Under What Conditions Does a Data Center Make Sense?

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

It’s Not Only the Gallons — It’s the Peak: Peak Demand, Utility Capacity, and the Terms That Protect a Community

A plain-English technical paper · July 2026

Executive Summary

Headlines about data centers quote annual totals — millions of gallons, megawatts “equal to a small city.” Those totals are real, but they point at the wrong risk. Utility systems are built, and financed with decades of debt, to survive their single worst day. Capacity built for that day must be paid for all year, every year, whether or not the water or power is ever sold. So the first question about any data center is not “how much will it use?” It is “how big must we build — and who pays for what stands idle?”

Three findings follow, developed one step at a time in the body of the paper:

  • On electricity, data centers are among the steadiest, cheapest-to-serve customers a utility can sign. The real electric-side issues are sheer size, capacity reserved but never used, and split-second power swings from AI computing — all manageable by contract.
  • On water, the opposite. The newest cooling designs cut annual gallons dramatically but concentrate demand into a few hot weeks — so a facility that looks small on annual volume can force a community to build big-city capacity that sits idle most of the year, and its wastewater brings its own peak and its own chemistry.
  • Block one path and the demand moves to another network. Denied water, a data center leans harder on the electric peak; denied grid power, it builds gas-fired generation that lands on the pipeline system’s worst winter morning — and needs water of its own. Water, electricity, and gas must be evaluated as one decision.

Two more conclusions complete the picture. First, where the underlying supply — the water in the watershed, the generation on the grid, the gas in the pipe — is genuinely short, totals do matter, and the honest remedy is curtailment shared evenhandedly by all users, not a ban on the newest arrival. Second, the benefits are just as real as the burdens: a data center can be the best-shaped utility customer a system has ever been offered and a major tax base that demands almost nothing in services. Every major objection has a practical fix that can be written into a contract — including, for the water peak, a storage tank costing the developer roughly one percent of the project. The right answer to a well-sited data center proposal is neither “no” nor an unexamined “yes.” It is “yes, if” — and this paper ends with the term sheet.

1. Introduction

Public debate about data centers has focused overwhelmingly on totals: millions of gallons of water per year, or electricity use “equal to a small city.” Totals make good headlines, but they describe the wrong risk. A utility is rarely crippled by how much its customers use over a year. It is crippled — or forced into expensive expansion — by how much all of its customers demand at the same moment, on the system’s single worst day.

The question is no longer academic, and it is not on the horizon — it is here, and policymakers at every level are moving. At least eleven states have weighed moratoriums; New York’s legislature has passed the nation’s first statewide pause, awaiting the governor’s signature; Maine’s governor vetoed a similar bill; and in Texas, the Public Utility Commission and the Texas Water Development Board are surveying existing and planned data centers about water use and treatment, with a PUC report due to the Legislative Budget Board and the Governor at the end of 2026 [15][22]. The scale in Texas alone frames the stakes:

Texas snapshotFigure
Data centers operating (2025)400+, concentrated in five regions: Dallas–Fort Worth (197), San Antonio (60), West Texas (59), Austin (53), Houston (48)
Water use by Texas data centers, 2025≈25 billion gallons
Projected water use by 203029–161 billion gallons per year — up to ≈2.7% of all Texas water use
Electricity demand today≈9,500 MW
Projected electricity demand, 2030≈22,000–78,000 MW (ERCOT forecast range)
The planning gapERCOT has a process for interconnecting large electric loads; no parallel statewide process yet exists for water

The scale of the question — Texas snapshot [22][23].

This paper explains why load factor, not annual usage, is the master variable in utility economics — and where that rule stops, because in supply-constrained regions totals do matter; examines what published data show about data center demand for electricity, water, and natural gas; traces the consequences for community capital budgets, utility rates, and municipal credit; and then turns the argument around, examining the substantial benefits data centers offer and the engineering and contractual tools that can neutralize each major objection. The subject is genuinely technical, and this paper does not pretend otherwise; the approach is to take it one step at a time, define every term on first use, and end each section with a Key Takeaway box for the reader who wants the point without the plumbing.

KEY TAKEAWAY — The risk to a community is not how much a data center uses in a year; it is how big a system must be built — and financed — to stand ready for its single worst day. That question has now reached legislatures and governors, and Texas agencies owe the Governor a report on it at the end of 2026.

2. Utility Economics 101: Systems Are Built for the Peak, Not the Average

2.1 Two kinds of cost

Every utility has two fundamentally different kinds of cost. Operating costs — fuel, treatment chemicals, pumping energy — rise and fall with how much product is actually delivered. Capital costs are different: they are the cost of building the system itself — the treatment plants, storage tanks, pipes, generating stations, wires, and substations. Capital costs are driven almost entirely by capacity, and capacity is set by expected peak demand plus a safety margin, not by average or total demand [12].

The intuition is everyday. A church kitchen is sized for Easter Sunday, not the average Tuesday. A highway is sized for rush hour, not 3 a.m. A water system must be able to treat and deliver the maximum-day demand, sustain the peak hour within that day, and still hold reserve for firefighting during a heat wave [1]. An electric grid must meet the single highest hour of the year, typically a summer afternoon when air conditioners are running everywhere at once. All of that capacity must be built, financed, and maintained year-round, even though much of it is idle most of the time. The debt service on a treatment plant is due every month; the plant only earns its keep on the days it runs hard.

2.2 One concept, two vocabularies — and the convention used in this paper

The electric and water industries measure the same idea from opposite directions, which causes endless confusion. The electric industry speaks of load factor — average demand divided by peak demand, so higher means flatter. The water industry speaks of peaking factor — maximum-day demand divided by average-day demand, so lower means flatter. One is simply the reciprocal of the other: a peaking factor of 4.0 is a load factor of 25 percent. They are two ways of looking at one critical concept: what share of the capacity reserved for a customer is actually used. To be consistent and as simple as possible, this paper uses load factor throughout, converting water-industry peaking factors wherever sources report them (load factor = 1 ÷ peaking factor). Table 1 sorts out the terms.

TermDefinitionA perfectly flat customer
Load factorAverage demand ÷ peak demand, usually over a year. Higher is flatter and cheaper to serve. Used throughout this paper for water, electricity, and gas alike.100%
Peaking factorMaximum-day demand ÷ average-day demand — the water industry’s customary metric. The reciprocal of load factor: a peaking factor of 4.0 equals a 25% load factor. Converted to load factor throughout this paper.1.0
Peak-hour factorPeak-hour flow ÷ average flow; derived from daily figures with additional multipliers; sizes pumps and storage.1.0
Coincident peakA customer’s demand at the moment of the whole system’s peak — the demand that actually drives system-wide capacity.Equal to its average

Table 1. Key terms. Load factor and peaking factor are reciprocal expressions of the same ratio; this paper standardizes on load factor [1][2][12].

2.3 A worked example: same gallons, six times the cost

Consider two industrial customers who each buy exactly 36.5 million gallons per year — identical annual volume, identical volumetric revenue to the utility. Customer A draws a steady 100,000 gallons every day: a 100 percent load factor. Customer B averages the same 100,000 gallons per day but spikes to 600,000 gallons on the hottest days of summer: a load factor of just 17 percent.

 Customer A (flat)Customer B (peaky)
Annual purchases36.5 million gallons36.5 million gallons
Average-day demand100,000 gal/day100,000 gal/day
Maximum-day demand100,000 gal/day600,000 gal/day
Load factor100%17%
Capacity the utility must build100,000 gal/day600,000 gal/day
Capacity cost per gallon actually sold1x6x

Table 2. Two customers with identical annual usage. Customer B forces the utility to build six times the capacity for the same sales.

If the utility recovers costs mainly through volumetric rates — dollars per thousand gallons — both customers pay the same, yet Customer B caused six times the capital requirement. The difference does not vanish; it is silently financed by every other ratepayer, embedded in general rates or in system-wide debt. This is the peaking problem in one sentence: capacity is what a community pays for, while usage is merely what the utility happens to sell. Worse, the capacity built for Customer B’s few hot days stands idle roughly 360 days a year while bondholders are paid on all 365.

2.4 A necessary distinction: supply versus capacity

Before the load-factor argument can be applied honestly, two different scarcities must be kept separate, because they are routinely conflated in public debate. The first is delivery capacity — the size of the treatment plant, the pipe, the wire, the pipeline. Capacity is a manufactured thing: a community can build more of it, and what drives its cost is peak demand. That is the subject of this paper. The second scarcity is the commodity itself — the water actually in the watershed or aquifer, the gas actually deliverable from the basin, the energy actually generatable over a year. Supply is not manufactured on demand, and what strains it is total consumption, not peaks.

Where supply is genuinely short — a drought-stressed river basin in the Southwest, a pipeline-constrained region in a deep freeze, a grid short of generation — total usage is a legitimate, binding concern, and no rate design can conjure water that does not exist. But the remedy in a supply crisis is fundamentally different: curtailment and allocation applied evenhandedly to all users — industrial, commercial, and residential alike — because a shortage of supply is a community problem, not a data center problem. A large flat customer did not cause the drought, and a moratorium on one industry does not refill the reservoir; it merely reassigns who gets to consume a fixed shortfall.

The practical sequence for any community evaluating a large-load proposal therefore has two steps. Step one is a supply adequacy assessment: how much firm water, generation, and gas supply actually exists under stress conditions — drought of record, heat wave, polar vortex — and how much is already committed? If that test fails, the conversation is about curtailment rules for everyone, and it should be had openly rather than through the back door of blocking whichever large customer arrived last. Step two, where supply is adequate, is the subject of the rest of this paper: the binding economics become peak-driven capacity, and the task is to make the customer who causes the peak pay for the peak.

KEY TAKEAWAY — Capacity is what a community pays for; usage is what it happens to sell. A customer’s load factor — how flat its demand is — decides its true cost to the system. And before any of that: verify the supply exists, because a supply shortage is everyone’s problem, not one industry’s.

3. Electricity: The Surprisingly Flat Customer

3.1 What the data show

The popular image of a data center is a building running flat-out, 24/7/365. On the electric side, that image is close enough to true that it works in the data center’s favor. Utilities and analysts commonly assume load factors of 90 to 100 percent for large data centers [2]. Utility planning practice is somewhat more conservative: Duke Energy plans for new large loads at about an 80 percent load factor, and Dominion reported roughly an 82 percent actual load factor for large data centers in Virginia in 2024 [3]. Metered results vary more than the folklore suggests — one analysis of actual facilities found fewer than half exceeded an 80 percent load factor [2][3] — but even so, data centers remain far flatter than almost any other customer class. Published figures translate to electric load factors of roughly 50 to 65 percent for conventional cloud data centers and close to 100 percent for AI training facilities, whose accelerators grind at near-constant power for weeks at a time [4].

In classic rate-making terms, a high-load-factor customer is the cheapest kind to serve per kilowatt-hour: the demand-related capital cost is spread across an enormous number of kilowatt-hours. On the traditional load-factor test — the same test that condemns them on water, as Section 4 shows — data centers pass with room to spare.

3.2 The three real electric-side problems

First, scale and coincidence. A flat load contributes its entire demand to the system’s coincident peak. A 500 MW data center at a 90 percent load factor still adds up to 500 MW to the summer peak hour, and the grid must build for it. Flatness spreads the cost over more energy; it does not shrink the capacity requirement.

Second, contracted versus realized demand. Load factor is measured against a facility’s realized peak, but the utility must build to its contracted (nameplate) capacity. If a facility’s realized peak is only 80 percent of its contract and its load factor is 90 percent, its true utilization of the capacity the utility stands ready to serve is only 72 percent [2]. Facilities also routinely over-request capacity to preserve room for growth, and they ramp up over years. The gap between what is reserved and what is used is a hidden peaking problem, and it is why minimum-demand charges, ratchets, and take-or-pay provisions exist.

Third, fast transients. AI training clusters synchronize tens of thousands of processors, producing quasi-periodic power swings every 2 to 6 seconds that can oscillate by tens of megawatts within a single facility, with ramps measured in tens to hundreds of megawatts per second at job starts, checkpoints, and failures [4][5][6][7]. These sub-minute swings do not show up in a monthly demand charge at all — they are a power-quality and grid-stability problem, a new kind of “peaking” measured in seconds rather than seasons.

3.3 Proof that peaks, not energy, are the scarce resource

Researchers at Duke University quantified how much slack lives inside existing grids if new loads simply avoid the worst hours: about 76 gigawatts of new load — roughly 10 percent of the entire U.S. aggregate peak — could be added to existing systems if that load curtailed just 0.25 percent of its annual energy, about 85 hours per year in events averaging two hours [8]. Nearly all of the grid’s spare room is hiding in the hours that are not the peak. The same insight, mirrored, explains the water problem in the next section.

KEY TAKEAWAY — On electricity, data centers are among the flattest, cheapest-to-serve customers ever offered to a utility. The real electric-side issues are sheer size at the system peak, capacity reserved but never used, and split-second power swings — each manageable by contract.

4. Water: Where the Peaking Problem Lives

4.1 Why constant cooling does not mean constant water

A natural objection runs: a data center needs cooling 24 hours a day, all year — so surely its water demand is flat, like its electricity. The premise is right and the conclusion is wrong, because water is not how most of the cooling is done. It is the peaking fuel.

Physics sets the terms. Essentially every watt of electricity entering the building becomes heat, and that heat must leave the building continuously. There are only two ways to dump heat into the environment: blow outside air across coils (dry cooling — no water consumed), or evaporate water, which absorbs roughly 8,000 Btu per gallon — the same trick the human body uses when it sweats [1][12]. Dry cooling works fine when outside air is cool. It falters exactly when it is 105°F outside, because you are trying to push heat into air nearly as hot as the equipment. Evaporation keeps working in extreme heat because it exploits the humidity-adjusted (“wet-bulb”) temperature, which stays well below the air temperature. So water demand tracks the weather, not the computing load.

4.2 But is the water not recirculated?

Inside the building, yes. Modern facilities — especially liquid-cooled AI facilities — run closed loops in which the same water is chilled and recirculated indefinitely; that water is bought once [13]. But chilling the loop does not destroy the heat, it only moves it to the edge of the building, where it must still be rejected to the outdoors by one of the same two paths: fans (electricity) or evaporation (water). Even a cooling tower recirculates its water many times — but on each pass a fraction evaporates, and a further portion must be deliberately drained and replaced (“blowdown”) to keep dissolved minerals from scaling the equipment. Recirculation dramatically reduces water withdrawal; it cannot eliminate consumption where evaporation does the work [1][12][13].

4.3 The paradox: designs that use less water use it more peakily

The dominant new design is dry cooling with evaporative assist: fans handle the heat load whenever ambient temperatures allow — typically 85 to 95 percent of the hours of the year — and water sprays switch on only during the hottest hours, when dry cooling alone cannot keep up [1]. This slashes annual water use, which is what operators advertise. But it concentrates the entire year’s water demand into a few hundred summer hours. Annual gallons went down; the maximum-day demand the water utility must be built to serve did not. The water load factor collapses — from roughly 45 percent for a conventional cooling tower into the teens or below.

Facility / systemCooling typeWater load factor
Typical residential and commercial users (benchmark)40 – 67%
The Dalles, OR pressure zone dominated by a hyperscale data center (measured)Evaporative cooling towers45%
Phoenix, AZ colocation facility (estimated)Evaporative cooling towers≤ 45%
West Des Moines, IA hyperscaler (measured monthly 23%; estimated daily)Dry with evaporative assist≤ 15%
Planned AI data center, Indiana innovation district (planning)Dry with evaporative assist≤ 16%
Leesburg, VA hyperscale campus (planning, inferred)Dry with evaporative assist≈ 12% or lower
Data centers in Prince William Water service area, VA (measured, 2024)Mixed fleet10%
Northern Virginia weighted actual, many facilities combinedMixed fleet27 – 29%
Wisconsin AI campus: 0.7 MGD capacity requested vs. ≈23,000 gal/day averageDry with evaporative assist (≈480 hrs/yr of water use)< 3.5%
Leading operators’ planning values for state-of-the-art facilitiesDry with evaporative assist12 – 17% or lower

Table 3. Documented data center water load factors (average-day demand ÷ maximum-day demand). Source documents report daily peaking factors; converted here as load factor = 1 ÷ peaking factor. All figures compiled in [1] from utility records, government filings, and planning documents.

Two rows deserve emphasis. The West Des Moines facility uses relatively little water in winter, yet its summer draw is so large that it became the utility’s single largest annual water customer in 2024 and 2025 — a low load factor and large scale compounding [1][9]. And the Wisconsin campus is the design taken to its logical extreme: in a cold climate, evaporative assist is expected to run only about 480 hours per year, so the facility averages a trivial 23,000 gallons per day while requiring the utility to stand ready to deliver 700,000 gallons per day — a water load factor of barely 3 percent. By annual volume it is a small customer. By the capacity the community must reserve for it, it is enormous. That single contrast is the central point of this paper.

4.4 The worst timing possible

These peaks are not randomly timed. Evaporative assist switches on during prolonged heat waves — precisely when lawns are being irrigated, municipal demand is at its annual maximum, drought restrictions may be in force, and fire risk is elevated. The data center’s peak lands on top of everyone else’s peak, so it adds almost gallon-for-gallon to the system’s design day. And unlike electricity, where batteries can shave short peaks, operators have rarely built multi-day water storage voluntarily [1] — under volumetric rates, there is no reason to; the utility bears the peak. Section 9 shows how sharply that economics changes once the peak is priced.

4.5 The return trip: wastewater has its own peak and its own chemistry

What a data center sends back down the sewer deserves the same scrutiny as what it takes in. Cooling blowdown is concentrated by design: the same gallons that cycled through the towers return with elevated dissolved minerals and salts, along with residues of the biocides and corrosion inhibitors used to protect the equipment — compounds containing phosphates, nitrites, and heavy metals that stress municipal treatment plants, raise treatment costs, and can threaten permit compliance downstream [22]. Regional wholesale providers are explicit on this point: the North Texas Municipal Water District advises member cities to engage its planning and wastewater pretreatment teams early — before site plans are approved, not after [22].

And the return flow is peaky too, for the same reason the intake is: blowdown scales with evaporative operation, which is concentrated in the hottest weeks. At the Wisconsin campus discussed above, the planned wastewater discharge pattern implies a load factor of roughly 7 percent [1] — the sewer plant, like the water plant, must be sized for a worst day that arrives only a few times a year. The remedies are standard industrial-pretreatment tools, applied before approval: discharge permits with concentration and flow limits, pretreatment requirements, surcharges tied to strength and peak flow, and early coordination with the wholesale treatment provider [22].

KEY TAKEAWAY — Cooling runs 24/7; water demand does not. Modern designs cut annual gallons but concentrate demand into heat waves — water load factors of 3–17% — and the wastewater comes back with its own peak and its own chemistry. Engage the treatment provider before the site plan is approved.

