Facilities open with expansion capacity
  • Capital timed to avoid crisis spending
  • Clear audit trail from approvals to costs

Organizational mindset

Growth is managed, not reacted to.

Benefits

  • Stable service delivery during growth
  • Higher workforce morale
  • Strong credibility with governing bodies

Level 5 — Adaptive, Data-Driven City

“We learn, recalibrate, and optimize continuously.”

Characteristics

  • Rolling population forecasts
  • Development milestones tracked in near-real time
  • Annual validation against COs and utility data
  • Forecast errors analyzed and corrected
  • Scenario modeling for alternative growth paths

Typical behaviors

  • Minimal surprises
  • High confidence in long-range plans
  • Early identification of inflection points
  • Proactive communication with councils and investors

Organizational mindset

Growth is a controllable system, not a threat.

Benefits

  • Lowest lifecycle cost
  • Highest service reliability
  • Institutional resilience

Summary Table

LevelDescriptionCore Risk
1ReactiveCrisis-driven decisions
2Aware, unintegratedLate responses
3StructuredExecution lag
4IntegratedFew surprises
5AdaptiveMinimal risk

Key Insight

Most cities are not failing—they are stuck between Levels 2 and 3. The largest gains come not from sophisticated analytics, but from integration and timing discipline.

Progression does not require:

  • Perfect forecasts
  • Advanced software
  • Large consulting engagements

It requires:

  • Using approvals the city already grants
  • Sharing population assumptions across departments
  • Sequencing decisions intentionally

Closing Observation

Cities do not choose whether they grow. They choose whether growth feels like a surprise or a scheduled event.

This maturity model makes that choice visible.

Rethinking Disaster Relief in America

Why States Can Absorb More—and Why the Federal Government Should Become a True Backstop

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

Introduction

For decades, disaster relief in America has operated under a familiar assumption: states cannot reliably handle the financial shock of natural disasters, so the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) must stand ready as the first and primary payer whenever storms, fires, floods, or earthquakes strike. This model dates back to 1979, when President Jimmy Carter created FEMA to consolidate civil defense and disaster-response functions into a single federal agency. After the attacks of September 11th, FEMA was folded into the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, broadening its responsibilities and cementing its role as the nation’s manager of both large and routine emergencies.

Yet the fiscal and operational landscape has changed sharply since those foundational decisions. States today maintain much stronger budgets, far deeper rainy-day reserves, more diversified revenue sources, and more mature emergency-management agencies than they had in the late twentieth century. Meanwhile, FEMA itself has grown increasingly bureaucratic, with administrative costs rising from around 9 percent of disaster spending in the early 1990s to roughly 18 percent between 1989 and 2011, and often exceeding its own internal cost targets. The agency has become indispensable in catastrophic cases but inefficient and slow in everyday ones.

This white paper examines whether FEMA must continue to function as a first-dollar payer, or whether a more modern system would assign routine responsibilities to states and reserve federal involvement for extreme, budget-threatening disasters. What emerges is a surprising conclusion backed by hard data: most states can, in fact, absorb the disaster costs FEMA typically covers, which ranged from 0.41 percent to 5.58 percent of state spending in the 2022–2024 period, with a national average of 1.19 percent. At the same time, states have median rainy-day reserves equal to 13–14 percent of their general-fund spending, and many maintain reserves far larger than that.

The implication is profound. FEMA is essential for rare catastrophic events—but its role as the payer of routine disaster bills imposes high overhead and creates slow, inefficient recovery cycles. This paper lays out a new model in which states pay their own ordinary disaster costs up to a clear percentage of their budgets, and the federal government becomes a streamlined, formula-driven backstop above that threshold. The goal is to reduce federal bureaucracy, preserve national capacity for massive events, and match responsibilities to the actual fiscal capabilities of states today.


