A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

For more than fifty years, Texas has been at the center of American redistricting law. Few states have produced as many major Supreme Court decisions shaping the meaning of the Voting Rights Act, the boundaries of racial gerrymandering doctrine, and—perhaps most significantly—the Court’s modern unwillingness to police partisan gerrymandering.

Two cases define the modern era for Texas: LULAC v. Perry (2006) and Abbott v. Perez (2018). Together, they reveal how the Court analyzes racial vote dilution, when partisan motives are permissible, how intent is inferred or rejected, and what evidentiary burdens challengers must meet.

At the heart of the Court’s reasoning is a recurring tension:

• the Constitution forbids racial discrimination in redistricting,
• the Voting Rights Act prohibits plans that diminish minority voting strength,
• but the Court has repeatedly held that partisan advantage, even aggressive partisan advantage, is not generally unconstitutional.

Texas’s maps have allowed the Court to articulate, refine, and—many argue—narrow these doctrines.

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I. LULAC v. Perry (2006): Partisan Motives Allowed, But Minority Vote Dilution Not

Background

In 2003, after winning unified control of state government, Texas Republicans enacted a mid-decade congressional redistricting plan replacing the court-drawn map used in 2002. It was an openly partisan effort to convert a congressional delegation that had favored Democrats into a Republican-leaning one.

Challengers argued:

1. The mid-decade redistricting itself was unconstitutional.
2. The legislature’s partisan intent violated the Equal Protection Clause.
3. The plan diluted Latino voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, particularly in old District 23.
4. Several districts were racial gerrymanders, subordinating race to politics.

Arguments Before the Court

• Challengers:
  • Texas had engaged in unprecedented partisan manipulation lacking a legitimate state purpose.
  • The dismantling of Latino opportunity districts—especially District 23—reduced the community’s ability to elect its preferred candidate.
  • Race was used as a tool to achieve partisan ends, in violation of Shaw v. Reno-line racial gerrymandering rules.
• Texas:
  • Nothing in the Constitution forbids mid-decade redistricting.
  • Political gerrymandering, even when aggressive and obvious, was allowed under Davis v. Bandemer (1986).
  • Latino voters in District 23 were not “cohesive” enough to qualify for Section 2 protection.
  • District configurations reflected permissible political considerations.

The Court’s Decision

The Court’s ruling was a fractured opinion, but several clear conclusions emerged.

1. Mid-Decade Redistricting Is Constitutional

The Court held that states are not restricted to once-a-decade redistricting. Nothing in the Constitution or federal statute bars legislatures from replacing a map mid-cycle.
This effectively legitimized Texas’s overtly partisan decision to redraw the map simply because political control had shifted.

2. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Remain Non-Justiciable (or Nearly So)

The Court again declined to articulate a manageable standard for judging partisan gerrymandering.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the controlling plurality, expressed concern about severe partisan abuses but concluded that no judicially administrable rule existed.

Key takeaway:
Texas’s partisan motivation, even if blatant, was not itself unconstitutional.

3. Section 2 Violation in District 23: Latino Voting Strength Was Illegally Diluted

This was the major substantive ruling.

The Court found that Texas dismantled an existing Latino opportunity district (CD-23) precisely because Latino voters were on the verge of electing their preferred candidate.
The legislature:

• removed tens of thousands of cohesive Latino voters from the district,
• replaced them with low-turnout Latino populations less likely to vote against the incumbent,
• and justified the move under the guise of creating a new Latino-majority district elsewhere.

This manipulation, the Court held, denied Latino voters an equal opportunity to elect their candidate of choice, violating Section 2.

4. Racial Gerrymandering Claims Mostly Fail

The Court rejected most Shaw-type racial gerrymandering claims because plaintiffs failed to prove that race, rather than politics, predominated.
This reflects a theme that becomes even stronger in later cases:
when race and politics correlate—as they often do in Texas—challengers must provide powerful evidence that race, not party, drove the lines.

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II. Abbott v. Perez (2018): A High Bar for Proving Discriminatory Intent

Background

After the 2010 census, Texas enacted new maps. A federal district court found that several districts were intentionally discriminatory and ordered Texas to adopt interim maps. In 2013, Texas then enacted maps that were largely identical to the court’s own interim maps.