5. What Peaks Cost a Community

Water systems are sized by three peak-driven standards: treatment and supply for the maximum day, pumping and storage for the peak hour, and reserve capacity for fire flow — all with safety margins for heat waves and drought [1]. Every one of those design parameters is set by peak demand. None is set by annual volume.

The capital sums are not abstract. In one Indiana economic-development district, adding 25 million gallons per day (MGD) of supply and 15 MGD of wastewater treatment is expected to take about six years and cost over $1 billion — and a single technology company’s data center holds 8 MGD, roughly a third, of the new allocation [1]. In Wisconsin, a data center developer’s request for 1.2 MGD triggered over $100 million in upgrades in a town whose entire remaining system capacity was under 2 MGD [1]. Three recent water infrastructure upgrades for large technology companies together approached $1 billion; in Louisiana, one company committed up to $400 million toward public water infrastructure serving its new campuses [1]. Nationally, U.S. data centers are projected to need roughly 700 to 1,450 MGD of new water capacity by 2030, with an estimated infrastructure valuation reaching as high as $58 billion — landing on public systems that already face a $1.3 trillion-plus, twenty-year funding backlog, in a country where 12 to 19 million households already lack affordable water service [1][11].

Rate design determines who bears these costs. Volumetric rates and gallonage-based impact fees systematically under-recover from low-load-factor customers, because — as Table 2 showed — such customers cause capacity costs far out of proportion to the water they buy. The under-recovery is not returned to anyone; it is spread across the remaining ratepayers as higher general rates or added system debt. The remedies are the water-sector equivalents of tools the electric industry has used for a century: capacity or demand charges based on each customer’s allocated maximum-day capacity; ratchet provisions so that a customer who sets a peak keeps paying for it; take-or-pay contracts and developer-funded infrastructure agreements; and impact fees computed on allocated max-day demand rather than on meters or projected average gallons [1][2]. A prerequisite for all of these is disclosure: most operators publish only annual water totals, often aggregated across an entire corporate fleet, which conceals exactly the numbers — facility-level peak demand and load factor — that determine what the community must build [1].

KEY TAKEAWAY — Water systems are sized by the maximum day, not annual volume. Under purely volumetric rates and gallonage-based fees, every other ratepayer quietly finances a peaky customer’s capacity — and the number that would reveal it, facility-level peak demand, is the one operators rarely publish.

6. The Peak Does Not Disappear — It Migrates Among Three Networks

6.1 Water to electricity

There is a tempting policy response to the water problem: simply require waterless, all-dry cooling. Some operators in cool climates already do this voluntarily. But conservation of energy is unforgiving — the heat still has to leave the building, and if water may not carry it, electricity must. All-dry facilities need larger chillers and more fan power, and their cooling equipment works hardest, least efficiently, on the hottest afternoons — which is precisely the electric grid’s annual peak hour. Squeezing the water peak inflates the electric peak. Analysts now project that water availability will rival power availability as the binding constraint on data center siting within about five years, and warn that “unmet” water demand is too often counted as zero demand rather than as a constraint someone must eventually pay to relieve [1][3].

6.2 Electricity to natural gas

The migration does not stop at the electric meter. When a utility’s interconnection queue is measured in years, developers increasingly build their own power: on-site, “behind-the-meter” gas-fired generation. Industry analysis counts roughly 100 gigawatts of gas-burning capacity planned to power U.S. data centers [16]. At first glance this looks like the community’s problem solved — the data center pays for its own generation and spares electric ratepayers the capacity build-out. In reality it moves the peak to a third network that is sized, financed, and priced by exactly the same design-day logic as the other two.

Gas pipelines and distribution systems are built for their own worst day: the coldest winter morning, when every furnace and boiler runs at once. Capacity on that system is sold in two forms. Firm transportation is reserved and paid for every day of the year whether a single cubic foot flows — the purest expression of this paper’s unused-capacity economics, and the revenue stream that finances pipeline construction. Interruptible transportation is cheaper precisely because it is cut first when the system tightens [17]. A gas-fired data center plant is, like the facility it powers, admirably flat — a high-load-factor gas customer. But its winter demand lands squarely on the design day, stacked on top of heating customers, tightening capacity exactly when both sectors need it most; in pipeline-constrained regions, polar-vortex events already push gas systems to their limits [17][18]. If the data center buys firm capacity, it enlarges the design-day build-out someone must finance. If it economizes with interruptible service, its celebrated reliability quietly depends on diesel backup or on being curtailed — and if it under-contracts, the shortfall risk shifts to everyone else sharing the pipe. Add the local-acceptance problem — gas turbines bring emissions and noise that communities did not bargain for [15] — and the “bring your own power” model is revealed as the same arithmetic on a different network. And note what the water district reminds its member cities: on-site generation itself requires water — thermal plants need cooling too — so bringing your own power can also mean bringing additional water demand with it [22].

The lesson for communities is to evaluate a data center proposal as one interlocking peak-capacity problem across all three networks — water, electricity, and gas — because the developer’s cooling and power choices largely decide which system’s design day grows and, therefore, which set of ratepayers funds the standby capacity.

KEY TAKEAWAY — Deny water and the peak moves to the electric grid; deny grid power and it moves to the gas system’s worst winter morning — and the generators need water of their own. Evaluate all three networks as one decision.

7. Moratoriums, Municipal Credit, and the Pricing Alternative

The politics have begun to move faster than the rate design. At least eleven states have considered moratoriums on data center development; New York’s legislature has passed a Responsible Data Center Development Act imposing a one-year statewide pause — the nation’s first, if signed — while Maine’s legislature passed a similar measure that was vetoed by its governor, and individual municipalities have enacted their own local pauses [15]. Governors, legislatures, and regulators are now directly engaged: in Texas, the Public Utility Commission and the Texas Water Development Board are surveying existing and planned data centers on water use and treatment, with a PUC report due to the Legislative Budget Board and the Governor at the end of 2026 [22]. Communities that put their own terms in place now will negotiate ahead of the coming rulebook; those that wait will inherit whatever it says. Rating agencies, meanwhile, have supplied the underlying worry in careful language: substantially increased water and electricity demands “can strain existing infrastructure and require the build-out of new capacity,” and if those costs are not offset by new revenues, the community funds the difference to the detriment of its credit [15]. That sentence is this paper’s argument translated into credit analysis: the build-out is financed with decades of debt, while the offsetting revenue depends on rate structures that mostly track usage.

The credit risk compounds because peaky demand is also concentrated and cancelable demand. Industry tracking counts some 120 data center projects canceled since 2024, most of them recently and most due to local opposition [15]. A utility that issues thirty-year revenue bonds for maximum-day capacity sized to a single customer’s planned peak bears stranded-capacity risk three ways: the project may cancel before it draws a gallon, it may ramp to only a fraction of its reserved capacity (the contracted-versus-realized gap of Section 3.2), or the facility may be functionally obsolete in ten to fifteen years while the debt runs twice that long. A low load factor, high concentration, and cancelability is the worst available combination for a revenue bond. Seen this way, take-or-pay contracts, developer-funded infrastructure, and capacity charges that survive cancellation are not merely fairness measures — they are bondholder protection.

One bookkeeping discipline keeps the debate honest: fiscal losses are not utility losses. Texas is reported to forgo more than $1 billion per year in sales tax revenue through data center exemptions, and Virginia’s incentives have been estimated at similar annual magnitudes [15]. Those are tax expenditures — policy choices about revenue — and they belong in a different column from the capacity cost-shifting analyzed here. Conflating the two weakens both arguments and lets each be rebutted with answers to the other.

Industry’s standard defense, meanwhile, concedes the central point. The Data Center Coalition states its members expect to be billed their “full cost of service,” with no other ratepayer paying for costs “directly assigned” to them [15]. But costs are only directly assigned if the tariff assigns them. Under volumetric water rates and gallonage-based impact fees, a customer with a water load factor of 12 to 17 percent is — by construction, as Table 2 showed — subsidized by everyone else, however sincere its intentions. A moratorium, in the end, is a price-signal failure: it is what a community reaches for when its prices cannot yet say what its engineers already know. The constructive exit is the sequence this paper has argued throughout — an honest supply adequacy assessment first, then capacity-based pricing, ratchets, take-or-pay terms, and debt backstops. Operators who are committed, as the industry says, to being responsible neighbors can demonstrate it by signing.

KEY TAKEAWAY — A moratorium is a price-signal failure — what a community reaches for when its prices cannot yet say what its engineers already know. The durable fix: verify supply, then price capacity and write contracts that survive cancellation. Move before the state rulebook arrives.

8. The Other Side of the Ledger: Why a Community Might Want to Say Yes

8.1 The best possible shape of electric customer — with one condition

Everything in Section 3 deserves restating as a benefit, because it is one. An 80-to-100 percent load factor customer is the best possible shape of electric load: it buys enormous volumes of energy against the capacity reserved for it, spreading the utility’s fixed costs — poles, wires, substations, administration — across far more kilowatt-hours than any residential or commercial customer ever could. On a system with spare capacity, adding such a customer puts downward pressure on everyone else’s average rates. This is the classic load-factor-improvement argument that utilities themselves made for decades when courting industry, and data centers fit it better than almost any industrial load in history. Communities that reflexively treat a data center as a burden on the electric system have the shape of the problem backwards.

The condition is headroom. The fixed-cost-spreading logic works when the new load is absorbed by existing, underused capacity. When the load instead triggers new generation and transmission at today’s marginal costs — which now exceed embedded average costs in most regions — even a perfectly flat customer can raise average rates. The evidence is current: capacity prices in PJM, the nation’s largest grid market, jumped roughly nine-fold between the 2024/25 and 2025/26 auctions, the market monitor attributed 63 percent of that increase — about $9.3 billion in a single year — to data center demand growth, and residential bills in parts of the region rose $16 to $21 per month [20]. Neither story disproves the other: the same customer shape that lowers rates on a slack system raises them on a tight one. This is why the supply-and-headroom assessment of Section 2.4 must come first, and why the Duke flexibility finding matters so much — 76 gigawatts of room exists for loads willing to curtail a few hours a year [8]. The honest framing for a community is: a data center is the best-shaped electric customer available; whether it is also a rate-lowering one depends on the system it joins and on whether it pays the marginal cost of what must be built for it.

8.2 The fiscal engine: high taxable value, almost no service demand

The second benefit belongs to the tax assessor, not the utility. Decades of cost-of-community-services studies show that commercial and industrial property typically demands only 35 to 65 cents of local services for every dollar of revenue it generates, while residential development demands $1.15 to $1.50 — more than it pays [19]. A data center is an extreme version of the industrial case: enormous assessed value in buildings and equipment, combined with a few dozen to a hundred employees, no schoolchildren, negligible traffic, and minimal police and fire demand. The taxable value includes not just the real property but the business personal property — the servers themselves, often worth as much as the building — which is refreshed on a three-to-five-year cycle that keeps replenishing the tax base as older equipment depreciates.

Here the record needs one correction that strengthens the community’s hand. The widely cited Texas figure — more than $1 billion per year in forgone revenue — is a sales tax exemption on equipment purchases, a state-level policy choice [15]. Property tax is different: data centers generally owe it in full unless a local government chooses to abate it. That choice is the community’s single best bargaining chip, and it should be spent, not given away: an abatement worth tens of millions of dollars can be traded for precisely the protections this paper prescribes — capacity-based utility charges, take-or-pay terms, on-site peak mitigation, disclosure, and host-community payments.

But the fiscal case is not automatic, and honesty requires saying so: your mileage may vary — so measure it. Tax rates, abatement posture, school-district shares and recapture, utility ownership, debt structure, and siting jurisdiction all move the answer, sometimes decisively. In states like Texas, the school district share of property tax dominates the bill and recapture provisions export much of it beyond the community, so the locally retained benefit is smaller than the headline levy. A facility sited just outside city limits can burden a city-owned utility while paying the city nothing. And the jobs argument should be retired: construction employment is transitory and permanent staffing is small [15]; the durable benefits are fiscal and, under the right conditions, ratepayer relief — argue those instead. Because the arithmetic is so community-specific, the authors have built a companion interactive tool — the CityBase.Net Data Center Fiscal Impact Model — that walks a Texas city through the full 20-year calculation from the municipal government’s perspective: property and sales tax revenues, utility revenues and costs, municipal service costs, employment, capacity audit, and net fiscal impact under alternative scenarios [24]. The fundamental question the model asks is the right one: not “how big is the investment?” but “does the city collect more than it spends to serve the facility — and by how much?”

KEY TAKEAWAY — A data center can be the best-shaped utility customer a system has ever signed and a major tax base demanding almost nothing in services — where headroom exists and abatements are traded for protections, never given away. But every community’s numbers differ: run them. A companion fiscal model [24] exists for exactly that purpose.

9. Engineering Away the Water Peak: The On-Site Storage Option

The biggest technical objection in this paper — the collapsed water load factor — turns out to have a remarkably cheap fix, and understanding why it has not already happened everywhere is itself instructive. The fix is a tank: on-site storage that the data center fills slowly from the public system at a contractually capped rate, around the clock and across the seasons, and draws down during heat waves. The tank does for the water system exactly what a battery does for the grid — it converts a peaky customer into a flat one. Nor is it an alien imposition: high-reliability facilities already keep hours of cooling water on-site as standard practice for ride-through of utility interruptions [12]; the proposal here simply extends hours to days.

The arithmetic is worth showing. Consider an illustrative 100 MW facility using dry cooling with evaporative assist. At a planned peak water intensity of 1.15 liters per kilowatt-hour — the Leesburg planning figure [1] — its peak-day demand is about 0.73 MGD, while at a 12 percent water load factor its average day is roughly 0.09 MGD. Table 4 shows what a tank does to the capacity the public system must reserve.

Contract designMax draw from utilityTank size (7-day design heat wave)Illustrative tank cost
No cap (status quo)0.73 MGDNone$0 — but the utility builds 0.73 MGD of capacity
Partial cap0.25 MGD≈ 3.4 million gallons≈ $7–14 million
Near-flat (≈100% water load factor)0.10 MGD≈ 4.4 MG (≈6.3 MG for a 10-day event)≈ $9–18 million

Table 4. Illustrative on-site storage sizing for a 100 MW data center with dry cooling and evaporative assist (peak day ≈0.73 MGD at 1.15 L/kWh [1]; average day ≈0.09 MGD at a 12% water load factor). Tank costs assume roughly $2–4 per gallon installed for multi-million-gallon ground storage [21]. All figures are order-of-magnitude planning estimates.

Three things stand out. First, full flattening costs barely more than partial mitigation — once the tank is sized for a design heat wave, capping the utility draw near the average adds little. Second, the money is small where it matters: $9 to $18 million is on the order of one percent of the capital cost of a 100 MW facility, and it is comparable to the utility-side capacity it avoids — in the Indiana case, new supply capacity is being built at roughly $22 per gallon-per-day, so the 0.6 MGD this tank avoids would cost the public system a similar $14 million [1]. The difference is who finances it and where it sits: private capital on private land, with no six-year municipal construction timeline and no revenue bond at risk. Third, a five-million-gallon ground tank is roughly 130 feet in diameter — a rounding error on a data center campus.

Why, then, are such tanks rare? Because under volumetric rates nobody has a reason to build one: the utility bears the peak, and the data center pays only for gallons. The academic literature observes that operators rarely rely on storage for multi-day peaks and attributes this to cost [1] — but the cost is modest; what is missing is the price signal. Charge for allocated maximum-day capacity, or cap the maximum draw in the service agreement, and the tank becomes the developer’s own cheapest solution. On-site storage is thus the clearest illustration of this paper’s thesis: correct pricing does not merely allocate the cost of the peak fairly — it causes the peak to be engineered away by the party best positioned to do it.

The honest caveats: the tank must be sized to the drought-of-record heat wave duration, not an average one; potable storage requires active turnover and disinfection management; the cap must be enforceable — metered, telemetered, with penalty ratchets, not aspirational; fire flow remains a separate requirement; and storage shaves the delivery peak without reducing consumption, so it solves nothing in a genuine supply shortage — the Section 2.4 assessment still comes first. None of these caveats changes the conclusion; they define the contract terms. The companion fiscal model’s capacity-audit and water-utility modules can be used to test these terms against a specific proposal [24].

KEY TAKEAWAY — For roughly one percent of project cost, on-site storage turns the peakiest water customer a system has ever seen into a flat one. Tanks are rare only because volumetric rates give nobody a reason to build them. Price the peak, and the developer builds the tank.

10. Conclusion: Not “No” — “Yes, If”

A community is rarely overwhelmed by the gallons or kilowatt-hours a data center consumes in a year — provided the supply exists. It is overwhelmed by the size of the pipe, the plant, and the wire that must stand ready for the worst afternoon of the summer — capacity that is financed every day of the year and used only on a few. The single most informative number in any data center proposal is therefore its load factor: average demand divided by peak demand — in other words, how much of the capacity reserved for the customer is actually used. It is also, not coincidentally, the number operators disclose least.

The full ledger, honestly stated, looks like this. On the benefit side: the best-shaped electric customer utilities have ever been offered, capable of putting downward pressure on everyone’s rates where headroom exists; and a fiscal engine — enormous taxable value demanding almost nothing in services — whose abatement is a bargaining chip the community controls. On the cost side: water load factors of 3 to 17 percent landing on heat-wave design days; wastewater with concentrated chemistry and its own peak; reserved-but-unused electric capacity; second-scale power transients; winter gas design-day exposure; and thirty-year debt issued against a customer that may cancel, under-ramp, or be obsolete in fifteen. The decisive fact is that every entry on the cost side has a known mitigating instrument. These are not exotic inventions; they are the standard toolbox of utility contracting, applied to a new customer class. The productive posture for a community is neither “no” nor an unexamined “yes,” but “yes, if” — and the “if” is a term sheet, not a sentiment:

  • Verify supply first, under stress conditions — drought of record, heat wave, polar vortex — for water, power, and gas together. If supply fails, the conversation is evenhanded curtailment for all users, not a ban on one industry.
  • Price capacity, not just volume: charges based on allocated maximum-day and coincident-peak demand, with ratchets so a customer who sets a peak keeps paying for it.
  • Contract the mitigation, don’t request it: on-site storage or a telemetered max-day cap with penalties for the water peak; minimum takes for reserved electric capacity; on-site batteries for transients; firm gas transportation assigned to any on-site generation; pretreatment terms for the wastewater.
  • Protect the debt: take-or-pay terms, term-matched financing, and developer-funded infrastructure that survive cancellation, under-ramping, and obsolescence.
  • Trade abatements for protections — never grant both. The property tax base is the community’s leverage; spend it deliberately.
  • Require disclosure as a condition of service: facility-level peak demand and load factor, published — because the political stumbling block is trust, and trust follows from terms the public can read.

A community that does this converts the peakiest water customer it has ever seen into a flat one, converts stranded-debt risk into developer capital, and keeps the two benefits — the ratepayer arithmetic and the tax base — that made the project attractive in the first place. A moratorium is what a community reaches for when its prices cannot yet say what its engineers already know. Utilities do not go broke selling water. They go broke building for water they rarely sell — and peaks, not totals, are what force them to build. Price the peak, contract the cure, and the right answer to a well-sited data center is yes.