I. FEMA’s Role and the Growth of Federal Disaster Spending

When FEMA was created in 1979, the federal government consolidated more than 100 disparate disaster- and civil-defense programs. Its newer home in the Department of Homeland Security expanded its remit, placing it at the center of national preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. Through its Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), FEMA has spent approximately $347 billion (in 2022 dollars) over the past three decades, with more than half of that total coming after 2005 as disasters increased in frequency and severity.

Despite the DRF’s historic role in major recovery efforts—Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Harvey, and Maria being among the most notable—the agency has become known for slow reimbursements, multi-year project closeouts, and a documentation system so complex that many counties wait months or even years to recover funds already expended. A single North Carolina county spent more on debris removal after Hurricane Helene than its entire annual budget and waited over a year without full reimbursement, a pattern familiar to many local governments.

Yet reliance on FEMA is not uniform across the country. Some states receive enormous federal aid in catastrophic years; others receive relatively little even across multiple years. It is only by understanding this distribution that a reformed model can be imagined.


II. How Dependent Are States on FEMA? Quantifying the Financial Exposure

The best picture of ongoing reliance comes from the 2022–2024 FEMA obligations dataset, which compared how much FEMA spent in each state to that state’s total expenditures. The findings provide a clear map of how deeply—or how little—states depend on the agency in routine years.

A. National Average

Across all fifty states, FEMA obligations equaled only 1.19 percent of total state spending. This means that for the average state, FEMA’s typical-year disaster role is fiscally small—a burden that could, in principle, be absorbed using normal budget tools without major restructuring.

B. Most FEMA-dependent states (recent years)

Though the national average is small, some states exhibit higher FEMA reliance:

  • Louisiana: 5.58% of total state spending
  • Florida: 4.39%
  • Montana: 3.91%
  • New York: 2.44%
  • Vermont: 2.14%
  • Virginia: 1.72%
  • Alaska: 1.71%
  • Rhode Island: 1.70%
  • Hawaii: 1.60%
  • Colorado: 1.58%

Importantly, even in these “higher exposure” states, the FEMA share of total expenditures remains well below the rainy-day reserves most states currently hold.

C. Least FEMA-dependent states

At the other end:

  • Nevada: 0.41% of state spending
  • Wyoming: 0.48%
  • Oklahoma: 0.58%

For these states, FEMA’s role is nearly negligible as a share of governmental revenue.

D. The catastrophic-year exception

These routine-year percentages mask an important truth: when disasters like Katrina or major multi-storm years hit, federal aid can reach staggering proportions. Pew’s long-term analysis showed that Louisiana’s federal disaster aid approached 19 percent of its general-fund spending in one extreme year. Such rare events are the moments where federal backstop capacity is crucial.

The real message in the data is this: states can handle the predictable; they cannot self-insure the catastrophic.


III. States’ Rainy-Day Funds: A Strong Foundation for a New Model

As federal disaster costs have grown, so too has state fiscal strength. Over the last decade, state rainy-day funds—formally called Budget Stabilization Funds—have reached historic highs.

  • Total U.S. state rainy-day funds (FY 2024): $158 billion
  • Total general-fund spending (FY 2024): $1.29 trillion
  • Median rainy-day balance: ~13–14 percent of general-fund expenditures
  • Some states far exceed that median:
    • Texas holds reserves equal to ~18 percent of annual general-fund spending.
    • Wyoming holds reserves equal to nearly 70 percent.
    • California’s reserve system in 2022 accounted for nearly half of all rainy-day dollars nationwide.

These figures dwarf the routine-year FEMA exposure numbers. For example, Florida’s FEMA dependence at 4.39 percent of spending is overshadowed by its double-digit rainy-day reserves. Montana’s 3.91 percent figure fits comfortably against the national 13–14 percent median. Even Louisiana, at 5.58 percent, can theoretically cover such costs with existing reserves in a typical year.

This means that the primary fiscal justification for FEMA as a first-dollar payer has largely evaporated; states now have mature financial defenses that simply did not exist decades ago.