Challengers argued that:

1. The original 2011 maps were passed with discriminatory intent.
2. The 2013 maps, though based on the court’s design, continued to embody the taint of 2011.
3. Multiple districts across Texas diluted minority voting strength or were racial gerrymanders.

Texas argued that:

• The 2013 maps were valid because they were largely adopted from a court-approved version.
• Any discriminatory intent from 2011 could not be imputed to the 2013 legislature.
• Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving intentional discrimination district by district.

The Court’s Decision

In a 5–4 ruling, the Supreme Court reversed almost all findings of discriminatory intent against Texas.

1. Burden of Proof Is on Challengers, Not the State

The Court rejected the lower court’s presumption that Texas acted with discriminatory intent in 2013 merely because the 2011 legislature had been found to do so.

Key Holding:
A finding of discriminatory intent in a prior map does not shift the burden; challengers must prove new intent for each new plan.

This significantly tightened the evidentiary bar.

2. Presumption of Legislative Good Faith

Chief Justice Roberts emphasized a longstanding principle:

Legislatures are entitled to a presumption of good faith unless challengers provide direct and persuasive evidence otherwise.

This presumption made it much harder to prove racial discrimination unless emails, testimony, or map-drawing files showed explicit racial motives.

3. Section 2 Vote Dilution Claims Largely Rejected

Challengers failed to show that minority voters were both cohesive and systematically defeated by white bloc voting in many districts.
The Court stressed the need for:

• clear demographic evidence,
• consistent voting patterns,
• and demonstration of feasible alternative districts.

4. Only One District Violated the Constitution

The Court affirmed discrimination in Texas House District 90, where the legislature had intentionally moved Latino voters to achieve a specific racial composition.

But the Court rejected violations in every other challenged district.

5. Practical Effect: Courts Must Defer Unless Evidence Is Unusually Strong

Abbott v. Perez is widely viewed as one of the strongest modern statements of judicial deference to legislatures in redistricting—even when past discrimination has been found.

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent called the majority opinion “astonishing in its blindness.”

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III. What These Cases Together Mean: Why the Court Upheld Texas’s Maps

Across both LULAC (2006) and Abbott (2018), a coherent theme emerges in the Supreme Court’s reasoning:

1. Partisan Gerrymandering Is Not the Court’s Job to Police

Unless partisan advantage clearly crosses into racial targeting, the Court will not strike it down.
Texas repeatedly argued political motives, and the Court repeatedly accepted them as legitimate.

2. Racial Discrimination Must Be Proven With Specific, District-Level Evidence

• Plaintiffs must demonstrate that race—not politics—predominated.
• Correlation between race and partisanship is not enough.
• Evidence must address each district individually.

3. Legislatures Receive a Strong Presumption of Good Faith

Abbott v. Perez reaffirmed that courts should not infer intent from

• prior discrimination,
• suspicious timing,
• or even foreseeable racial effects.

4. Section 2 Remedies Require Cohesive Minority Voting Blocs

LULAC (2006) found a violation only because evidence clearly showed cohesive Latino voters whose electoral progress was intentionally undermined.

5. Courts Avoid Intruding into “Political Questions”

The Court has repeatedly signaled reluctance to take over the political process.
This culminated in Rucho v. Common Cause (2019), where the Court held partisan gerrymandering claims categorically non-justiciable—a rule entirely consistent with how Texas cases were decided.

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Conclusion: Why Texas Keeps Winning

Texas’s redistricting cases illustrate how the Supreme Court draws a sharp—and highly consequential—line:

• Racial discrimination is unconstitutional, but must be proven with very specific evidence.
• Partisan manipulation, even extreme manipulation, is permissible.
• Courts defer heavily to state legislatures unless plaintiffs can clearly show that lawmakers used race as a tool, not merely politics.

In LULAC, challengers succeeded only where the evidence of racial vote dilution was unmistakable.
In Abbott v. Perez, they failed everywhere except one district because intent was not proven with the level of granularity the Court demanded.

The result is that Texas has repeatedly prevailed in redistricting litigation—not necessarily because its maps are racially neutral, but because the Court has set an unusually high bar for proving racial motive and has washed its hands of partisan claims altogether.