References

[1] “Small Bottle, Big Pipe: Quantifying and Addressing the Impact of Data Centers on Public Water Systems,” arXiv preprint 2603.02705 (2026). Primary source for water peaking data, case studies (The Dalles, West Des Moines, Leesburg, Prince William, Indiana, Wisconsin), capacity valuations, and infrastructure cost figures. Reports daily peaking factors; converted to load factors in this paper (load factor = 1 ÷ peaking factor). https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.02705

[2] Norris, T., “The Puzzle of Low Data Center Utilization Rates,” Power & Policy, August 7, 2025. Distinctions among load factor, capacity utilization, and uptime; survey of industry load-factor assumptions. https://www.powerpolicy.net/p/the-puzzle-of-low-data-center-utilization

[3] Energy and Environmental Economics (E3), “Forecasting Large Loads in the Age of AI and Data Centers,” whitepaper, December 2025. Utility planning load factors (Duke ≈80%, Dominion ≈82%) and metered load-factor findings. https://www.ethree.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/E3Whitepaper_DataCenterForecasting.pdf

[4] “Electricity Demand and Grid Impacts of AI Data Centers: Challenges and Prospects,” arXiv preprint 2509.07218 (2025). Reports peak-to-average ratios of ≈1.0 for AI training and 1.5–2.0 for conventional data centers — equivalent to load factors of ≈100% and 50–65% respectively; transient characteristics. https://arxiv.org/html/2509.07218v3

[5] “Technical Challenges of AI Data Center Integration into Power Grids — A Survey,” Energies 19(1):137 (2026). Gradient-synchronization power oscillations and megawatt-per-second ramp rates. https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/19/1/137

[6] “Power Stabilization for AI Training Datacenters,” arXiv preprint 2508.14318 (2025). Facility-scale power swing magnitudes and mitigation approaches. https://arxiv.org/html/2508.14318v1

[7] SemiAnalysis, “AI Training Load Fluctuations at Gigawatt-scale — Risk of Power Grid Blackout?” (2025). https://newsletter.semianalysis.com/p/ai-training-load-fluctuations-at-gigawatt-scale-risk-of-power-grid-blackout

[8] Norris, T., et al., “Rethinking Load Growth: Assessing the Potential for Integration of Large Flexible Loads in US Power Systems,” Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & Sustainability, Duke University (2025). 76 GW headroom at 0.25% annual curtailment (≈85 hours/year). Summary coverage: Utility Dive. https://www.utilitydive.com/news/us-grid-headroom-flexible-load-data-center-ai-ev-duke-report/739767/

[9] West Des Moines Water Works, monthly financial reports, 2022–2025 (monthly withdrawal data for the West Des Moines hyperscale facility and comparison of large-user demand patterns), as compiled and analyzed in [1].

[10] Prince William Water service-area analysis (measured daily data center water load factor of 10% in 2024; Northern Virginia weighted actual water load factor of 27–29%), as cited in [1].

[11] U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Drinking Water Infrastructure Needs Survey and Assessment; Clean Watersheds Needs Survey; and 2024 Report to Congress on water affordability (national funding needs of $1.3T+ over 20 years; 12.1–19.2 million households lacking affordable water service), as cited in [1].

[12] DgtlInfra, “Data Center Water Usage: A Comprehensive Guide.” Cooling system mechanics, evaporation, blowdown, cycles of concentration, and on-site water storage for reliability. https://dgtlinfra.com/data-center-water-usage/

[13] Vantage Data Centers, “Cooling Without the Drain: How Closed-Loop Systems Cut Day-to-Day Water Use” (2026). https://blog.vantage-dc.com/2026/04/22/cooling-without-the-drain-how-closed-loop-systems-cut-day-to-day-water-use/

[14] Shehabi, A., et al., “2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report,” Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, LBNL-2001637 (2024). Utilization data gaps and transparency needs. https://eta.lbl.gov/publications/2024-lbnl-data-center-energy-usage-report

[15] Royal, C., “More states are considering putting a pause on data centers,” The Bond Buyer, July 8, 2026. State and local moratoriums; Moody’s and S&P analyst commentary; 120 canceled projects (S&P 451 Research); Texas and Virginia tax-incentive figures; Data Center Coalition statements. https://www.bondbuyer.com

[16] Institute for Energy Research, “Natural Gas is Preferred by Data Centers and Manufacturers, and More Capacity and Pipelines are Needed” (2026), citing BloombergNEF analysis of ~100 GW of planned on-site gas-fired capacity for U.S. data centers. https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/fossil-fuels/natural-gas-is-preferred-by-data-centers-and-manufacturers-and-more-capacity-and-pipelines-are-needed/

[17] American Oil & Gas Reporter, “Ramping Data Center Demand Prompts Improved Coordination Between Gas, Electric Sectors.” Firm versus interruptible transportation; winter coincidence of data center and heating loads. https://www.aogr.com/magazine/markets-analytics/ramping-data-center-demand-prompts-improved-coordination-between-gas-electric-sectors

[18] Utility Dive, “Behind-the-meter data center gas plants will raise US energy bills” (2026). Pipeline-capacity effects of behind-the-meter data center generation. https://www.utilitydive.com/news/data-centers-raise-energy-bills-not-for-reason-you-think/822205/

[19] American Farmland Trust / Farmland Information Center, “Cost of Community Services Studies” (fact sheet summarizing 150+ studies): commercial/industrial land typically requires $0.35–$0.65 of local services per $1.00 of revenue generated; residential requires $1.15–$1.50. https://farmlandinfo.org/publications/cost-of-community-services-studies/

[20] Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), “Projected data center growth spurs PJM capacity prices” (2025), and Office of the People’s Counsel (D.C.) / Synapse Energy Economics, “Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge” (2025). Capacity prices rose from $28.92/MW-day (2024/25) to $269.92 (2025/26) and $329.17 (2026/27); Monitoring Analytics attributes 63% of the 2025/26 increase (≈$9.3B) to data centers; residential impacts of $16–21/month in parts of the region. https://ieefa.org/resources/projected-data-center-growth-spurs-pjm-capacity-prices-factor-10

[21] Vendor and industry cost guides for large ground-level water storage (welded steel, bolted steel, and prestressed concrete tanks to 5+ million gallons), indicating roughly $2–4 per gallon installed at multi-million-gallon scale (site-specific). https://www.tank-depot.com/blog/water-tank-prices-how-much-does-a-water-tank-cost

[22] North Texas Municipal Water District, “Facts About Data Centers: Considerations for NTMWD Member Cities and Customers” (2026). Texas data center counts and regional distribution; water and electricity use figures; cooling-system water guidance; wastewater chemistry (biocides, corrosion inhibitors, phosphates, nitrites, heavy metals; high-TDS blowdown); guidance to engage District planning and pretreatment teams early; PUC/TWDB surveys and end-of-2026 report to the Legislative Budget Board and Governor. https://www.ntmwd.com

[23] Cook, M., “Thirsty Data and the Lone Star State: The Impact of Data Center Growth on Texas’ Water Supply,” Houston Advanced Research Center (January 2026). Texas data centers used ≈25 billion gallons in 2025; projected 29–161 billion gallons annually by 2030 (up to ≈2.7% of state water use); 400+ facilities; ≈9,500 MW today with ERCOT 2030 forecasts of ≈22,000–78,000 MW; notes ERCOT has a large-load interconnection process while no parallel statewide water-planning process exists. https://harcresearch.org/research/thirsty-data-and-the-lone-star-state-the-impact-of-data-center-growth-on-texas-water-supply/

[24] McLain, L., et al., “Data Center Fiscal Impact Model — Municipal Revenue & Cost Analysis Tool for Texas Cities,” CityBase.Net, Interactive Model v1.0 (2026). Twenty-year net fiscal impact from the municipal perspective: property and sales tax, utility revenues and costs, power demand, employment, municipal service costs, capacity audit, scenarios, and case studies. https://datacenterfiscalimpact.netlify.app/

Introducing CityBaseLab: financial and data intelligence for the people running cities.

Same mindset, renewed focus using AI

CityBaseLab | Financial Intelligence for Local Governments

After 50+ years working in and around municipal finance — as a city and county budget director, consultant, and analyst — I built the platform I always wished I had. Today, I’m putting it in front of you.

Lewis McLain·Founder, CityBase.Net·May 2026

Why I built this

Local government finance is one of the most consequential and least-understood disciplines in American public life. A city’s ACFR, its rate-setting models, its long-range capital plan — these documents quietly decide whether a town can afford its next fire station, whether bonds get priced fairly, whether a growing population gets the services it pays for.

And yet almost all of that intelligence lives buried in static PDFs. Hundred-page documents that get printed, filed, and quoted from selectively at council meetings six months later. Even the cities doing it well — and there are many — struggle to turn their own data into a decision tool. The story is in the data. The data isn’t in the conversation.

I’ve watched this play out in council chambers, bond pricing calls, budget workshops, and rate hearings for five decades. I built CityBaseLab to close that gap.

What CityBaseLab does

CityBaseLab turns the public financial record — ACFRs, monthly comptroller data, population projections, capital plans, debt schedules — into working decision tools. Not dashboards-for-dashboards’ sake. Actual instruments a finance director, a city/county manager, a school district superintendent, an elected official can use the week before a vote.

It’s organized as three layers stacked on top of one another:

Data Layer

Audited financials, monthly sales-tax distributions, debt registries, certified property values, population projections — ingested from the actual public sources (Texas Comptroller, the entity’s own ACFR, U.S. Census, NCTCOG, the Bond Review Board, EMMA), structured consistently, and kept current.

Intelligence Layer

On top of the data, the tools that interpret it: trend analysis, rolling-12 windows, per-capita normalization, scenario engines, structural-balance signals, debt-stress ratios, and the explanatory text that ties what the numbers say to what it means. Can you analyze every city, county and school district, and then provide commentary on each? I already have with the help of AI.

Decision Layer

The view a specific role — not a generic user — opens before a specific decision. A finance director the morning of a pricing call. A city manager the day before a budget workshop. A council member the night before a rate vote. Each gets their own framing of the same underlying data.

Who it’s for

City Managers

The structural read on revenue, capacity, and growth pressure before the next strategic decision.

Finance Directors

Rate-setting, MYFP, debt strategy, and pricing-day tools that hold up to FA scrutiny and council questions.

Elected Officials

The honest one-page view of where the city stands — growth, debt, services — in plain language.

Analysts & Auditors

Reproducible numbers, transparent assumptions, and the trail from raw source to printed exhibit.

A practical path, not a moon shot

I’m not asking anyone to rip out their existing systems. CityBaseLab is built to layer on top of what cities already have. How many software systems have been acquired by justifying management information tools – and then only transactional data is produced? A typical first engagement looks like this:

  • 30 days — Financial Data Foundation. Pull the entity’s last decade of audited financials, sales tax history, and debt registry into the platform.
  • 60 days — Cost Allocation & Operations. Add per-capita normalization, peer comparisons, the structural read, and the working ratios staff actually use.
  • 90 days — MYFP & Scenario Modeling. Forward projections, scenario engine, and the briefing views for council and bond pricing.

Three months in, a city has a working long-range financial plan, a defensible scenario engine, and a set of role-specific decision views — built on its own data, anchored to its own ACFR and budgets.

What you can see today

The “Kick the Tires” page links to live, working examples built on the CityBaseLab approach — not screenshots, not slideware. Open any of them in a new tab, click around, and see how the platform turns public financial and demographic data into decision-ready views:

  • NTMWD — Cost of Service & Population Dashboard. A full financial-intelligence view of one of Texas’s largest regional water systems.
  • Texas Population Atlas. Every Texas city and county, 2010–2024 actuals plus projections to 2100, with revenue-base implications baked in.
  • Debt Management & Bond Pricing Lab. 21 tabs covering AAA MMD scale, refunding savings, Texas bond comps, and a fully worked example using a real $2.5B financing.
  • McKinney 2025B Refunding Verification. A penny-perfect replication of a real Causey verification report.
  • City of Fiscal Bliss — EDC/CDC Long-Range Model. Type A and Type B sales-tax corporation modeling with project pipeline and debt capacity.
  • Data Center Fiscal Impact Model. 20-year net fiscal impact of a 100 MW data center on a host city — both sides of the ledger, with full abatement and BPP depreciation modeling.
  • North Texas CPI & Construction Escalation Dashboard. Custom composite builder for honest project-cost escalation.
  • MYFP & Scenario Engine. A working long-range financial plan covering FY1997–FY2036, built on real McKinney financial data.
  • McKinney ISD Financial Data. An analysis of their key financial data all in one place, and ready to tell the story of trends that contain yellow flags.

Every one of those is real. The data sources are public. The methodology is transparent. The math is reproducible. That’s the standard.

What’s next

Over the next few months I’ll be publishing more on the specific decisions CityBaseLab is built to support — rate cases, pricing days, MYFPs, fiscal-impact analyses for large developments — with worked examples from real cities. If you run finance for a city, school, special district, or transit agency, I’d like to talk.

Data Sandbox Architecture and Responsible AI Policy For Cities, Counties, and School Districts


A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

Data Sandbox Architecture and Responsible AI Policy

Executive Summary

Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, local governments have invested heavily in computerized systems to manage payroll, taxation, accounting, courts, utilities, public safety, and student records. These investments promised “management information systems.” For decades, however, most organizations received little more than thick accounting printouts.

In recent years, modern visualization tools such as Power BI began delivering meaningful executive insight. Interactive dashboards and real-time analytics finally made operational data accessible for strategic decision-making.

We are now entering a second technological inflection point.

Artificial intelligence systems can write SQL code at the direction of analysts, generate analytical scripts in seconds, simulate long-range financial projections, and produce narrative explanations automatically. The pace of technological acceleration is no longer measured in years — but in weeks and days.

This acceleration dramatically increases both analytical power and operational risk.

To harness these capabilities responsibly, cities, counties, and school districts must formally separate operational systems from analytical systems through structured Data Sandbox Architecture.

This document outlines a comprehensive framework to do so.


I. Historical Context and the Present Inflection Point

For fifty years, local governments built increasingly sophisticated operational systems:

  • Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
  • Property tax systems
  • Court and jail management systems
  • Student Information Systems (SIS)
  • Payroll and HR platforms
  • Utility billing systems

These systems were designed for:

  • Transaction integrity
  • Compliance
  • Record retention
  • Service continuity

They were not designed for high-volume, exploratory analytics.

Modern business intelligence platforms finally allowed insight extraction from these systems. But artificial intelligence now multiplies analytical activity beyond prior imagination.

AI systems can:

  • Write database queries on demand
  • Explore alternative financial scenarios automatically
  • Cross-reference multi-departmental datasets
  • Create predictive models
  • Narrate variance explanations
  • Regenerate models repeatedly with modified assumptions

The infrastructure built over five decades is now being interrogated at speeds and volumes never anticipated by its designers.

Governance architecture must evolve accordingly.


II. Purpose of Data Sandbox Architecture

The purpose of a Data Sandbox is to:

  1. Protect live operational systems.
  2. Enable safe analytical exploration.
  3. Support responsible AI deployment.
  4. Maintain data integrity and audit defensibility.
  5. Protect sensitive information.
  6. Preserve public trust.

A sandbox is a replicated, read-only analytical environment logically or physically separated from production systems.

All analytical activity — including AI interaction — occurs within the sandbox.

Production systems remain insulated.


III. Scope of Applicability

This framework applies equally to:

Cities

  • Utility billing
  • Capital planning
  • Public safety
  • Permitting systems
  • Financial accounting

Counties

  • Property taxation
  • Court and jail systems
  • Elections infrastructure
  • Health services data
  • Indigent defense reporting

School Districts

  • Student Information Systems
  • Special education data
  • Attendance reporting
  • State funding calculations
  • Payroll and staffing analytics

Each operates mission-critical systems that cannot tolerate disruption.


IV. Architectural Components

A. Production System Protection

Production systems shall:

  • Be restricted to operational use.
  • Limit direct analytical access.
  • Prohibit ad hoc querying by unauthorized users.
  • Prevent AI systems from direct interrogation unless explicitly authorized.

B. Sandbox Environment Requirements

The sandbox shall:

  • Be logically or physically separate from production.
  • Be configured as read-only.
  • Receive scheduled replication updates.
  • Support indexing optimized for analytics.
  • Maintain controlled access permissions.

C. Data Masking and Segmentation

Sensitive data fields must be:

  • Masked
  • Tokenized
  • Redacted
  • Removed
  • Restricted by role-based row-level security

Examples include:

  • Social Security numbers
  • Bank routing information
  • Student identifiers
  • Protected juvenile data
  • Health-related information

V. Data Governance Controls

A. Versioning and Snapshot Control

The organization shall maintain:

  • Month-end frozen datasets
  • Budget-adoption snapshot archives
  • Pre-election financial snapshots where applicable
  • Timestamped refresh documentation

All AI-driven or analytical outputs must reference dataset version identifiers.

This ensures reproducibility in audit, litigation, or public inquiry contexts.


B. Data Lineage and Documentation

Each analytical dataset must include:

  • Source system identification
  • Field definitions
  • Transformation logic documentation
  • Change logs
  • Known caveats

AI-generated transformations must be logged and reviewable.

Public finance cannot operate on undocumented numbers.


C. Logging and Monitoring

Sandbox environments shall log:

  • User access
  • Query execution
  • Large exports
  • AI-generated query activity
  • Dataset modifications

Logs shall be retained consistent with records retention policies.


VI. Artificial Intelligence Governance

AI tools interacting with organizational data must:

  • Operate within sandbox environments.
  • Be subject to logging and monitoring.
  • Undergo human review for policy, budget, or staffing decisions.
  • Not autonomously modify operational systems.

The organization may establish:

  • An AI Governance Committee
  • Model validation procedures
  • Bias and fairness review protocols
  • Periodic AI performance audits

AI informs decisions. It does not replace governance.


VII. Public Records and Transparency

AI outputs used for decision-making shall be treated as public records consistent with applicable state law.

Sandbox activity logs shall be retained per records schedules.

Data exports must comply with public information laws.

Transparency must evolve alongside technology.


VIII. Cybersecurity Integration

Sandbox architecture enhances cybersecurity by:

  • Reducing direct exposure of production systems.
  • Limiting lateral system movement.
  • Segregating sensitive data.
  • Supporting NIST-aligned internal control structures.

Cyber insurers increasingly evaluate system segmentation.

Credit rating agencies evaluate operational maturity.

Sandbox architecture supports both.


IX. Infrastructure Planning and Budget Implications

Implementation requires:

  • Replication processes
  • Storage allocation
  • Compute capacity
  • Network planning
  • Cloud cost modeling (if applicable)
  • Ongoing maintenance resources

This is infrastructure investment — not optional software enhancement.