IV. FEMA’s Bureaucracy Cost: The Inefficient Load-Bearing Wall

The financial problem with FEMA is not simply the cost of disaster payments—it is the cost of administering them. GAO’s multi-decade analyses show a clear historical trend:

  • In the early 1990s, FEMA’s administrative costs averaged about 9 percent of disaster spending.
  • From 1989 to 2011, the average nearly doubled to around 18 percent.
  • Many small- and medium-scale disasters exceeded FEMA’s own internal administrative-cost targets—which ranged from 8 percent to 20 percent depending on disaster size.

These numbers mean that for every $1 billion in disaster assistance, taxpayers may be funding $120 million to $180 million in federal overhead.

This inefficiency is not due solely to waste; it is structural. The current FEMA reimbursement system:

  • requires extensive documentation for thousands of separate projects;
  • demands eligibility reviews, re-reviews, appeals, closeouts, and audits;
  • relies on multi-year case management;
  • burdens counties that must front millions of dollars;
  • often requires several rounds of resubmission for small technical errors.

The system is built for granular reimbursement, not for speed, clarity, or administrative efficiency.

Any serious reform must begin with this reality: FEMA’s overhead is too high for routine work but entirely justified for rare catastrophic events.


V. A New Structure: State-First Responsibility with a Federal Safety Net Above a Threshold

The empirical question—whether states can absorb FEMA’s typical yearly costs—has been answered by the data: yes, they can. What states cannot absorb are the extreme, once-in-a-generation events that create fiscal shocks exceeding 10–20 percent of a budget year.

A modernized system should reflect this difference.

A. States handle their own disaster costs up to a fixed percentage of their budget

A clear and uniform rule could be adopted nationwide:

A state must cover disaster-related costs up to 3 percent of its prior-year general-fund expenditures before federal aid begins.

This threshold is intentionally set:

  • above the national FEMA-reliance average (1.19%);
  • above most moderate-exposure states’ reliance;
  • below the high-exposure states’ routine-year experience (3.91–5.58%);
  • and well within median rainy-day capacity.

This requirement is neither punitive nor unrealistic. It simply aligns responsibility with the fiscal strength states have already built.

B. States rely on rainy-day reserves and disaster accounts first

States already use a mix of rainy-day funds, disaster funds, supplemental appropriations, and budget flexibility to manage emergencies. In a reformed model, these existing tools would be applied in a structured, predictable sequence—not in political improvisation after the fact.

C. The federal government acts only as a high-threshold backstop

Once a state’s disaster costs exceed the 3 percent trigger, the federal government intervenes. For truly catastrophic years—costs exceeding 10 or 15 percent of state general-fund spending—the federal share could increase to 90 or even 95 percent.

This preserves national solidarity for the events no state can manage alone, while eliminating unnecessary federal entanglement in predictable, lower-level disasters.

D. Federal overhead is reduced dramatically

Under the backstop model, the federal government would only process a small number of large, formula-based payments rather than tens of thousands of reimbursement claims. This change alone could reduce federal overhead from the current 13–18 percent range to 3–5 percent, freeing substantial tax dollars for actual recovery work.


VI. Why a State-First, Federal-Backstop Model Is the Right Path Forward

A system in which states handle ordinary disasters and the federal government protects against the extraordinary aligns perfectly with the fiscal and operational realities of the 2020s.

For states, this model restores autonomy and incentivizes better land-use planning, improved mitigation, and more responsible financial preparation. It also removes the long bureaucratic delays associated with FEMA reimbursements, which often burden local governments more than the disasters themselves.

For the federal government, the model offers clarity and efficiency. Instead of struggling to administer thousands of granular projects—including small-dollar repairs that should never have been federalized—the national government can focus its resources on high-impact events, surge capacity, interstate coordination, and macro-level resilience.

For taxpayers, the new model promises a better mix of value and protection. Money that once funded administrative overhead can instead flow to recovery. At the same time, Americans maintain confidence that when the unimaginable occurs—a Katrina, a California megaquake, a Category 5 storm impacting two states simultaneously—the nation remains ready.