X. Training and Cultural Adoption

The organization shall provide:

  • AI literacy training for elected officials.
  • Responsible data use training for staff.
  • Clear communication regarding sandbox purpose.
  • Education on model limitations and assumptions.

Cultural maturity must accompany technological maturity.


XI. Oversight and Reporting

The Chief Information Officer (or equivalent) shall provide periodic reporting to the governing body regarding:

  • Sandbox performance
  • Security posture
  • AI integration progress
  • Identified risks
  • Compliance status

XII. Risk of Non-Implementation

Failure to implement sandbox architecture increases risk of:

  • System slowdowns
  • Accidental data corruption
  • PII exposure
  • Audit findings
  • Litigation vulnerability
  • Public trust erosion
  • Bond rating scrutiny
  • Consultant shadow databases
  • Simply a loss of modern data analysis capabilities

Preventable instability is the most expensive kind.


XIII. Strategic Conclusion

Local governments spent fifty years building operational computing infrastructure.

Modern business intelligence began unlocking insight from that investment.

Artificial intelligence now multiplies analytical capacity at a pace measured in days rather than years.

The analytical future is arriving faster than policy frameworks.

The question is not whether AI will be used.

It will.

The question is whether it will operate inside protected architecture.

A Data Sandbox Architecture:

  • Preserves operational stability.
  • Enables responsible innovation.
  • Protects sensitive information.
  • Supports elected oversight.
  • Strengthens audit defensibility.
  • Enhances credit profile.
  • Maintains public trust.

Quiet architectural discipline today will determine whether technological acceleration strengthens or destabilizes public institutions tomorrow.

In cities, counties, and school districts alike, stability is not optional.

It is the foundation of governance.

The New York Nurses’ Strike, AI, and the Question Every Profession Is About to Face

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

The threatened nurses’ strike in New York City today is being discussed as a labor dispute, but it is better understood as a systems negotiation under financial pressure. Thousands of registered nurses represented by the New York State Nurses Association (NYSNA) have pushed back against major hospital systems—including Mount Sinai Health System, Montefiore Medical Center, and NewYork-Presbyterian—over staffing, workload, and the terms under which new technology is introduced into care.

To understand what is really happening, one has to acknowledge both sides of the pressure. Nurses are stretched thin. But hospital administrators are also operating in an environment of rising labor costs, payer constraints, regulatory exposure, and reputational risk. AI enters this moment not as a villain or savior, but as a lever—one that can be pulled well or badly.


The Clinical Reality: A Team Under Strain

Modern hospital care is not delivered by a single role. It is delivered by a clinical triangle:

  • Bedside nurses, who provide continuous observation, early detection, and human presence.
  • Hospitalists and floor doctors, who integrate evolving data into daily diagnostic and treatment decisions.
  • Attending physicians, who carry longitudinal responsibility for diagnosis, care strategy, and outcomes.

When this triangle is overloaded, care quality degrades—not because clinicians are unskilled, but because attention is fragmented.

A central grievance in the strike is that too much clinical time is consumed by documentation, coordination, and compliance tasks that add little to patient outcomes. Nurses did not enter the profession to spend their best hours feeding data into systems. They entered it to observe, assess, comfort, and intervene. When that calling is crowded out by screens, burnout follows.


Why AI Raises Anxiety—and Why That Anxiety Is Rational

AI’s arrival in hospitals coincides with staffing shortages and cost containment mandates. That timing matters.

Clinicians are not primarily afraid that AI will replace bedside judgment. They are afraid it will be used to justify higher throughput without relief—the familiar logic of “you’re more efficient now, so you can handle more.”

From a labor perspective, that fear is rational. From a management perspective, the temptation is real. Efficiency gains are often absorbed invisibly into higher census, tighter schedules, or reduced staffing buffers.

But that path misunderstands where AI’s true value lies.


The Administrative Case for AI—Done Right

Hospital administrators are under intense pressure to control costs, reduce errors, and protect institutional reputation. Used correctly, AI directly serves those goals—not by replacing clinicians, but by reducing risk and increasing accuracy.

Consider what AI does well today and will do better soon:

  • Documentation accuracy and completeness
    AI-assisted charting reduces omissions, inconsistencies, and after-the-fact corrections—key drivers of malpractice exposure.
  • Early risk detection
    Pattern recognition across vitals, labs, and notes can flag deterioration earlier, allowing human intervention sooner.
  • Continuity and handoff clarity
    Clear summaries reduce miscommunication across shifts—a major source of adverse events.
  • Burnout reduction and retention
    A hospital known as a place where clinicians spend time with patients—not screens—retains staff more effectively. Turnover is expensive. Reputation matters.
  • Regulatory and payer confidence
    More consistent records and clearer clinical rationale improve audits, reviews, and reimbursement defensibility.

In short, AI used as an assistant improves care quality, risk management, and institutional stability—all core administrative objectives.


The Crucial Design Choice: Assistant or Multiplier

The disagreement is not about whether AI should exist. It is about what the efficiency dividend is used for.

If AI eliminates even 10% of non-clinical workload, that capacity can be treated in two ways:

  1. As a multiplier
    More patients per nurse, tighter staffing grids, higher alert volume.
  2. As an assistant
    More bedside observation, better diagnostics, calmer clinicians, lower error rates.

The first approach extracts value until the system breaks.
The second compounds value by protecting judgment.

Administrators who choose the second path are not indulging sentimentality; they are investing in accuracy, safety, and long-term workforce stability.


Why Nurses Are Right to Insist on Guardrails

Nurses’ calls for explicit contract language around AI are not anti-technology. They are pro-alignment.

They are asking for assurance that:

  • AI will reduce clerical burden, not increase patient ratios.
  • Human clinical judgment remains central and accountable.
  • Efficiency gains return as time and focus, not silent workload creep.

Absent those guarantees, skepticism is not obstruction—it is prudence.


The Deeper Truth: Why People Choose Their Professions

This dispute surfaces a deeper, universal truth.

Nurses did not fall in love with nursing to stare at documentation screens.
Doctors did not train for decades to chase alerts and reconcile notes.
Most professionals—across fields—did not choose their work to become data clerks.

They chose it to think, judge, create, and serve.


The End Note: This Is Not Just About Healthcare

What is happening in New York hospitals is a preview of what every profession is about to face.

Whether it is:

  • Nurses and physicians
  • Accountants and auditors
  • City secretaries and budget analysts
  • Engineers, planners, or consultants

The same question will arise:

When AI saves time, does that time go back to the human purpose of the profession—or is it absorbed as more output?

Institutions that answer this wisely will gain accuracy, loyalty, reputation, and resilience. Those that do not will experience faster burnout, higher turnover, and brittle systems masked as efficiency.

The New York nurses’ strike is not resisting the future.
It is negotiating the terms under which the future becomes sustainable.

And that negotiation—quietly or loudly—is coming for everyone.

The Day the iPhone Rewired the World

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A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

On January 9, 2007, at Macworld in San Francisco, Steve Jobs walked onto the stage and delivered one of the most consequential product announcements in modern history. He framed it theatrically—three devices in one: an iPod, a phone, and an internet communicator. Then he paused, smiled, and revealed the trick. They were not three devices. They were one. The Apple iPhone had arrived.

What followed was not merely a successful product launch. It was a hinge moment—one that quietly reordered how humans interact with technology, with information, with each other, and even with themselves.


What Made the iPhone Event Different

The iPhone announcement mattered not because it was the first smartphone, but because it redefined what a phone was supposed to be.

At the time, the market was dominated by devices with physical keyboards, styluses, nested menus, and clunky mobile browsers. BlackBerry owned business communication. Nokia owned scale. Microsoft owned enterprise software assumptions. Apple owned none of these markets.

Yet the iPhone introduced several radical departures:

  • Multi-touch as the interface
    Fingers replaced keyboards and styluses. Pinch, swipe, and tap turned abstract computing into something instinctive and physical.
  • A real web browser
    Not a stripped-down “mobile” version of the internet, but the actual web—zoomable, readable, usable.
  • Software-first design
    The device wasn’t defined by buttons or ports but by software, animations, and user experience. Hardware existed to serve software, not the other way around.
  • A unified ecosystem vision
    The iPhone was conceived not as a gadget but as a node—connected to iTunes, Macs, carriers, and eventually an App Store that did not yet exist but was already implied.

Jobs did not spend the keynote talking about specs. He talked about experience. That choice alone signaled a philosophical shift in consumer technology.


The Immediate Shockwave

The reaction was mixed. Some praised the elegance. Others mocked the lack of a physical keyboard, the high price, and the absence of third-party apps at launch. Industry leaders dismissed it as a niche luxury device.

Those critiques aged poorly.

Within a few years, nearly every phone manufacturer had abandoned keyboards. Touchscreens became universal. Mobile operating systems replaced desktop metaphors. The skeptics were not foolish—they were anchored to the past in a moment when the ground moved.


How the iPhone Changed Everyday Life

The iPhone did not just change phones. It collapsed entire categories of human activity into a pocket-sized slab of glass.

Communication shifted from voice-first to text, image, and video-first. Navigation moved from paper maps and memory to GPS-by-default. Photography became constant and social rather than occasional and deliberate. The internet ceased to be a place you “went” and became something you carried.

Several deeper changes followed:

  • Time became fragmented
    Micro-moments—checking, scrolling, responding—filled the spaces once occupied by waiting, boredom, or reflection.
  • Attention became a resource
    Notifications, feeds, and apps competed continuously for awareness, reshaping media, advertising, and even politics.
  • Work escaped the office
    Email, documents, approvals, and meetings followed people everywhere, blurring boundaries between professional and personal life.
  • Memory outsourced itself
    Phone numbers, directions, appointments, even photographs replaced recall with retrieval.

The iPhone did not force these changes, but it made them frictionless, and friction is often the last defense of human habits.


The App Store Effect

A year later, Apple launched the App Store, and the iPhone’s impact accelerated exponentially. Developers gained a global distribution platform overnight. Entire industries emerged—ride-sharing, mobile banking, food delivery, social media influencers, mobile gaming—built on the assumption that everyone carried a powerful computer at all times.

This was not just technological leverage. It was economic leverage.

Apple positioned itself as the gatekeeper of a new digital economy, collecting a share of transactions while letting others shoulder innovation risk. Few business models in history have been so scalable with so little marginal cost.


The Financial Transformation of Apple

Before the iPhone, Apple was a successful but niche computer company. After the iPhone, it became something else entirely.

The iPhone evolved into Apple’s single largest revenue driver, often accounting for roughly half of annual revenue in its peak years. More importantly, it pulled customers into a broader ecosystem—Macs, iPads, Apple Watch, AirPods, services, subscriptions—each reinforcing the others.

Apple’s profits followed accordingly:

  • Revenue grew from tens of billions annually to hundreds of billions
  • Gross margins remained unusually high for a hardware company
  • Cash reserves swelled to levels rivaling national treasuries
  • Apple became, at times, the most valuable company in the world

The genius was not just the device. It was the integration—hardware, software, services, and brand operating as a single system. Competitors could copy features, but not the whole machine.


The Long View

January 9, 2007, now looks less like a product launch and more like a civilizational inflection point. The iPhone compressed computing into daily life so completely that it is now difficult to remember what came before.

That power has brought wonder and convenience—and distraction, dependency, and new ethical dilemmas. Tools that shape attention inevitably shape culture.

Apple did not merely sell a phone that day. It sold a future—one we are still living inside, still arguing about, and still trying to understand.

Artificial Intelligence in City Government: From Adoption to Accountability

A Practical Framework for Innovation, Oversight, and Public Trust

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI – A Companion to the previous blog on AI

Artificial intelligence has moved from novelty to necessity in public institutions. What began as experimental tools for drafting documents or summarizing data is now embedded in systems that influence budgeting, service delivery, enforcement prioritization, procurement screening, and public communication. Cities are discovering that AI is no longer optional—but neither is governance.

This essay unifies two truths that are often treated as competing ideas but must now be held together:

  1. AI adoption is inevitable and necessary if cities are to remain operationally effective and fiscally sustainable.
  2. AI oversight is now unavoidable wherever systems influence decisions affecting people, rights, or public trust.

These are not contradictions. They are sequential realities. Adoption without governance leads to chaos. Governance without adoption leads to irrelevance. The task for modern city leadership is to do both—intentionally.

I. The Adoption Imperative: AI as Municipal Infrastructure

Cities face structural pressures that are not temporary: constrained budgets, difficulty recruiting and retaining staff, growing service demands, and rising analytical complexity. AI tools offer a way to expand institutional capacity without expanding payrolls at the same rate.

Common municipal uses already include:

  • Drafting ordinances, reports, and correspondence
  • Summarizing public input and staff analysis
  • Forecasting revenues, expenditures, and service demand
  • Supporting customer service through chat or triage tools
  • Enhancing internal research and analytics

In this sense, AI is not a gadget. It is infrastructure, comparable to ERP systems, GIS, or financial modeling platforms. Cities that delay adoption will find themselves less capable, less competitive, and more expensive to operate.

Adoption, however, is not merely technical. AI reshapes workflows, compresses tasks, and changes how work is performed. Over time, this may alter staffing needs. The question is not whether AI will change city operations—it already is. The question is whether those changes are guided or accidental.

II. The Oversight Imperative: Why Governance Is Now Required

As AI systems move beyond internal productivity and begin to influence decisions—directly or indirectly—oversight becomes essential.

AI systems are now used, or embedded through vendors, in areas such as:

  • Permit or inspection prioritization
  • Eligibility screening for programs or services
  • Vendor risk scoring and procurement screening
  • Enforcement triage
  • Public safety analytics

When AI recommendations shape outcomes, even if a human signs off, accountability cannot be vague. Errors at scale, opaque logic, and undocumented assumptions create legal exposure and erode public trust faster than traditional human error.

Oversight is required because:

  • Scale magnifies mistakes: a single flaw can affect thousands before detection.
  • Opacity undermines legitimacy: residents are less forgiving of decisions they cannot understand.
  • Legal scrutiny is increasing: courts and legislatures are paying closer attention to algorithmic decision-making.

Oversight is not about banning AI. It is about ensuring AI is used responsibly, transparently, and under human control.

III. Bridging Adoption and Oversight: A Two-Speed Framework

The tension between “move fast” and “govern carefully” dissolves once AI uses are separated by risk.

Low-Risk, Internal AI Uses

Examples include drafting, summarization, forecasting, research, and internal analytics.

Approach:
Adopt quickly, document lightly, train staff, and monitor outcomes.

Decision-Adjacent or High-Risk AI Uses

Examples include enforcement prioritization, eligibility determinations, public safety analytics, and procurement screening affecting vendors.

Approach:
Require review, documentation, transparency, and meaningful human oversight before deployment.

This two-speed framework allows cities to capture productivity benefits immediately while placing guardrails only where risk to rights, equity, or trust is real.

IV. Texas Context: Statewide Direction on AI Governance

The Texas Legislature reinforced this balanced approach through the Texas Responsible Artificial Intelligence Governance Act, effective January 1, 2026. The law does not prohibit AI use. Instead, it establishes expectations for transparency, accountability, and prohibited practices—particularly for government entities.

Key elements include:

  • Disclosure when residents interact with AI systems
  • Prohibitions on social scoring by government
  • Restrictions on discriminatory AI use
  • Guardrails around biometric and surveillance applications
  • Civil penalties for unlawful or deceptive deployment
  • Creation of a statewide Artificial Intelligence Council

The message is clear: Texas expects governments to adopt AI responsibly—neither recklessly nor fearfully.

V. Implications for Cities and Transit Agencies

Cities are already using AI, often unknowingly, through vendor-provided software. Transit agencies face elevated exposure because they combine finance, enforcement, surveillance, and public safety.

The greatest risk is not AI itself, but uncontrolled AI:

  • Vendor-embedded algorithms without disclosure
  • No documented human accountability
  • No audit trail
  • No process for suspension or correction

Cities that act early reduce legal risk, preserve public trust, and maintain operational flexibility.

VI. Workforce Implications: Accurate and Defensible Language

AI will change how work is done over time. It would be inaccurate and irresponsible to claim otherwise.

At the same time, AI does not mandate immediate workforce reductions. In public institutions, workforce impacts—if they occur—are most likely to happen gradually through:

  • Attrition
  • Reassignment
  • Retraining
  • Role redesign

Final staffing decisions remain with City leadership and City Council. AI is a tool for improving capacity and sustainability, not an automatic trigger for reductions.

Conclusion: Coherent, Accountable AI

AI adoption without governance invites chaos. Governance without adoption invites stagnation. Cities that succeed will do both—moving quickly where risk is low and governing carefully where risk is high.

This is not about technology hype. It is about institutional competence in a digital age.


Appendix 1 — Texas Responsible Artificial Intelligence Governance Act (HB 149)

Legislature Online

                                                   H.B. No. 149

AN ACT

relating to regulation of the use of artificial intelligence systems in this state; providing civil penalties.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:

SECTION 1.  This Act may be cited as the Texas Responsible Artificial Intelligence Governance Act.

SECTION 2.  Section 503.001, Business & Commerce Code, is amended by amending Subsections (a) and (e) and adding Subsections (b-1) and (f) to read as follows:

(a)  In this section:

(1)  “Artificial intelligence system” has the meaning assigned by Section 551.001.

(2)  “Biometric identifier” means a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or record of hand or face geometry.

(b-1)  For purposes of Subsection (b), an individual has not been informed of and has not provided consent for the capture or storage of a biometric identifier of an individual for a commercial purpose based solely on the existence of an image or other media containing one or more biometric identifiers of the individual on the Internet or other publicly available source unless the image or other media was made publicly available by the individual to whom the biometric identifiers relate.

(e)  This section does not apply to:

(1)  voiceprint data retained by a financial institution or an affiliate of a financial institution, as those terms are defined by 15 U.S.C. Section 6809;

(2)  the training, processing, or storage of biometric identifiers involved in developing, training, evaluating, disseminating, or otherwise offering artificial intelligence models or systems, unless a system is used or deployed for the purpose of uniquely identifying a specific individual; or

(3)  the development or deployment of an artificial intelligence model or system for the purposes of:

(A)  preventing, detecting, protecting against, or responding to security incidents, identity theft, fraud, harassment, malicious or deceptive activities, or any other illegal activity;

(B)  preserving the integrity or security of a system; or

(C)  investigating, reporting, or prosecuting a person responsible for a security incident, identity theft, fraud, harassment, a malicious or deceptive activity, or any other illegal activity.

(f)  If a biometric identifier captured for the purpose of training an artificial intelligence system is subsequently used for a commercial purpose not described by Subsection (e), the person possessing the biometric identifier is subject to:

(1)  this section’s provisions for the possession and destruction of a biometric identifier; and

(2)  the penalties associated with a violation of this section.

SECTION 3.  Section 541.104(a), Business & Commerce Code, is amended to read as follows:

(a)  A processor shall adhere to the instructions of a controller and shall assist the controller in meeting or complying with the controller’s duties or requirements under this chapter, including:

(1)  assisting the controller in responding to consumer rights requests submitted under Section 541.051 by using appropriate technical and organizational measures, as reasonably practicable, taking into account the nature of processing and the information available to the processor;

(2)  assisting the controller with regard to complying with requirements relating to the security of processing personal data, and if applicable, the personal data collected, stored, and processed by an artificial intelligence system, as that term is defined by Section 551.001, and to the notification of a breach of security of the processor’s system under Chapter 521, taking into account the nature of processing and the information available to the processor; and

(3)  providing necessary information to enable the controller to conduct and document data protection assessments under Section 541.105.

SECTION 4.  Title 11, Business & Commerce Code, is amended by adding Subtitle D to read as follows:

SUBTITLE D.  ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PROTECTION

CHAPTER 551.  GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 551.001.  DEFINITIONS.  In this subtitle:

(1)  “Artificial intelligence system” means any machine-based system that, for any explicit or implicit objective, infers from the inputs the system receives how to generate outputs, including content, decisions, predictions, or recommendations, that can influence physical or virtual environments.

(2)  “Consumer” means an individual who is a resident of this state acting only in an individual or household context.  The term does not include an individual acting in a commercial or employment context.

(3)  “Council” means the Texas Artificial Intelligence Council established under Chapter 554.

Sec. 551.002.  APPLICABILITY OF SUBTITLE.  This subtitle applies only to a person who:

(1)  promotes, advertises, or conducts business in this state;

(2)  produces a product or service used by residents of this state; or

(3)  develops or deploys an artificial intelligence system in this state.

Sec. 551.003.  CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF SUBTITLE.  This subtitle shall be broadly construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to:

(1)  facilitate and advance the responsible development and use of artificial intelligence systems;

(2)  protect individuals and groups of individuals from known and reasonably foreseeable risks associated with artificial intelligence systems;

(3)  provide transparency regarding risks in the development, deployment, and use of artificial intelligence systems; and

(4)  provide reasonable notice regarding the use or contemplated use of artificial intelligence systems by state agencies.

CHAPTER 552.  ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PROTECTION

SUBCHAPTER A.  GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 552.001.  DEFINITIONS.  In this chapter:

(1)  “Deployer” means a person who deploys an artificial intelligence system for use in this state.

(2)  “Developer” means a person who develops an artificial intelligence system that is offered, sold, leased, given, or otherwise provided in this state.

(3)  “Governmental entity” means any department, commission, board, office, authority, or other administrative unit of this state or of any political subdivision of this state, that exercises governmental functions under the authority of the laws of this state.  The term does not include:

(A)  a hospital district created under the Health and Safety Code or Article IX, Texas Constitution; or

(B)  an institution of higher education, as defined by Section 61.003, Education Code, including any university system or any component institution of the system.

Sec. 552.002.  CONSTRUCTION OF CHAPTER.  This chapter may not be construed to:

(1)  impose a requirement on a person that adversely affects the rights or freedoms of any person, including the right of free speech; or

(2)  authorize any department or agency other than the Department of Insurance to regulate or oversee the business of insurance.

Sec. 552.003.  LOCAL PREEMPTION.  This chapter supersedes and preempts any ordinance, resolution, rule, or other regulation adopted by a political subdivision regarding the use of artificial intelligence systems.

SUBCHAPTER B. DUTIES AND PROHIBITIONS ON USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Sec. 552.051.  DISCLOSURE TO CONSUMERS.  (a)  In this section, “health care services” means services related to human health or to the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of a human disease or impairment provided by an individual licensed, registered, or certified under applicable state or federal law to provide those services.

(b)  A governmental agency that makes available an artificial intelligence system intended to interact with consumers shall disclose to each consumer, before or at the time of interaction, that the consumer is interacting with an artificial intelligence system.

(c)  A person is required to make the disclosure under Subsection (b) regardless of whether it would be obvious to a reasonable consumer that the consumer is interacting with an artificial intelligence system.

(d)  A disclosure under Subsection (b):

(1)  must be clear and conspicuous;

(2)  must be written in plain language; and

(3)  may not use a dark pattern, as that term is defined by Section 541.001.

(e)  A disclosure under Subsection (b) may be provided by using a hyperlink to direct a consumer to a separate Internet web page.

(f)  If an artificial intelligence system is used in relation to health care service or treatment, the provider of the service or treatment shall provide the disclosure under Subsection (b) to the recipient of the service or treatment or the recipient’s personal representative not later than the date the service or treatment is first provided, except in the case of emergency, in which case the provider shall provide the required disclosure as soon as reasonably possible.

Sec. 552.052.  MANIPULATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR.  A person may not develop or deploy an artificial intelligence system in a manner that intentionally aims to incite or encourage a person to:

(1)  commit physical self-harm, including suicide;

(2)  harm another person; or

(3)  engage in criminal activity.

Sec. 552.053.  SOCIAL SCORING.  A governmental entity may not use or deploy an artificial intelligence system that evaluates or classifies a natural person or group of natural persons based on social behavior or personal characteristics, whether known, inferred, or predicted, with the intent to calculate or assign a social score or similar categorical estimation or valuation of the person or group of persons that results or may result in:

(1)  detrimental or unfavorable treatment of a person or group of persons in a social context unrelated to the context in which the behavior or characteristics were observed or noted;

(2)  detrimental or unfavorable treatment of a person or group of persons that is unjustified or disproportionate to the nature or gravity of the observed or noted behavior or characteristics; or

(3)  the infringement of any right guaranteed under the United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, or state or federal law.

Sec. 552.054.  CAPTURE OF BIOMETRIC DATA.  (a)  In this section, “biometric data” means data generated by automatic measurements of an individual’s biological characteristics.  The term includes a fingerprint, voiceprint, eye retina or iris, or other unique biological pattern or characteristic that is used to identify a specific individual.  The term does not include a physical or digital photograph or data generated from a physical or digital photograph, a video or audio recording or data generated from a video or audio recording, or information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment, payment, or operations under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (42 U.S.C. Section 1320d et seq.).

(b)  A governmental entity may not develop or deploy an artificial intelligence system for the purpose of uniquely identifying a specific individual using biometric data or the targeted or untargeted gathering of images or other media from the Internet or any other publicly available source without the individual’s consent, if the gathering would infringe on any right of the individual under the United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, or state or federal law.

(c)  A violation of Section 503.001 is a violation of this section.

Sec. 552.055.  CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION.  (a)  A person may not develop or deploy an artificial intelligence system with the sole intent for the artificial intelligence system to infringe, restrict, or otherwise impair an individual’s rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution.

(b)  This section is remedial in purpose and may not be construed to create or expand any right guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Sec. 552.056.  UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION.  (a)  In this section:

(1)  “Financial institution” has the meaning assigned by Section 201.101, Finance Code.

(2)  “Insurance entity” means:

(A)  an entity described by Section 82.002(a), Insurance Code;

(B)  a fraternal benefit society regulated under Chapter 885, Insurance Code; or

(C)  the developer of an artificial intelligence system used by an entity described by Paragraph (A) or (B).

(3)  “Protected class” means a group or class of persons with a characteristic, quality, belief, or status protected from discrimination by state or federal civil rights laws, and includes race, color, national origin, sex, age, religion, or disability.

(b)  A person may not develop or deploy an artificial intelligence system with the intent to unlawfully discriminate against a protected class in violation of state or federal law.

(c)  For purposes of this section, a disparate impact is not sufficient by itself to demonstrate an intent to discriminate.

(d)  This section does not apply to an insurance entity for purposes of providing insurance services if the entity is subject to applicable statutes regulating unfair discrimination, unfair methods of competition, or unfair or deceptive acts or practices related to the business of insurance.

(e)  A federally insured financial institution is considered to be in compliance with this section if the institution complies with all federal and state banking laws and regulations.

Sec. 552.057.  CERTAIN SEXUALLY EXPLICIT CONTENT AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY.  A person may not:

(1)  develop or distribute an artificial intelligence system with the sole intent of producing, assisting or aiding in producing, or distributing:

(A)  visual material in violation of Section 43.26, Penal Code; or

(B)  deep fake videos or images in violation of Section 21.165, Penal Code; or

(2)  intentionally develop or distribute an artificial intelligence system that engages in text-based conversations that simulate or describe sexual conduct, as that term is defined by Section 43.25, Penal Code, while impersonating or imitating a child younger than 18 years of age.

SUBCHAPTER C.  ENFORCEMENT

Sec. 552.101.  ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY.  (a)  The attorney general has exclusive authority to enforce this chapter, except to the extent provided by Section 552.106.

(b)  This chapter does not provide a basis for, and is not subject to, a private right of action for a violation of this chapter or any other law.

Sec. 552.102.  INFORMATION AND COMPLAINTS.  The attorney general shall create and maintain an online mechanism on the attorney general’s Internet website through which a consumer may submit a complaint under this chapter to the attorney general.

Sec. 552.103.  INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY.  (a)  If the attorney general receives a complaint through the online mechanism under Section 552.102 alleging a violation of this chapter, the attorney general may issue a civil investigative demand to determine if a violation has occurred.  The attorney general shall issue demands in accordance with and under the procedures established under Section 15.10.

(b)  The attorney general may request from the person reported through the online mechanism, pursuant to a civil investigative demand issued under Subsection (a):

(1)  a high-level description of the purpose, intended use, deployment context, and associated benefits of the artificial intelligence system with which the person is affiliated;

(2)  a description of the type of data used to program or train the artificial intelligence system;

(3)  a high-level description of the categories of data processed as inputs for the artificial intelligence system;

(4)  a high-level description of the outputs produced by the artificial intelligence system;

(5)  any metrics the person uses to evaluate the performance of the artificial intelligence system;

(6)  any known limitations of the artificial intelligence system;

(7)  a high-level description of the post-deployment monitoring and user safeguards the person uses for the artificial intelligence system, including, if the person is a deployer, the oversight, use, and learning process established by the person to address issues arising from the system’s deployment; or

(8)  any other relevant documentation reasonably necessary for the attorney general to conduct an investigation under this section.

Sec. 552.104.  NOTICE OF VIOLATION; OPPORTUNITY TO CURE.  (a)  If the attorney general determines that a person has violated or is violating this chapter, the attorney general shall notify the person in writing of the determination, identifying the specific provisions of this chapter the attorney general alleges have been or are being violated.

(b)  The attorney general may not bring an action against the person:

(1)  before the 60th day after the date the attorney general provides the notice under Subsection (a); or

(2)  if, before the 60th day after the date the attorney general provides the notice under Subsection (a), the person:

(A)  cures the identified violation; and

(B)  provides the attorney general with a written statement that the person has:

(i)  cured the alleged violation;

(ii)  provided supporting documentation to show the manner in which the person cured the violation; and

(iii)  made any necessary changes to internal policies to reasonably prevent further violation of this chapter.

Sec. 552.105.  CIVIL PENALTY; INJUNCTION.  (a)  A person who violates this chapter and does not cure the violation under Section 552.104 is liable to this state for a civil penalty in an amount of:

(1)  for each violation the court determines to be curable or a breach of a statement submitted to the attorney general under Section 552.104(b)(2), not less than $10,000 and not more than $12,000;

(2)  for each violation the court determines to be uncurable, not less than $80,000 and not more than $200,000; and

(3)  for a continued violation, not less than $2,000 and not more than $40,000 for each day the violation continues.

(b)  The attorney general may bring an action in the name of this state to:

(1)  collect a civil penalty under this section;

(2)  seek injunctive relief against further violation of this chapter; and

(3)  recover attorney’s fees and reasonable court costs or other investigative expenses.

(c)  There is a rebuttable presumption that a person used reasonable care as required under this chapter.

(d)  A defendant in an action under this section may seek an expedited hearing or other process, including a request for declaratory judgment, if the person believes in good faith that the person has not violated this chapter.

(e)  A defendant in an action under this section may not be found liable if:

(1)  another person uses the artificial intelligence system affiliated with the defendant in a manner prohibited by this chapter; or

(2)  the defendant discovers a violation of this chapter through:

(A)  feedback from a developer, deployer, or other person who believes a violation has occurred;

(B)  testing, including adversarial testing or red-team testing;

(C)  following guidelines set by applicable state agencies; or

(D)  if the defendant substantially complies with the most recent version of the “Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile” published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology or another nationally or internationally recognized risk management framework for artificial intelligence systems, an internal review process.

(f)  The attorney general may not bring an action to collect a civil penalty under this section against a person for an artificial intelligence system that has not been deployed.

Sec. 552.106.  ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY STATE AGENCIES.  (a)  A state agency may impose sanctions against a person licensed, registered, or certified by that agency for a violation of Subchapter B if:

(1)  the person has been found in violation of this chapter under Section 552.105; and

(2)  the attorney general has recommended additional enforcement by the applicable agency.

(b)  Sanctions under this section may include:

(1)  suspension, probation, or revocation of a license, registration, certificate, or other authorization to engage in an activity; and

(2)  a monetary penalty not to exceed $100,000.

CHAPTER 553.  ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE REGULATORY SANDBOX PROGRAM

SUBCHAPTER A.  GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 553.001.  DEFINITIONS.  In this chapter:

(1)  “Applicable agency” means a department of this state established by law to regulate certain types of business activity in this state and the people engaging in that business, including the issuance of licenses and registrations, that the department determines would regulate a program participant if the person were not operating under this chapter.

(2)  “Department” means the Texas Department of Information Resources.

(3)  “Program” means the regulatory sandbox program established under this chapter that allows a person, without being licensed or registered under the laws of this state, to test an artificial intelligence system for a limited time and on a limited basis.

(4)  “Program participant” means a person whose application to participate in the program is approved and who may test an artificial intelligence system under this chapter.

SUBCHAPTER B.  SANDBOX PROGRAM FRAMEWORK

Sec. 553.051.  ESTABLISHMENT OF SANDBOX PROGRAM.  (a)  The department, in consultation with the council, shall create a regulatory sandbox program that enables a person to obtain legal protection and limited access to the market in this state to test innovative artificial intelligence systems without obtaining a license, registration, or other regulatory authorization.

(b)  The program is designed to:

(1)  promote the safe and innovative use of artificial intelligence systems across various sectors including healthcare, finance, education, and public services;

(2)  encourage responsible deployment of artificial intelligence systems while balancing the need for consumer protection, privacy, and public safety;

(3)  provide clear guidelines for a person who develops an artificial intelligence system to test systems while certain laws and regulations related to the testing are waived or suspended; and

(4)  allow a person to engage in research, training, testing, or other pre-deployment activities to develop an artificial intelligence system.

(c)  The attorney general may not file or pursue charges against a program participant for violation of a law or regulation waived under this chapter that occurs during the testing period.

(d)  A state agency may not file or pursue punitive action against a program participant, including the imposition of a fine or the suspension or revocation of a license, registration, or other authorization, for violation of a law or regulation waived under this chapter that occurs during the testing period.

(e)  Notwithstanding Subsections (c) and (d), the requirements of Subchapter B, Chapter 552, may not be waived, and the attorney general or a state agency may file or pursue charges or action against a program participant who violates that subchapter.

Sec. 553.052.  APPLICATION FOR PROGRAM PARTICIPATION.  (a)  A person must obtain approval from the department and any applicable agency before testing an artificial intelligence system under the program.

(b)  The department by rule shall prescribe the application form.  The form must require the applicant to:

(1)  provide a detailed description of the artificial intelligence system the applicant desires to test in the program, and its intended use;

(2)  include a benefit assessment that addresses potential impacts on consumers, privacy, and public safety;

(3)  describe the applicant’s plan for mitigating any adverse consequences that may occur during the test; and

(4)  provide proof of compliance with any applicable federal artificial intelligence laws and regulations.

Sec. 553.053.  DURATION AND SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION.  (a)  A program participant approved by the department and each applicable agency may test and deploy an artificial intelligence system under the program for a period of not more than 36 months.

(b)  The department may extend a test under this chapter if the department finds good cause for the test to continue.

Sec. 553.054.  EFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES.  The department shall coordinate the activities under this subchapter and any other law relating to artificial intelligence systems to ensure efficient system implementation and to streamline the use of department resources, including information sharing and personnel.

SUBCHAPTER C.  OVERSIGHT AND COMPLIANCE

Sec. 553.101.  COORDINATION WITH APPLICABLE AGENCY.  (a)  The department shall coordinate with all applicable agencies to oversee the operation of a program participant.

(b)  The council or an applicable agency may recommend to the department that a program participant be removed from the program if the council or applicable agency finds that the program participant’s artificial intelligence system:

(1)  poses an undue risk to public safety or welfare;

(2)  violates any federal law or regulation; or

(3)  violates any state law or regulation not waived under the program.

Sec. 553.102.  PERIODIC REPORT BY PROGRAM PARTICIPANT.  (a)  A program participant shall provide a quarterly report to the department.

(b)  The report shall include:

(1)  metrics for the artificial intelligence system’s performance;

(2)  updates on how the artificial intelligence system mitigates any risks associated with its operation; and

(3)  feedback from consumers and affected stakeholders that are using an artificial intelligence system tested under this chapter.

(c)  The department shall maintain confidentiality regarding the intellectual property, trade secrets, and other sensitive information it obtains through the program.

Sec. 553.103.  ANNUAL REPORT BY DEPARTMENT.  (a)  The department shall submit an annual report to the legislature.

(b)  The report shall include:

(1)  the number of program participants testing an artificial intelligence system in the program;

(2)  the overall performance and impact of artificial intelligence systems tested in the program; and

(3)  recommendations on changes to laws or regulations for future legislative consideration.

CHAPTER 554.  TEXAS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

SUBCHAPTER A.  CREATION AND ORGANIZATION OF COUNCIL

Sec. 554.001.  CREATION OF COUNCIL.  (a)  The Texas Artificial Intelligence Council is created to:

(1)  ensure artificial intelligence systems in this state are ethical and developed in the public’s best interest;

(2)  ensure artificial intelligence systems in this state do not harm public safety or undermine individual freedoms by finding issues and making recommendations to the legislature regarding the Penal Code and Chapter 82, Civil Practice and Remedies Code;

(3)  identify existing laws and regulations that impede innovation in the development of artificial intelligence systems and recommend appropriate reforms;

(4)  analyze opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of state government operations through the use of artificial intelligence systems;

(5)  make recommendations to applicable state agencies regarding the use of artificial intelligence systems to improve the agencies’ efficiency and effectiveness;

(6)  evaluate potential instances of regulatory capture, including undue influence by technology companies or disproportionate burdens on smaller innovators caused by the use of artificial intelligence systems;

(7)  evaluate the influence of technology companies on other companies and determine the existence or use of tools or processes designed to censor competitors or users through the use of artificial intelligence systems;

(8)  offer guidance and recommendations to the legislature on the ethical and legal use of artificial intelligence systems;

(9)  conduct and publish the results of a study on the current regulatory environment for artificial intelligence systems;

(10)  receive reports from the Department of Information Resources regarding the regulatory sandbox program under Chapter 553; and

(11)  make recommendations for improvements to the regulatory sandbox program under Chapter 553.