Conclusion

The debate around eliminating FEMA has often been framed as a choice between total federal withdrawal and the continuation of an increasingly bureaucratic status quo. The data, however, points to a more balanced and responsible path. Most states rely on FEMA for only 1 to 2 percent of their total spending in typical disaster years. Even the states with higher exposure—Louisiana at 5.58 percent, Florida at 4.39 percent, and Montana at 3.91 percent—retain rainy-day reserves far larger than these amounts. With median rainy-day balances now reaching 13 to 14 percent of general-fund spending, the financial capacity to absorb routine disaster costs already exists at the state level.

At the same time, the extreme years—the years where total federal disaster aid climbs into double digits as a share of a state’s budget—prove unequivocally that a national safety net remains essential. No state can self-fund a shock approaching one-fifth of its general fund, as Louisiana once experienced. In those moments, the federal government must still be the guardian of last resort.

The most effective reform lies in between: eliminate FEMA’s role as the payer of first resort and reshape the federal role into a streamlined backstop triggered only when a state’s disaster costs exceed a fixed percentage of its budget—3 percent being the most logical threshold. This shift would dramatically reduce federal overhead, accelerate recovery timelines, clarify responsibilities, reward mitigation, and ensure that the nation’s full strength remains available when true catastrophe strikes.

In short, the future of American disaster management should not be FEMA everywhere or FEMA nowhere. It should be FEMA where it matters most, and a state-first model where it does not. This approach honors both fiscal responsibility and national solidarity, and it reflects the actual capabilities of states today—capabilities strong enough to shoulder their own burdens, and a nation still strong enough to stand with them when those burdens become too great.

Data Centers in Texas: Peak Math, Success, Failures, and How to Keep Residents Off the Hook

AI Reponses to Questions Posed by Lewis McLain

Introduction

It was exciting to me when I joined the City of Garland in the early 1970s. Working in municipal government was not something I had considered when I received my BBA in Accounting. I never really wanted to be an accountant. My true love was Budgeting and Cost Accounting. The gift I really received was the introduction to Utility Rate Making. Garland not only had Water & Sewer Utilities, but the city also had an Electric Utility. I was also fortunate to work with excellent outside Rate Consultants. The big present wrapped with a nice bow was the concept of Peak Demand vs Average Demand in utility systems. From there, I realized the concept applied to roadways and many other aspects of municipal services. LFM

The Quick Math (so this posting makes sense)

Every discussion about data centers and electricity should begin with two simple metrics: load factor and peak demand.

  • Load factor (LF) = Average demand ÷ Peak demand.
  • Peaking factor (the inverse) = Peak ÷ Average = 1/LF.

Example (same annual energy, different load factors):
Suppose a data center averages 50 MW (megawatts or one million watts) of demand across the year. The perfect situation would be if there were businesses with a 100% load factor, meaning a business used the same amount of power every single hour (actually every minute) of the year.

  • At 50% LF, the peaking factor is 2.0. That means Peak = 100 MW.
  • At 75% LF, the peaking factor is 1.333. That means Peak ≈ 66.7 MW.

Takeaway: By raising the load factor from 50% to 75%, the required peak capacity falls by about 33% while delivering the same yearly energy.

And here’s why that matters: Texas utilities and ERCOT must size substations, feeders, and generation to meet the peak, not the average.

Homes conversion rule of thumb:

  • 1 MW ≈ 250 Texas homes at summer peak (based on ~4 kW per home).
  • 1 MW ≈ 625 homes on an annual-energy basis (average load ~1.6 kW per home).

So a 100 MW campus is the equivalent of a new mid-sized city landing on your grid overnight.


The Perfect Story and Outcome

Now picture the ideal case. A fast-growing tech firm proposes a 100 MW data campus in Texas. Instead of rushing, city leaders and the utility sit down with the company at the start and insist on clear answers. The questions are simple but critical:

  • What will your peak demand be, and how will you manage it during the state’s hottest afternoons?
  • Who pays for the new substation and feeders, and who carries the risk if you scale back or leave?
  • How do we ensure your taxable value stays meaningful even after your servers depreciate?
  • What tangible benefits will our community see, beyond the building itself?