(b)  The council is administratively attached to the Department of Information Resources, and the department shall provide administrative support to the council as provided by this section.

(c)  The Department of Information Resources and the council shall enter into a memorandum of understanding detailing:

(1)  the administrative support the council requires from the department to fulfill the council’s purposes;

(2)  the reimbursement of administrative expenses to the department; and

(3)  any other provisions necessary to ensure the efficient operation of the council.

Sec. 554.002.  COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP.  (a)  The council is composed of seven members as follows:

(1)  three members of the public appointed by the governor;

(2)  two members of the public appointed by the lieutenant governor; and

(3)  two members of the public appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives.

(b)  Members of the council serve staggered four-year terms, with the terms of three or four members expiring every two years.

(c)  The governor shall appoint a chair from among the members, and the council shall elect a vice chair from its membership.

(d)  The council may establish an advisory board composed of individuals from the public who possess expertise directly related to the council’s functions, including technical, ethical, regulatory, and other relevant areas.

Sec. 554.003.  QUALIFICATIONS.  Members of the council must be Texas residents and have knowledge or expertise in one or more of the following areas:

(1)  artificial intelligence systems;

(2)  data privacy and security;

(3)  ethics in technology or law;

(4)  public policy and regulation;

(5)  risk management related to artificial intelligence systems;

(6)  improving the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental operations; or

(7)  anticompetitive practices and market fairness.

Sec. 554.004.  STAFF AND ADMINISTRATION.  The council may hire an executive director and other personnel as necessary to perform its duties.

SUBCHAPTER B.  POWERS AND DUTIES OF COUNCIL

Sec. 554.101.  ISSUANCE OF REPORTS.  (a)  The council may issue reports to the legislature regarding the use of artificial intelligence systems in this state.

(b)  The council may issue reports on:

(1)  the compliance of artificial intelligence systems in this state with the laws of this state;

(2)  the ethical implications of deploying artificial intelligence systems in this state;

(3)  data privacy and security concerns related to artificial intelligence systems in this state; or

(4)  potential liability or legal risks associated with the use of artificial intelligence systems in this state.

Sec. 554.102.  TRAINING AND EDUCATIONAL OUTREACH.  The council shall conduct training programs for state agencies and local governments on the use of artificial intelligence systems.

Sec. 554.103.  LIMITATION OF AUTHORITY.  The council may not:

(1)  adopt rules or promulgate guidance that is binding for any entity;

(2)  interfere with or override the operation of a state agency; or

(3)  perform a duty or exercise a power not granted by this chapter.

SECTION 5.  Section 325.011, Government Code, is amended to read as follows:

Sec. 325.011.  CRITERIA FOR REVIEW.  The commission and its staff shall consider the following criteria in determining whether a public need exists for the continuation of a state agency or its advisory committees or for the performance of the functions of the agency or its advisory committees:

(1)  the efficiency and effectiveness with which the agency or the advisory committee operates;

(2)(A)  an identification of the mission, goals, and objectives intended for the agency or advisory committee and of the problem or need that the agency or advisory committee was intended to address; and

(B)  the extent to which the mission, goals, and objectives have been achieved and the problem or need has been addressed;

(3)(A)  an identification of any activities of the agency in addition to those granted by statute and of the authority for those activities; and

(B)  the extent to which those activities are needed;

(4)  an assessment of authority of the agency relating to fees, inspections, enforcement, and penalties;

(5)  whether less restrictive or alternative methods of performing any function that the agency performs could adequately protect or provide service to the public;

(6)  the extent to which the jurisdiction of the agency and the programs administered by the agency overlap or duplicate those of other agencies, the extent to which the agency coordinates with those agencies, and the extent to which the programs administered by the agency can be consolidated with the programs of other state agencies;

(7)  the promptness and effectiveness with which the agency addresses complaints concerning entities or other persons affected by the agency, including an assessment of the agency’s administrative hearings process;

(8)  an assessment of the agency’s rulemaking process and the extent to which the agency has encouraged participation by the public in making its rules and decisions and the extent to which the public participation has resulted in rules that benefit the public;

(9)  the extent to which the agency has complied with:

(A)  federal and state laws and applicable rules regarding equality of employment opportunity and the rights and privacy of individuals; and

(B)  state law and applicable rules of any state agency regarding purchasing guidelines and programs for historically underutilized businesses;

(10)  the extent to which the agency issues and enforces rules relating to potential conflicts of interest of its employees;

(11)  the extent to which the agency complies with Chapters 551 and 552 and follows records management practices that enable the agency to respond efficiently to requests for public information;

(12)  the effect of federal intervention or loss of federal funds if the agency is abolished;

(13)  the extent to which the purpose and effectiveness of reporting requirements imposed on the agency justifies the continuation of the requirement; [and]

(14)  an assessment of the agency’s cybersecurity practices using confidential information available from the Department of Information Resources or any other appropriate state agency; and

(15)  an assessment of the agency’s use of artificial intelligence systems, as that term is defined by Section 551.001, Business & Commerce Code, in its operations and its oversight of the use of artificial intelligence systems by persons under the agency’s jurisdiction, and any related impact on the agency’s ability to achieve its mission, goals, and objectives, made using information available from the Department of Information Resources, the attorney general, or any other appropriate state agency.

SECTION 6.  Section 2054.068(b), Government Code, is amended to read as follows:

(b)  The department shall collect from each state agency information on the status and condition of the agency’s information technology infrastructure, including information regarding:

(1)  the agency’s information security program;

(2)  an inventory of the agency’s servers, mainframes, cloud services, and other information technology equipment;

(3)  identification of vendors that operate and manage the agency’s information technology infrastructure; [and]

(4)  any additional related information requested by the department; and

(5)  an evaluation of the use or considered use of artificial intelligence systems, as defined by Section 551.001, Business & Commerce Code, by each state agency.

SECTION 7.  Section 2054.0965(b), Government Code, is amended to read as follows:

(b)  Except as otherwise modified by rules adopted by the department, the review must include:

(1)  an inventory of the agency’s major information systems, as defined by Section 2054.008, and other operational or logistical components related to deployment of information resources as prescribed by the department;

(2)  an inventory of the agency’s major databases, artificial intelligence systems, as defined by Section 551.001, Business & Commerce Code, and applications;

(3)  a description of the agency’s existing and planned telecommunications network configuration;

(4)  an analysis of how information systems, components, databases, applications, and other information resources have been deployed by the agency in support of:

(A)  applicable achievement goals established under Section 2056.006 and the state strategic plan adopted under Section 2056.009;

(B)  the state strategic plan for information resources; and

(C)  the agency’s business objectives, mission, and goals;

(5)  agency information necessary to support the state goals for interoperability and reuse; and

(6)  confirmation by the agency of compliance with state statutes, rules, and standards relating to information resources.

SECTION 8.  Not later than September 1, 2026, the attorney general shall post on the attorney general’s Internet website the information and online mechanism required by Section 552.102, Business & Commerce Code, as added by this Act.

SECTION 9.  (a)  Notwithstanding any other section of this Act, in a state fiscal year, a state agency to which this Act applies is not required to implement a provision found in another section of this Act that is drafted as a mandatory provision imposing a duty on the agency to take an action unless money is specifically appropriated to the agency for that fiscal year to carry out that duty.  The agency may implement the provision in that fiscal year to the extent other funding is available to the agency to do so.

(b)  If, as authorized by Subsection (a) of this section, the state agency does not implement the mandatory provision in a state fiscal year, the state agency, in its legislative budget request for the next state fiscal biennium, shall certify that fact to the Legislative Budget Board and include a written estimate of the costs of implementing the provision in each year of that next state fiscal biennium.

SECTION 10.  This Act takes effect January 1, 2026.

    President of the Senate           Speaker of the House      

I certify that H.B. No. 149 was passed by the House on April 23, 2025, by the following vote:  Yeas 146, Nays 3, 1 present, not voting; and that the House concurred in Senate amendments to H.B. No. 149 on May 30, 2025, by the following vote:  Yeas 121, Nays 17, 2 present, not voting.

______________________________

Chief Clerk of the House   

I certify that H.B. No. 149 was passed by the Senate, with amendments, on May 23, 2025, by the following vote:  Yeas 31, Nays 0.

______________________________

Secretary of the Senate   

APPROVED: __________________

                 Date       

          __________________

               Governor       


Appendix 2 — Model Ordinance: Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence in City Operations

ORDINANCE NO. ______

AN ORDINANCE

relating to the responsible use of artificial intelligence systems by the City; establishing transparency, accountability, and oversight requirements; and providing for implementation and administration.

WHEREAS,

the City recognizes that artificial intelligence (“AI”) systems are increasingly used to improve operational efficiency, service delivery, data analysis, and internal workflows; and

WHEREAS,

the City further recognizes that certain uses of AI may influence decisions affecting residents, employees, vendors, or regulated parties and therefore require appropriate oversight; and

WHEREAS,

the City seeks to encourage responsible innovation while preserving public trust, transparency, and accountability; and

WHEREAS,

the Texas Legislature has enacted the Texas Responsible Artificial Intelligence Governance Act, effective January 1, 2026, establishing statewide standards for AI use by government entities; and

WHEREAS,

the City recognizes that the adoption of artificial intelligence tools may, over time, change how work is performed and how staffing needs are structured, and that any such impacts are expected to occur gradually through attrition, reassignment, or role redesign rather than immediate workforce reductions;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF __________, TEXAS:

Section 1. Definitions

For purposes of this Ordinance:

  1. “Artificial Intelligence System” means a computational system that uses machine learning, statistical modeling, or related techniques to perform tasks normally associated with human intelligence, including analysis, prediction, classification, content generation, or prioritization.
  2. “Decision-Adjacent AI” means an AI system that materially influences, prioritizes, or recommends outcomes related to enforcement, eligibility, allocation of resources, personnel actions, procurement decisions, or public services, even if final decisions are made by a human.
  3. “High-Risk AI Use” means deployment of an AI system that directly or indirectly affects individual rights, access to services, enforcement actions, or legally protected interests.
  4. “Department” means any City department, office, division, or agency.

Section 2. Permitted Use of Artificial Intelligence

(a) Internal Productivity Uses. Departments may deploy AI systems for internal productivity and analytical purposes, including but not limited to:

  • Drafting and summarization of documents
  • Data analysis and forecasting
  • Workflow automation
  • Research and internal reporting
  • Customer-service chat tools providing general information (with disclaimers as appropriate)

Such uses shall not require prior Council approval but shall be subject to internal documentation requirements.

(b) Decision-Adjacent Uses. AI systems that influence or support decisions affecting residents, employees, vendors, or regulated entities may be deployed only in accordance with Sections 3 and 4 of this Ordinance.

Section 3. Prohibited Uses

No Department shall deploy or use an AI system that:

  1. Performs social scoring of individuals or groups based on behavior, personal traits, or reputation for the purpose of denying services, benefits, or rights;
  2. Intentionally discriminates against a protected class in violation of state or federal law;
  3. Generates or deploys biometric identification or surveillance in violation of constitutional protections;
  4. Produces or facilitates unlawful deep-fake or deceptive content;
  5. Operates as a fully automated decision-making system without meaningful human review in matters affecting legal rights or obligations.

Section 4. Oversight and Approval for High-Risk AI Uses

(a) Inventory Requirement. The City Manager shall maintain a centralized AI Systems Inventory identifying:

  • Each AI system in use
  • The Department deploying the system
  • The system’s purpose
  • Whether the use is classified as high-risk

(b) Approval Process. Prior to deployment of any High-Risk AI Use, the Department must:

  1. Submit a written justification describing the system’s purpose and scope;
  2. Identify the data sources used by the system;
  3. Describe human oversight mechanisms;
  4. Obtain approval from:
    • The City Manager (or designee), and
    • The City Attorney for legal compliance review.

(c) Human Accountability. Each AI system shall have a designated human owner responsible for:

  • Monitoring performance
  • Responding to errors or complaints
  • Suspending use if risks are identified

Section 5. Transparency and Public Disclosure

(a) Disclosure to the Public. When a City AI system interacts directly with residents, the City shall provide clear notice that the interaction involves AI.

(b) Public Reporting. The City shall publish annually:

  • A summary of AI systems in use
  • The general purposes of high-risk AI systems
  • Contact information for public inquiries

No proprietary or security-sensitive information shall be disclosed.

Section 6. Procurement and Vendor Requirements

All City contracts involving AI systems shall, where applicable:

  1. Require disclosure of AI functions;
  2. Prohibit undisclosed algorithmic decision-making;
  3. Allow the City to audit or review AI system outputs relevant to City operations;
  4. Require vendors to notify the City of material changes to AI functionality.

Section 7. Review and Sunset

(a) Periodic Review. High-risk AI systems shall be reviewed at least annually to assess:

  • Accuracy
  • Bias
  • Continued necessity
  • Compliance with this Ordinance

(b) Sunset Authority. The City Manager may suspend or terminate use of any AI system that poses unacceptable risk or fails compliance review.

Section 8. Training

The City shall provide appropriate training to employees involved in:

  • Deploying AI systems
  • Supervising AI-assisted workflows
  • Interpreting AI-generated outputs

Section 9. Severability

If any provision of this Ordinance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining provisions.

Section 10. Effective Date

This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon adoption.


Appendix 3 — City Manager Administrative Regulation: Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence

ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION NO. ___

Subject: Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in City Operations
Authority: Ordinance No. ___ (Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence)
Issued by: City Manager
Effective Date: __________

1. Purpose

This Administrative Regulation establishes operational procedures for the responsible deployment, oversight, and monitoring of artificial intelligence (AI) systems used by the City, consistent with adopted Council policy and applicable state law.

The intent is to:

  • Enable rapid adoption of AI for productivity and service delivery;
  • Ensure transparency and accountability for higher-risk uses; and
  • Protect the City, employees, and residents from unintended consequences.

2. Scope

This regulation applies to all City departments, offices, and divisions that:

  • Develop, procure, deploy, or use AI systems; or
  • Rely on vendor-provided software that includes AI functionality.

3. AI System Classification

Departments shall classify AI systems into one of the following categories:

A. Tier 1 — Internal Productivity AI

Examples:

  • Document drafting and summarization
  • Data analysis and forecasting
  • Internal research and reporting
  • Workflow automation

Oversight Level:

  • Department-level approval
  • Registration in AI Inventory

B. Tier 2 — Decision-Adjacent AI

Examples:

  • Permit or inspection prioritization
  • Vendor or application risk scoring
  • Resource allocation recommendations
  • Enforcement or compliance triage

Oversight Level:

  • City Manager approval
  • Legal review
  • Annual performance review

C. Tier 3 — High-Risk AI

Examples:

  • AI influencing enforcement actions
  • Eligibility determinations
  • Public safety analytics
  • Biometric or surveillance tools

Oversight Level:

  • City Manager approval
  • City Attorney review
  • Documented human-in-the-loop controls
  • Annual audit and Council notification

4. AI Systems Inventory

The City Manager’s Office shall maintain a centralized AI Systems Inventory, which includes:

  • System name and vendor
  • Department owner
  • Purpose and classification tier
  • Date of deployment
  • Oversight requirements

Departments shall update the inventory prior to deploying any new AI system.

5. Approval Process

A. Tier 1 Systems

  • Approved by Department Director
  • Registered in inventory

B. Tier 2 and Tier 3 Systems

Departments must submit:

  1. A description of the system and intended use
  2. Data sources and inputs
  3. Description of human oversight
  4. Risk mitigation measures

Approval required from:

  • City Manager (or designee)
  • City Attorney (for legal compliance)

6. Human Oversight & Accountability

Each AI system shall have a designated System Owner responsible for:

  • Monitoring system outputs
  • Responding to errors or complaints
  • Suspending use if risks emerge
  • Coordinating audits or reviews

No AI system may operate as a fully autonomous decision-maker for actions affecting legal rights or obligations.

7. Vendor & Procurement Controls

Procurement involving AI systems shall:

  • Identify AI functionality explicitly in solicitations
  • Require vendors to disclose material AI updates
  • Prohibit undisclosed algorithmic decision-making
  • Preserve City audit and review rights

8. Monitoring, Review & Sunset

  • Tier 2 and Tier 3 systems shall undergo annual review.
  • Systems may be suspended or sunset if:
    • Accuracy degrades
    • Bias is identified
    • Legal risk increases
    • The system no longer serves a defined purpose

9. Training

Departments deploying AI shall ensure appropriate staff training covering:

  • Proper interpretation of AI outputs
  • Limitations of AI systems
  • Escalation and error-handling procedures

10. Reporting to Council

The City Manager shall provide Council with:

  • An annual summary of AI systems in use
  • Identification of Tier 3 (High-Risk) systems
  • Any material incidents or corrective actions

11. Effective Date

This Administrative Regulation is effective immediately upon issuance.

12. Workforce Considerations

The use of artificial intelligence systems may change job functions and workflows over time. Departments shall:

  • Use AI to augment employee capabilities wherever possible;
  • Prioritize retraining, reassignment, and natural attrition when workflows change;
  • Coordinate with Human Resources before deploying AI systems that materially alter job duties; and
  • Recognize that long-term staffing impacts, if any, remain subject to City Manager and City Council authority.

Appendix 4 — Public-Facing FAQ: Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence in City Operations

What is this ordinance about?

This ordinance establishes clear rules for how the City may use artificial intelligence (AI) tools. It allows the City to use modern technology to improve efficiency and service delivery while ensuring that higher-risk uses are transparent, accountable, and overseen by people.

Is the City already using artificial intelligence?

Yes. Like most modern organizations, the City already uses limited AI-enabled tools for tasks such as document drafting, data analysis, customer service support, and vendor-provided software systems.

This ordinance ensures those tools are used consistently and responsibly.

Is this ordinance banning artificial intelligence?

No.
The ordinance does not ban AI. It encourages responsible adoption of AI for productivity and internal efficiency while placing guardrails on uses that could affect people’s rights or access to services.

Why is the City adopting rules now?

AI tools are becoming more common and more capable. Clear rules help ensure:

  • Transparency in how AI is used
  • Accountability for outcomes
  • Compliance with new Texas law
  • Public trust in City operations

The Texas Legislature recently enacted statewide standards for AI use by government entities, and this ordinance aligns the City with those expectations.

Will artificial intelligence affect City jobs?

AI may change how work is done over time, just as previous technologies have.

This ordinance does not authorize immediate workforce reductions. Any long-term impacts are expected to occur gradually and, where possible, through:

  • Natural attrition
  • Reassignment
  • Retraining
  • Changes in job duties

Final staffing decisions remain with City leadership and City Council.

Will AI replace City employees?

AI tools are intended to assist employees, not replace human judgment. For higher-risk uses, the ordinance requires meaningful human oversight and accountability.

Can AI make decisions about me automatically?