On the grid:
The company commits to a high load factor and pledges to curtail 20–30 MW during ERCOT’s four summer peaks. The new substation and feeders are paid through contribution in aid of construction (CIAC), so residents will never face stranded costs like the costly investment itself.

On the finances:
Abatements are milestone-based—tied to actual MW energized, not just breaking ground. Valuation floors lock in a taxable base for servers and electrical gear, guaranteeing a predictable $5–10 million per year for schools, police, and parks.

On jobs and training:
The campus directly employs about 60 skilled staff for operations. But the developer also funds a community-college training pipeline in IT and electrical trades, seeding hundreds of local careers. The construction phase delivers hundreds of short-term jobs for two years.

On resources:
The data hall commits to water-efficient cooling, capped at a set gallon-per-MW threshold with quarterly reporting. A community benefit fund supplements fire protection and road upgrades near the campus.

On politics:
Hearings are calm because everything is transparent. Residents know in plain English that their bills won’t rise, because the project carries its own risk.

Outcome:
Five years later, the facility hums steadily, the schools are flush with additional tax revenue, and the city is recognized as a model for how to land high-tech investment without burdening households or small businesses.


What Could Go Wrong? (Case Narratives)

Of course, not every story ends this way. Around the country, major data-center projects have stumbled, been cancelled, or backfired in ways that offer hard lessons for Texas communities.

Corporate pullback after big promises — Microsoft

In 2025, Microsoft canceled or walked away from about 2,000 MW of planned data center capacity in the U.S. and Europe. Analysts cited oversupply compared with near-term demand. Utilities and communities that had already been preparing for those loads were left with planning costs and the risk of stranded substations.

Lesson for Texas: Even blue-chip firms are not risk-free. Cities must require CIAC, minimum bills, demand ratchets, and parent guarantees so residents aren’t forced to backfill the shortfall if plans change.


Court voids approvals after years of work — Prince William County, Virginia

In August 2025, a Virginia judge voided the rezonings for the “Digital Gateway” project—37 data centers on 1,700 acres—citing legal defects in notice and hearings. Years of planning collapsed overnight.

Lesson for Texas: Keep zoning and notice airtight. Add regulatory failure clauses in agreements so if courts unwind approvals, the city isn’t on the hook.


Political rejection at the finish line — College Station, Texas

On September 11, 2025, the College Station City Council unanimously rejected a proposed 600 MW data campus after residents raised concerns about grid strain, noise, water use, and meager job counts. The rejection stopped the project before construction—but it revealed how quickly sentiment can flip.

Lesson for Texas: Require peak-hour commitments (4CP curtailment), publish MW timelines, and cap water usage. Transparency eases public concerns and avoids last-minute backlash.


Industry-wide pauses — Meta redesigns for AI

Between 2022 and 2024, Meta paused more than a dozen U.S. projects to redesign for artificial intelligence. Sites like Mesa, Arizona slipped years behind schedule. Communities banking on near-term tax revenue saw gaps in their budgets.

Lesson for Texas: Tie abatements to energized MW milestones. If load slips, abatements pause until actual demand materializes.


Subsidy blow-ups — Texas and beyond

By 2025, Texas’ data center sales-tax exemptions ballooned from $157 million to more than $1 billion per year in foregone revenue. Other states saw similar overruns as projects multiplied faster than expected.

Lesson for Texas: Model depreciation and appeals honestly. Use valuation floors in agreements, and don’t oversell the net gain at ribbon-cuttings.


Local backlash stalls projects — Central Texas

In Central Texas, residents have already forced pauses or redesigns of major projects, citing water stress, noise, and grid strain. CyrusOne and others adjusted timelines under pressure.

Lesson for Texas: Put MW forecasts, curtailment commitments, and water-use data in plain English. Opaqueness breeds opposition.