No.
The ordinance prohibits fully automated decision-making that affects legal rights, enforcement actions, or access to services without human review.

AI may provide information or recommendations, but people remain responsible for decisions.

Will the City use AI for surveillance or facial recognition?

The ordinance prohibits AI uses that violate constitutional protections, including improper biometric surveillance.

Any use of biometric or surveillance-related AI would require strict legal review and compliance with state and federal law.

How will I know if I’m interacting with AI?

If the City uses AI systems that interact directly with residents, the City must clearly disclose that you are interacting with an AI system.

Does this apply to police or public safety?

Yes.
AI tools used in public safety contexts are considered higher-risk and require additional review, approval, and oversight. AI systems may not independently make enforcement decisions.

Who is responsible if an AI system makes a mistake?

Each AI system has a designated City employee responsible for monitoring its use, addressing errors, and suspending the system if necessary.

Responsibility remains with the City—not the software.

Will the public be able to see how AI is used?

Yes.
The City will publish an annual summary describing:

  • The types of AI systems in use
  • Their general purpose
  • How residents can ask questions or raise concerns

Sensitive or proprietary information will not be disclosed.

Does this create a new board or bureaucracy?

No.
Oversight is handled through existing City leadership and administrative structures.

Is there a cost to adopting this ordinance?

There is no direct cost associated with adoption. Over time, responsible AI use may help control costs by improving productivity and efficiency.

How often will this policy be reviewed?

Higher-risk AI systems are reviewed annually. The ordinance itself may be updated as technology and law evolve.

Who can I contact with questions or concerns?

Residents may contact the City Manager’s Office or submit inquiries through the City’s website. Information on AI use and reporting channels will be publicly available.

Bottom Line

This ordinance ensures the City:

  • Uses modern tools responsibly
  • Maintains human accountability
  • Protects public trust
  • Aligns with Texas law
  • Adapts thoughtfully to technological change

The Municipal & Business Workquake of 2026: Why Cities Must Redesign Roles Now—Before Attrition Does It for Them

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

Cities are about to experience an administrative shift that will look nothing like a “tech revolution” and nothing like a classic workforce reduction. It will arrive as a workquake: a sudden drop in the labor required to complete routine tasks across multiple departments, driven by AI systems that can ingest documents, apply rules, assemble outputs, and draft narratives at scale.

The danger is not that cities will replace everyone with software. The danger is more subtle and far more likely: cities will allow AI to hollow out core functions unintentionally, through non-replacement hiring, scattered tool adoption, and informal workflow shortcuts—until the organization’s accountability structure no longer matches the work being done.

In 2026, the right posture is not fascination or fear. It is proactive redesign.


I. The Real Change: Task Takeover, Not Job Replacement

Municipal roles often look “human” because they involve public trust, compliance, and service. But much of the day-to-day work inside those roles is structured:

  • collecting inputs
  • applying policy checklists
  • preparing standardized packets
  • producing routine reports
  • tracking deadlines
  • drafting summaries
  • reconciling variances
  • adding narrative to numbers

Those tasks are precisely what modern AI systems now handle with speed and consistency. What remains human is still vital—but it is narrower: judgment, discretion, ethics, and accountability.

That creates the same pattern across departments:

  • the production layer shrinks rapidly
  • the review and exception layer becomes the job

Cities that don’t define this shift early will experience it late—as a staffing and governance crisis.


II. Example- City Secretary: Where Governance Work Becomes Automated

The city secretary function sits at the center of formal governance: agendas, minutes, public notices, records, ordinances, and elections. Much of the labor in this area is procedural and document-heavy.

Tasks likely to be absorbed quickly

  • Agenda assembly from departmental submissions
  • Packet compilation and formatting
  • Deadline tracking for posting and notices
  • Records indexing and retrieval
  • Draft minutes from audio/video with time stamps
  • Ordinance/resolution histories and cross-references

What shrinks

  • clerical assembly roles
  • manual transcription
  • routine records handling

What becomes more important

  • legal compliance judgment (Open Meetings, Public Information)
  • defensibility of the record
  • election integrity protocols
  • final human review of public-facing outputs

In other words: the city secretary role does not disappear. It becomes governance QA—with higher stakes and fewer support layers.


III. Example – Purchasing & Procurement: Where Process Becomes Automated Screening

Purchasing has always been a mix of routine compliance and high-risk discretion. AI hits the routine side first, fast.

Tasks likely to be absorbed quickly

  • quote comparisons and bid tabulations
  • price benchmarking against history and peers
  • contract template population
  • insurance/required-doc compliance checks
  • renewal tracking and vendor performance summaries
  • anomaly detection (odd pricing, split purchases, policy exceptions)

What shrinks

  • bid tabulators
  • quote chasers
  • contract formatting staff
  • clerical procurement roles

What becomes more important

  • vendor disputes and negotiations
  • integrity controls (conflicts, favoritism risk)
  • exception approvals with documented reasoning
  • strategic sourcing decisions

Procurement shifts from “processing” to risk-managed decisioning.


IV. Example – Budget Analysts: Where “Analysis” Separates from “Assembly”

Budget offices are often mistaken as purely analytical. In reality, a large share of work is assembly: gathering departmental submissions, normalizing formats, building tables, writing routine narratives, and explaining variances.

Tasks likely to be absorbed quickly

  • ingestion and normalization of department requests
  • enforcement of submission rules and formatting
  • auto-generated variance explanations
  • draft budget narratives (department summaries, highlights)
  • scenario tables (base, constrained, growth cases)
  • continuous budget-to-actual reconciliation

What shrinks

  • entry-level budget analysts
  • table builders and narrative drafters
  • budget book production labor

What becomes more important

  • setting assumptions and policy levers
  • framing tradeoffs for leadership and council
  • long-range fiscal forecasting judgment
  • telling the truth clearly under political pressure

Budget staff shift from spreadsheet production to decision support and persuasion with integrity.


V. Example – Police & Fire Data Analysts: Where Reporting Becomes Real-Time Patterning

Public safety analytics is one of the most automatable municipal domains because it is data-rich, structured, and continuous. The “report builder” role is especially vulnerable.

Tasks likely to be absorbed quickly

  • automated monthly/quarterly performance reporting
  • response-time distribution analysis
  • hotspot mapping and geospatial summaries
  • staffing demand pattern detection
  • anomaly flagging (unusual patterns in calls, activity, response)
  • draft CompStat-style narratives and slide-ready briefings

What shrinks

  • manual report builders
  • map producers
  • dashboard-only roles
  • grant-report drafters relying on routine metrics

What becomes more important

  • human interpretation (what the pattern means operationally)
  • explaining limitations and avoiding false certainty
  • bias and fairness oversight
  • defensible analytics for court, public inquiry, or media scrutiny

Public safety analytics becomes less about producing charts and more about protecting truth and trust.


VI. Example – More Roles Next in Line

Permitting & Development Review

AI can quickly absorb:

  • completeness checks
  • code cross-referencing
  • workflow routing and status updates
  • templated staff reports

Humans remain essential for:

  • discretionary judgments
  • negotiation with applicants
  • interpreting ambiguous code situations
  • public-facing case management

HR Analysts

AI absorbs:

  • classification comparisons
  • market surveys and comp modeling
  • policy drafting and FAQ support

Humans remain for:

  • discipline, negotiations, sensitive cases
  • equity judgments and culture
  • leadership counsel and conflict resolution

Grants Management

AI absorbs:

  • opportunity scanning and matching
  • compliance calendars
  • draft narrative sections and attachments lists

Humans remain for:

  • strategy (which grants matter)
  • partnerships and commitments
  • risk management and audit defense

VII. The Practical Reality in Cities: Attrition Is the Mechanism

This won’t arrive as dramatic layoffs. It will arrive as:

  • hiring freezes
  • “we won’t backfill that position”
  • consolidation of roles
  • sudden expectations that one person can do what three used to do

If cities do nothing, AI will still be adopted—piecemeal, unevenly, and without governance redesign. That produces an organization with:

  • fewer people
  • unclear accountability
  • heavier compliance risk
  • fragile institutional memory

VIII. What “Proactive” Looks Like in 2026

Cities need to act immediately in four practical ways:

  1. Define what must remain human
    • elections integrity
    • public record defensibility
    • procurement exceptions and ethics
    • budget assumption-setting and council framing
    • public safety interpretation and bias oversight
  2. Separate production from review
    • let AI assemble
    • require humans to verify, approve, and own
  3. Rewrite job descriptions now
    • stop hiring for assembly work
    • hire for judgment, auditing, communication, and governance
  4. Build the governance layer
    • standards for AI outputs
    • audit trails
    • transparency policies
    • escalation rules
    • periodic review of AI-driven decisions

This is not an IT upgrade. It’s a redesign of how public authority is exercised.


Conclusion: The Choice Cities Face

Cities will adopt AI regardless—because the savings and speed will be undeniable. The only choice is whether the city adopts AI intentionally or accidentally.

If adopted intentionally, AI becomes:

  • a productivity tool
  • a compliance enhancer
  • a service accelerator

If adopted accidentally, AI becomes:

  • a quiet hollowing of institutional capacity
  • a transfer of control from policy to tool
  • and eventually a governance failure that will be blamed on people who never had the chance to redesign the system

2026 is early enough to steer the transition.
Waiting will not preserve the old model. It will only ensure the new one arrives without a plan.

End note: I usually spend a couple of days (minimum) completing the compilation of all my bank and credit card records, assigning a classification, summarizing and giving my CPA a complete set of documents. I uploaded the documents to AI, gave it instructions to prepare the package, answering a list of questions regarding reconciliation and classification issues. Two hours later, I had the full package with comparisons to past years from the returns I also uploaded. I was 100% ready on New Year’s Eve just waiting for the 1099’s to be sent to me by the end of January. Meanwhile, I have been having AI enhance and create a comprehensive accounting system with beautiful schedules like cash flow, taxation notes, checklists with new IRS rules and general help – more than I was getting from CPA. I’ll be able to actually take over the CPA duties. It’s just the start of the things I can turn over to AI while I become the editor and reviewer instead of the dreaded grunt work. LFM

The Infrastructure We Don’t See: Aging Gas Systems, Hidden Risks, and the Case for Annual Accountability

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

It’s not if, but when!

Natural gas infrastructure is the most invisible—and therefore the most misunderstood—critical system in modern cities. Power lines are visible. Water mains announce themselves through pressure and flow. Roads crack and bridges age in plain sight. But gas lines remain buried, silent, and largely forgotten—until something goes wrong.

That invisibility is not benign. It creates a governance gap where responsibility is fragmented, risk is assumed rather than measured, and accountability is episodic instead of continuous. As cities grow denser, older, and more complex, that gap widens.

This essay makes a simple but demanding case: cities should require annual, technical accountability briefings from gas utilities and structured gas-safety evaluations for high-occupancy buildings—public and private—because safety is no longer assured by age, ownership boundaries, or regulatory compliance alone.

The ultimate question is not whether gas systems are regulated. They are.
The question is whether, at the local level, we are actually safer than we were a year ago.


I. The Aging Gas Network: A Technical Reality, Not a Hypothetical

Much of the U.S. gas distribution network was installed decades ago. While significant modernization has occurred, legacy materials—particularly cast iron and bare steel—still exist in pockets, often in the very neighborhoods where density, redevelopment, and consequence are highest.

These systems age in predictable ways:

  • Material degradation such as corrosion, joint failure, and metal fatigue
  • Ground movement from expansive soils, drought cycles, and freeze–thaw conditions
  • Pressure cycling driven by modern load variability
  • Construction interaction, including third-party damage during roadway, utility, and redevelopment projects

Technically speaking, aging is not a binary condition. It is a curve. Systems do not fail all at once; they fail where stress, material fatigue, and external disturbance intersect. Cities that approve redevelopment without understanding where those intersections lie are not managing risk—they are inheriting it.


II. Monitoring Is Better Than Ever—But It Is Not Replacement

Modern gas utilities deploy advanced leak detection technologies that did not exist a generation ago: mobile survey vehicles, high-sensitivity handheld sensors, aerial detection, and in some cases continuous monitoring.

Regulatory standards have improved as well. Leak surveys are more frequent, detection thresholds are lower, and repair timelines are clearer. From a technical standpoint, the industry is better at finding leaks than it was even a few years ago.

But monitoring is inherently reactive. It detects deterioration after it has begun. It does not restore structural integrity. It does not change the age profile of the system. It does not eliminate brittle joints or corrosion-prone materials.

Replacement is the only permanent risk reduction. And replacement is expensive, disruptive, and largely invisible unless cities require it to be discussed openly.


III. Why Annual Gas Utility Accountability Briefings Are Essential

Gas utilities operate under long-range capital replacement programs driven by regulatory approval, rate recovery, and internal prioritization models. Cities operate under land-use approvals, zoning changes, density increases, and redevelopment pressures that can change risk far faster than infrastructure plans adjust.

An annual gas utility accountability briefing is how those two worlds reconnect.

Not a promotional update. Not a general safety overview. But a technical, decision-grade briefing that allows city leadership to understand:

  • What materials remain in the ground
  • Where risk is concentrated
  • How fast legacy systems are being retired
  • Whether replacement is keeping pace with growth
  • Where development decisions may be increasing consequence

Without this, cities are effectively approving new intensity above ground while assuming adequacy below it.


IV. The Forgotten Segment: From the Meter to the Building

Most gas incidents that injure people do not originate in transmission pipelines or deep mains. They occur closest to occupied space—often in the short stretch between the gas meter and the building structure.

Legally, responsibility is clear:

  • The utility owns and maintains the system up to the meter.
  • The property owner owns everything downstream.

Assessment, however, is not.

Post-meter gas piping is frequently:

  • Older steel without modern corrosion protection
  • Stressed by foundation movement
  • Altered during remodels and additions
  • Poorly documented
  • Rarely inspected after initial construction

Utilities generally do not inspect customer-owned piping. Building departments see it only during permitted work. Fire departments respond after leaks are reported. Property owners often do not realize they own it.

This creates a true orphaned asset class: high-consequence infrastructure with no lifecycle oversight.


V. Responsibility Alone Is Not Safety

Cities often take comfort in the legal distinction: “That’s private property.” Legally, that is correct. Practically, it is insufficient.

Gas does not respect ownership boundaries. A failure inside a school, apartment building, restaurant, or nursing home becomes a public emergency immediately.

Risk governance does not require cities to assume liability. It requires them to ensure that someone is actually evaluating risk in places where failure would have severe consequences.


VI. Required Gas-Safety Evaluations for High-Occupancy Properties

This is the missing pillar of modern gas safety.

Just as elevators, fire suppression systems, and boilers undergo periodic inspection, gas piping systems in high-occupancy buildings should be subject to structured evaluation—regardless of whether the building is publicly or privately owned.

Facilities warranting mandatory evaluation include:

  • Schools (public and private)
  • Daycares
  • Nursing homes and assisted-living facilities
  • Hospitals and clinics
  • Large multifamily buildings
  • Assembly venues (churches, theaters, gyms)
  • Restaurants and food-service establishments
  • High-load commercial and industrial users

These are places where evacuation is difficult, ignition sources are common, and consequences are magnified.

A gas-safety evaluation should assess:

  • Condition and material of post-meter piping
  • Corrosion, support, and anchoring
  • Stress at building entry points
  • Evidence of undocumented modifications or abandoned lines
  • Accessibility and labeling of shutoff valves

These evaluations need not be frequent. They need to be periodic, triggered, and credible.


VII. Triggers That Make the System Work

Cities can implement this framework without blanket inspections by tying evaluations to specific events:

  • Change of occupancy or use
  • Major remodels or additions
  • Buildings reaching certain age thresholds when work is permitted
  • Repeated gas odor or leak responses
  • Sale or transfer of high-occupancy properties

This approach focuses effort where risk is most likely to have changed.


VIII. Public vs. Private: One Standard of Care

A gas explosion in a public school is not meaningfully different from one in a private daycare or restaurant. The victims do not care who owned the pipe.

A city that limits safety evaluation requirements to public buildings is acknowledging risk—but only partially. The standard should be risk-based, not ownership-based.


IX. Are We Better or Worse Off Than a Year Ago?

Technically, the answer is nuanced.

We are better off nationally in detection capability and regulatory clarity. Technology has improved. Survey frequency has increased. Reporting is stronger.

But many cities are likely worse off locally in exposure:

  • Buildings are older
  • Density is higher
  • Construction activity is heavier
  • Post-meter piping remains largely unassessed
  • High-occupancy facilities rely on outdated assumptions

So the honest answer is this:

We are better at finding problems—but not necessarily better at eliminating risk where people live, work, and gather.


X. Governance Is the Missing Link

Gas safety is no longer only an engineering problem. It is a governance problem.

Cities already regulate:

  • Land use and density
  • Building permits and occupancy
  • Business licensing
  • Emergency response coordination

Requiring annual gas utility accountability briefings and targeted gas-safety evaluations does not expand government arbitrarily. It closes a blind spot that modern urban conditions have exposed.


Conclusion: Asking the Right Question, Every Year

The most important question cities should ask annually is not:

“Did the utility comply with regulations?”

It is:

“Given our growth, our buildings, and our infrastructure, are we actually safer than we were last year?”

If city leaders cannot answer that clearly—above ground and below—it is not because the answer is unknowable.

It is because no one has required it to be known.


**Appendix A

Model Ordinance: Gas Infrastructure Accountability and High-Occupancy Safety Evaluations**

This model ordinance is designed to improve transparency, situational awareness, and public safety without transferring ownership, operational control, or liability from utilities or property owners to the City.


Section 1. Purpose and Findings

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this ordinance is to:

  1. Improve transparency regarding the condition, monitoring, and replacement of gas infrastructure;
  2. Ensure that risks associated with aging gas systems are identified and reduced over time;
  3. Require periodic gas safety evaluations for high-occupancy buildings where consequences of failure are greatest;
  4. Strengthen coordination among gas utilities, property owners, and City emergency services; and
  5. Establish consistent, decision-grade information for City leadership.

1.2 Findings

The City Council finds that:

  1. Natural gas infrastructure is largely underground and not visible to the public.
  2. Portions of the gas system—including customer-owned piping—may age without systematic reassessment.
  3. Increased density, redevelopment, and construction activity elevate the consequences of gas failures.
  4. Existing regulatory frameworks do not provide city-specific visibility into system condition or replacement progress.
  5. Periodic reporting and targeted evaluation improve public safety without assuming utility or private ownership responsibilities.

Section 2. Annual Gas Utility Accountability Briefing

2.1 Requirement

Each gas utility operating within the City shall provide an Annual Gas Infrastructure Accountability Briefing to the City Council or its designated committee.

2.2 Scope

The briefing shall address, at a minimum:

  • Pipeline materials and age profile;
  • Replacement progress and future plans;
  • Leak detection, classification, and repair performance;
  • High-consequence areas and impacts of development;
  • Construction coordination and damage prevention;
  • Emergency response readiness and communication protocols.