Who Pays When a Big Customer Leaves?

In Texas, fixed delivery costs don’t vanish if a large customer fails or exits. Unless safeguards are in place, those costs roll into the next rate case and land on residents and small businesses.

Protective tools include:

  • CIAC: Customer funds all dedicated substations/feeders.
  • Facilities charges: Monthly fees for customer-specific assets.
  • Contract demand and minimum bills: Revenue stability even if load shrinks.
  • Demand ratchets: If they ever peak high once, they pay a portion of that demand for future months.
  • Parent guarantees or letters of credit: Real money backing early-exit costs.
  • Peak-hour curtailment covenants: Written commitments to reduce load during ERCOT’s four summer peaks.

These tools are standard in Texas utility practice. The only mistake is failing to insist on them.


Bringing It Home to Collin & Denton (DFW)

The Dallas–Fort Worth market is growing fast: nearly 600 MW operating and another 600 MW under construction, almost all pre-leased. In Collin and Denton counties, just two or three large campuses can rival the load of an entire mid-size city.

That’s why development agreements must:

  • Stage energization in MW blocks,
  • Require 4CP curtailment reporting, and
  • Hard-wire CIAC plus facilities charges so no “stranded substation” ever lands on residents.

Conclusion: Planning With Eyes Wide Open

Data centers are the backbone of cloud computing, e-commerce, and artificial intelligence. For Texas, they promise billions in private investment and hundreds of millions in taxable value. But their true footprint is measured in megawatts, not headcount.

Handled well—with CIAC, ratchets, valuation floors, and peak-hour curtailment—they can be stable anchors of local finance. Handled poorly, they can leave residents paying for stranded substations, foregone tax revenue, and empty server halls.

The “perfect story” shows it can be done right. The failures across the country show what happens when it isn’t. For Texas cities, the path forward is clear: land the investment, but make the project carry the risk—not your ratepayers.


Contract terms cities and utilities should insist on (plug-and-play list)

  • CIAC for all dedicated facilities (feeders, substation bays, transformers).
  • Facilities charge (monthly) on any utility-owned dedicated equipment.
  • Contract demand with a minimum bill and demand ratchet.
  • Parent guarantee / letter of credit sized to cover early exit and decommissioning.
  • Peak-hour curtailment targets (spell out dates/hours and telemetry).
  • Milestone-based incentives (abatement pauses if MW milestones slip).
  • Valuation floors for server personal property and clear depreciation schedules.
  • Quarterly public reporting: MW online, curtailment at peaks, water usage if relevant.

DFW planning checklist (Collin & Denton emphasis)

  1. Get the MW ramp (Year 1–5), contract demand, and minimum bill in writing.
  2. Require CIAC + facilities charges so bespoke assets aren’t rate-based on everyone.
  3. Bake in peak-hour curtailment commitments (the four summer peaks).
  4. Tie local incentives to energized MW, not just building permits.
  5. Set valuation floors and independent appraisal rights.
  6. Secure credit support (parent guarantee or LOC) sized for the dedicated build.
  7. Publish quarterly progress (MW online and peak reductions) to keep trust with residents.

Sources (selected)

  • Corporate pullback: Microsoft cancellations ≈ 2,000 MW (TD Cowen). Reuters+1
  • Court reversal: Prince William “Digital Gateway” rezonings voided (Aug. 2025). Data Center Dynamics+1
  • Political rejection: College Station votes down 600 MW sale (Sept. 2025). Data Center Dynamics+1
  • Industry-wide pause/redesign: Meta paused >12 builds; Mesa AZ delay to 2025. Tech Funding News+1
  • Subsidy growth: Texas data-center tax costs > $1 B/yr; spikes across states. Good Jobs First+1
  • DFW market scale and pre-leasing: CBRE market profiles and releases (H1/H2 2024–2025). CBRE+2CBRE+2
  • Central-Texas pushback (CyrusOne pause noted): Austin American-Statesman review (Sept. 2025). Statesman