2.3 Format and Standards

  • Briefings shall include written materials, maps, and data tables.
  • Metrics shall be presented in a year-over-year comparable format.
  • Information shall be technical, factual, and suitable for governance decision-making.

2.4 No Transfer of Liability

Nothing in this section shall be construed to transfer ownership, maintenance responsibility, or operational control of gas facilities to the City.


Section 3. High-Occupancy Gas Safety Evaluations

3.1 Covered Facilities

Gas safety evaluations are required for the following facilities, whether publicly or privately owned:

  • Schools (public and private)
  • Daycare facilities
  • Nursing homes and assisted-living facilities
  • Hospitals and medical clinics
  • Multifamily buildings exceeding [X] dwelling units
  • Assembly occupancies exceeding [X] persons
  • Restaurants and commercial food-service establishments
  • Other facilities designated by the Fire Marshal as high-consequence occupancies

3.2 Scope of Evaluation

Evaluations shall assess:

  • Condition and materials of post-meter gas piping
  • Corrosion potential and structural support
  • Stress at building entry points and foundations
  • Evidence of undocumented modifications or abandoned piping
  • Accessibility, labeling, and operation of shutoff valves

3.3 Qualified Evaluators

Evaluations shall be conducted by:

  • Licensed plumbers,
  • Licensed mechanical contractors, or
  • Professional engineers with gas system experience.

3.4 Triggers

Evaluations shall be required upon:

  • Change of occupancy or use;
  • Major remodels or building additions;
  • Buildings reaching [X] years of age when permits are issued;
  • Repeated gas odor complaints or leak responses;
  • Sale or transfer of covered properties, if adopted by the City.

Section 4. Documentation and Compliance

4.1 Certification

Property owners shall submit documentation certifying completion of required evaluations.

4.2 Corrective Action

Identified hazards shall be corrected within timeframes established by code officials.

4.3 Enforcement

Non-compliance may result in:

  • Withholding of permits or certificates of occupancy;
  • Temporary suspension of approvals;
  • Administrative penalties as authorized by law.

Section 5. Education and Coordination

The City shall:

  • Provide educational materials clarifying ownership and safety responsibilities;
  • Coordinate with gas utilities on public outreach;
  • Integrate findings into emergency response planning and training.


**Appendix B

Annual Gas Utility Accountability Briefing — Preparation Checklist**

This checklist ensures annual briefings are consistent, measurable, and focused on risk reduction rather than general compliance.


I. System Inventory & Condition

☐ Total pipeline miles within city limits (distribution vs. transmission)
☐ Pipeline miles by material type
☐ Pipeline miles by decade installed
☐ Location and extent of remaining legacy materials
☐ Identification of oldest segments still in service


II. Replacement Progress

☐ Miles replaced in the previous year (by material type)
☐ Five-year replacement plan with schedules
☐ Funded vs. unfunded replacement projects
☐ Year-over-year reduction in legacy materials
☐ Explanation of changes from prior plans


III. Leak Detection & Repair Performance

☐ Total leaks detected (normalized per mile)
☐ Leak classification breakdown
☐ Average and maximum repair times by class
☐ Repeat leak locations identified and mapped
☐ Root-cause analysis of recurring issues


IV. Monitoring Technology

☐ Detection technologies currently deployed
☐ Survey frequency achieved vs. required
☐ Use of advanced or emerging detection tools
☐ Known limitations of monitoring methods


V. High-Consequence Areas

☐ Definition and criteria for high-consequence zones
☐ Updated risk maps
☐ Impact of new development on risk profile
☐ Trunk lines serving rapidly densifying areas


VI. Construction & Damage Prevention

☐ Third-party damage incidents
☐ 811 ticket response performance
☐ High-risk project types identified
☐ Coordination procedures with City capital projects


VII. Emergency Response Readiness

☐ Incident response timelines
☐ Coordination with fire, police, and emergency management
☐ Date and scope of last joint exercise or drill
☐ Public communication and notification protocols


VIII. Customer-Owned (Post-Meter) Piping

☐ Incidents involving post-meter piping
☐ Common failure materials or conditions
☐ Customer education and outreach efforts
☐ Voluntary inspection or assistance programs


IX. Forward-Looking Risk Assessment

☐ Top unresolved risks
☐ Areas of greatest concern
☐ Commitments for the next 12 months
☐ Clear answer to:
“Are we safer than last year—and why?”


Closing Note

A briefing that cannot complete this checklist is not incomplete—it is revealing where risk remains unmanaged.

That visibility is the purpose of accountability.

An Update on Drone Uses in Texas Municipalities

A second collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

From Tactical Tools to a Quiet Redefinition of First Response

A decade ago, a municipal drone program in Texas usually meant a small team, a locked cabinet, and a handful of specially trained officers who were called out when circumstances justified it. The drone was an accessory—useful, sometimes impressive, but peripheral to the ordinary rhythm of public safety.

That is no longer the case.

Across Texas, drones are being absorbed into the daily mechanics of emergency response. In a growing number of cities, they are no longer something an officer brings to a scene. They are something the city sends—often before the first patrol car, engine, or ambulance has cleared an intersection.

This shift is subtle, technical, and easily misunderstood. But it represents one of the most consequential changes in municipal public safety design in a generation.


The quiet shift from tools to systems

The defining change is not better cameras or longer flight times. It is program design.

Early drone programs were built around people: pilots, certifications, and equipment checklists. Today’s programs are built around systems—launch infrastructure, dispatch logic, real-time command centers, and policies that define when a drone may be used and, just as importantly, when it may not.

Cities like Arlington illustrate this evolution clearly. Arlington’s drones are not stored in trunks or deployed opportunistically. They launch from fixed docking stations, controlled through the city’s real-time operations center, and are sent to calls the way any other responder would be. The drone’s role is not to replace officers, but to give them something they rarely had before arrival: certainty.

Is someone actually inside the building? Is the suspect still there? Is the person lying in the roadway injured or already moving? These are small questions, but they shape everything that follows. In many cases, the presence of a drone overhead resolves a situation before physical contact ever occurs.

That pattern—early information reducing risk—is now being repeated, in different forms, across the state.


North Texas as an early laboratory

In North Texas, the progression from experimentation to normalization is especially visible.

Arlington’s program has become a reference point, not because it is flashy, but because it works. Drones are treated as routine assets, subject to policy, supervision, and after-action review. Their value is measured in response times and avoided escalations, not in flight hours.

Nearby, Dallas is navigating a more complex path. Dallas already operates one of the most active municipal drone programs in the state, but scale changes everything. Dense neighborhoods, layered airspace, multiple airports, and heightened civil-liberties scrutiny mean that Dallas cannot simply replicate what smaller cities have done.

Instead, Dallas appears to be doing something more consequential: deliberately embedding “Drone as First Responder” capability into its broader public-safety technology framework. Procurement language and public statements now describe drones verifying caller information while officers respond—a quiet but important acknowledgement that drones are becoming part of the dispatch process itself. If Dallas succeeds, it will establish a model for large, complex cities that have so far watched DFR from a distance.

Smaller cities have moved faster.

Prosper, for example, has embraced automation as a way to overcome limited staffing and long travel distances. Its program emphasizes speed—sub-two-minute arrivals made possible by automated docking stations that handle charging and readiness without human intervention. Prosper’s experience suggests that cities do not have to grow into DFR gradually; some can leap directly to system-level deployment.

Cities like Euless represent another important strand of adoption. Their programs are smaller, more cautious, and intentionally bounded. They launch drones to specific call types, collect experience, and adjust policy as they go. These cities matter because they demonstrate how DFR spreads laterally, city by city, through observation and imitation rather than mandates or statewide directives.


South Texas and the widening geography of DFR

DFR is not a North Texas phenomenon.

In the Rio Grande Valley, Edinburg has publicly embraced dispatch-driven drone response for crashes, crimes in progress, and search-and-rescue missions, including night operations using thermal imaging. In regions where heat, terrain, and distance complicate traditional response, the value of rapid aerial awareness is obvious.

Further west, Laredo has framed drones as part of a broader rapid-response network rather than a narrow policing tool. Discussions there extend beyond observation to include overdose response and medical support, pointing toward a future where drones do more than watch—they enable intervention while ground units close the gap.

Meanwhile, cities like Pearland have quietly done the hardest work of all: making DFR ordinary. Pearland’s early focus on remote operations and program governance is frequently cited by other cities, even when it draws little public attention. Its lesson is simple but powerful: the more boring a drone program becomes, the more likely it is to scale.


What 2026 will likely bring

By 2026, Texas municipalities will no longer debate drones in abstract terms. The conversation will shift to coverage, performance, and restraint.

City leaders will ask how much of their jurisdiction can be reached within two or three minutes, and what it costs to achieve that standard. DFR coverage maps will begin to resemble fire-station service areas, and response-time percentiles will replace anecdotal success stories.

Dispatch ownership will matter more than pilot skill. The most successful programs will be those in which drones are managed as part of the call-taking and response ecosystem, not as specialty assets waiting for permission. Pilots will become supervisors of systems, not just operators of aircraft.

At the same time, privacy will increasingly determine the pace of expansion. Cities that define limits early—what drones will never be used for, how long video is kept, who can access it—will move faster and with less friction. Those that delay these conversations will find themselves stalled, not by technology, but by public distrust.

Federal airspace rules will continue to separate tactical programs from scalable ones. Dense metro areas will demand more sophisticated solutions—automated docks, detect-and-avoid capabilities, and carefully designed flight corridors. The cities that solve these problems will not just have better drones; they will have better systems.

And perhaps most telling of all, drones will gradually fade from public conversation. When residents stop noticing them—when a drone overhead is no more remarkable than a patrol car passing by—the transformation will be complete.


A closing thought

Texas cities are not adopting drones because they are fashionable or futuristic. They are doing so because time matters, uncertainty creates risk, and early information saves lives—sometimes by prompting action, and sometimes by preventing it.

By 2026, the question will not be whether drones belong in municipal public safety. It will be why any city, given the chance to act earlier and safer, would choose not to.


Looking Ahead to 2026: When Drones Become Ordinary

By 2026, the most telling sign of success for municipal drone programs in Texas will not be innovation, expansion, or even capability. It will be normalcy.

The early years of public-safety drones were marked by novelty. A drone launch drew attention, generated headlines, and often triggered anxiety about surveillance or overreach. That phase is already fading. What is emerging in its place is quieter and far more consequential: drones becoming an assumed part of the response environment, much like radios, body cameras, or computer-aided dispatch systems once did.

The conversation will no longer revolve around whether a city has drones. Instead, it will focus on coverage and performance. City leaders will ask how quickly aerial eyes can reach different parts of the city, how often drones arrive before ground units, and what percentage of priority calls benefit from early visual confirmation. Response-time charts and service-area maps will replace anecdotes and demonstrations. In this sense, drones will stop being treated as technology and start being treated as infrastructure.

This shift will also clarify responsibility. The most mature programs will no longer center on individual pilots or specialty units. Ownership will move decisively toward dispatch and real-time operations centers. Drones will be launched because a call meets predefined criteria, not because someone happens to be available or enthusiastic. Pilots will increasingly function as system supervisors, ensuring compliance, safety, and continuity, rather than as hands-on operators for every flight.

At the same time, restraint will become just as important as reach. Cities that succeed will be those that articulate, early and clearly, what drones are not for. By 2026, residents will expect drone programs to come with explicit boundaries: no routine patrols, no generalized surveillance, no silent expansion of mission. Programs that fail to define those limits will find themselves stalled, regardless of how capable the technology may be.

Federal airspace rules and urban complexity will further separate casual programs from durable ones. Large cities will discover that scaling drones is less about buying more aircraft and more about solving coordination problems—airspace, redundancy, automation, and integration with other systems. The cities that work through those constraints will not just fly more often; they will fly predictably and defensibly.

And then, gradually, the attention will drift away.

When a drone arriving overhead is no longer remarkable—when it is simply understood as one of the first tools a city sends to make sense of an uncertain situation—the transition will be complete. The public will not notice drones because they will no longer symbolize change. They will symbolize continuity.

That is the destination Texas municipalities are approaching: not a future where drones dominate public safety, but one where they quietly support it—reducing uncertainty, improving judgment, and often preventing escalation precisely because they arrive early and ask the simplest question first: What is really happening here?

By 2026, the most advanced drone programs in Texas will not feel futuristic at all. They will feel inevitable.

What Question Are We Actually Answering?

A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

Why Good Analysis Begins Long Before Data — and Why Asking Better Questions Is a Skill That Must Be Practiced


I. The Invisible Starting Line

Every serious analysis begins with a question.
Almost every serious failure begins with the wrong one.

This is uncomfortable because it means that many errors are not technical. They are not caused by bad data, weak models, insufficient funding, or lack of expertise. They occur before any of that—at the moment a question is framed, accepted, and allowed to go unchallenged.

Questions are often inherited rather than chosen. They arrive embedded in headlines, legislation, grant applications, consulting scopes, software templates, or political urgency. By the time anyone pauses to ask whether the question itself is sound, the machinery is already moving.

Once that happens, better data does not fix the problem.
It accelerates it.

Precision is not clarity. A precisely answered wrong question produces results that feel authoritative while being fundamentally misleading. This is why analysis so often fails quietly and confidently.


II. The Four Types of Questions (And Why Only One Sustains Analysis)

Not all questions do the same kind of work. Most confusion in public debate and institutional decision-making comes from treating very different questions as if they were interchangeable.

1. Descriptive Questions

What is happening?

These establish facts, counts, and trends. They are necessary, but inert. Description alone does not explain change, causation, or constraint. Mistaking description for understanding is one of the most common analytical errors.

2. Attributional Questions

Who is responsible?

These arrive early and loudly. They satisfy emotional and political needs, but they tend to collapse complex systems into villains and heroes. Attribution feels like insight, but it usually precedes understanding.

3. Prescriptive Questions

What should we do?

These feel decisive and productive. They are also dangerous when asked prematurely. Prescriptions lock systems into action paths that may be impossible to reverse, even if the diagnosis was wrong.

4. Analytical Questions

What changed, relative to what, over what time horizon, and under which constraints?

These are the least intuitive and least rewarded questions, yet they are the only ones that scale. They slow the conversation down, resist moral shortcuts, and force structure onto complexity.

Most debates skip directly from description to prescription. Analysis happens, if at all, in the margins.


III. Time Horizons: The Quiet Distorter

Every question implies a time frame, whether stated or not. When it goes unstated, it is almost always too short.

Systems behave differently over one year than over five, and differently again over a generation. Short horizons hide maturation effects, suppress lagged consequences, and reward surface solutions. Long horizons expose tradeoffs, reveal inevitabilities, and demand humility.

When someone asks, “Why is this happening now?” without clarifying whether “now” means this quarter, this decade, or this lifecycle stage, the answer will be confident and wrong.

A reliable analytical rule is simple:
If the time horizon is unstated, it is probably distorting the conclusion.


IV. Baselines: The Question Nobody Wants to Ask

“Compared to what?” is the most expensive sentence in analysis.

Baselines are almost always chosen quietly and defended rarely. Yet they determine whether something appears as growth or stagnation, crisis or normal variation, success or failure.

Common baseline errors include:

  • Comparing growing systems to static ones
  • Comparing interventions to “doing nothing,” which never exists
  • Comparing today to yesterday instead of to trend or lifecycle stage

Without a baseline, change has no meaning. Without an agreed-upon baseline, debate becomes endless recalibration rather than understanding.

The refusal—or failure—to ask baseline questions is not a technical oversight. It is often a psychological one. Baselines make certain narratives harder to maintain.


V. The Substitution Problem

Systems do not eliminate pressure. They redirect it.

Every policy, reform, or intervention substitutes one cost, risk, or burden for another. The analytical failure is not unintended consequences; it is unacknowledged substitution.

When analysis celebrates a solution without tracing where pressure moved, it is incomplete by definition. The question “What problem did we solve?” must be followed immediately by “Where did the pressure go?”

Ignoring substitution allows success to be declared in one domain while strain accumulates invisibly in another.


VI. Metrics Are Mirrors, Not Truth

Metrics are indispensable—and dangerous.

They capture what is easy to measure, not necessarily what matters most. They reward visibility, not durability. They improve responsiveness but often degrade resilience.

Measurement should provoke questions, not end them. When metrics become substitutes for judgment, they stop illuminating reality and begin reflecting institutional incentives back at themselves.

What improves on paper may be decaying in practice. The analyst’s task is not to reject metrics, but to interrogate them relentlessly.


VII. The Discipline of the Second Question

Most people ask one good question. Then they stop.

The first question usually reveals curiosity. The second reveals discipline.

  • First question: What happened?
  • Second question: Relative to what expectation?
  • Third question: Why now and not earlier?
  • Fourth question: At whose expense did this improve?
  • Fifth question: What constraint was binding?

Most analytical errors occur between questions one and two. The pause required to ask the second question feels unproductive, even obstructive. In reality, it is where understanding begins.


VIII. Asking Good Questions Is a Skill — and It Must Be Practiced

The ability to ask good questions is not innate. It is trained.

It requires resisting the urge to sound smart quickly. It requires tolerating ambiguity longer than is comfortable. It requires being willing to appear slow, cautious, or even naïve in environments that reward speed and certainty.

Like any discipline, it improves through repetition:

  • Reviewing past analyses and identifying where the wrong question was asked
  • Practicing reframing problems in multiple ways before selecting one
  • Studying failures not for answers, but for misframed questions
  • Learning to sit with incomplete understanding without rushing to closure

Good questioners are not passive. They are rigorous. They know that the hardest work happens before the first chart, model, or recommendation.


IX. What Your Questions Reveal About You

Questions are diagnostic. They reveal far more about the questioner than about the subject being questioned.

They reveal:

  • Whether someone is seeking understanding or validation
  • Whether they tolerate uncertainty or rush to control
  • Whether they think in systems or in narratives
  • Whether they are curious about limits or allergic to them

A person who habitually asks attributional questions before analytical ones is revealing impatience with complexity. A person who never asks baseline or time-horizon questions is revealing comfort with surface explanations.

In this sense, questions are a form of moral autobiography. Over time, they expose whether a person is oriented toward truth, persuasion, blame, or reassurance.


X. Analysis as Responsibility

Analysis is not neutral. It shapes how resources are allocated, how authority is exercised, and how force—legal, financial, or moral—is applied.

Bad questions do not merely mislead; they coerce. They narrow the range of permissible answers and foreclose alternatives before they are considered.

The responsibility of the analyst is not certainty. It is honesty about limits, tradeoffs, and unknowns. Asking better questions is not intellectual vanity; it is an ethical act.


Conclusion

The most dangerous answers are not the wrong ones.
They are the ones that emerge from unexamined questions.

Before asking what the data says, before debating solutions, before declaring success or failure, the analyst owes one discipline above all others:

Stop.
Name the question.
Interrogate it.
And be willing to change it.

That pause—unrewarded, uncomfortable, and often invisible—is where real thinking begins.