A collaboration between Lewis McLain & AI

Introduction

On December 5, 2025, the Trump administration released its National Security Strategy, a 33-page document that invokes—and dramatically expands upon—one of the oldest principles in American foreign policy: the Monroe Doctrine. The new strategy presents itself as a restoration of hemispheric clarity, but in substance it offers something far more ambitious: a Trump-era corollary that transforms a defensive warning into an assertion of American primacy.

Understanding what this “Trump Corollary” means—and whether it represents a legitimate evolution or a radical departure—requires revisiting the original doctrine, understanding how national security strategies gain force in American governance, assessing reactions across the hemisphere, and considering how American history might have looked had this posture been adopted earlier. It also requires confronting a deceptively simple question: Can a 19th-century doctrine be meaningfully revived in a 21st-century multipolar world?

Part I: The Monroe Doctrine of 1823

Historical Context

President James Monroe articulated his doctrine on December 2, 1823, at a moment when European empires were recalibrating their power in the Western Hemisphere. Russia pressed southward down the Pacific coast. Spain hoped to reclaim Latin American colonies that had recently secured independence. The United States, barely forty years old, lacked the naval power to enforce its preferences but had a growing conviction that the Western Hemisphere required a geopolitical boundary line separating Old World and New.

Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, relied on an emerging American diplomatic philosophy—one that blended George Washington’s caution against entangling alliances with James Madison’s insistence that foreign interference in the Western Hemisphere posed unacceptable risks. The British sought joint action with the United States, but Adams famously rejected it, arguing that America should not appear as “a cock-boat in the wake of the British naval man-of-war.”

The Three Core Principles

Monroe’s declaration rested on three foundational principles:

Non-Colonization — The Americas were no longer open to European colonization.
Non-Intervention — Any European attempt to impose its system in the hemisphere would be viewed as a threat.
Separate Spheres — Europe and the Americas operated under fundamentally different political logics and should remain separate.

Reciprocity and Restraint

Often forgotten today is Monroe’s reciprocal pledge:

“With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.”

In other words, the doctrine was defensive, not dominative. It did not seek to revise political arrangements or expand American control. And because the United States lacked the power to enforce it, the doctrine functioned more as a diplomatic aspiration than a military guarantee—its viability propped up, ironically, by the British Royal Navy.

Latin American Perspectives

Latin America’s early reaction was complicated. While many leaders welcomed U.S. opposition to recolonization, they also recognized the unilateral nature of Monroe’s declaration. Over time, as the United States intervened repeatedly in the Caribbean, Central America, and northern South America, skepticism hardened. By the 20th century, much of Latin America viewed the Monroe Doctrine not as a shield against European ambitions but as a mask for American dominance. This historical memory forms the backdrop against which any modern revival—particularly one framed as a U.S. “right” to dictate hemispheric security—will be received.

Later Interpretations

The doctrine evolved dramatically:

Olney Interpretation (1895): Asserted U.S. authority to mediate hemispheric disputes.
Roosevelt Corollary (1904): Claimed the right to intervene in Latin American affairs to prevent “chronic wrongdoing.”
Good Neighbor Policy (1933): Pledged non-intervention, attempting to restore the doctrine’s original spirit.
Cold War Era: Revived interventionist logic to counter communism.

Thus, the doctrine became not a fixed principle but a malleable tool—sometimes restraining U.S. action, other times justifying it.

Part II: The Trump Corollary of 2025

A New Framework

The 2025 National Security Strategy sharply critiques the last 30 years of American foreign policy, dismissing post-Cold War global engagement as utopian overreach. The new governing principle is “America First”—defined not as isolationism but as a recalibration of American obligations, alliances, and priorities.

Core Philosophy

The strategy asserts that safeguarding American sovereignty requires:

“Full control over our borders”
A modernized nuclear deterrent and missile defense “Golden Dome”
Revitalization of American cultural and spiritual health
Economic growth from $30 trillion to $40 trillion within a decade

It rejects the long-standing assumption that American security depends on expansive global commitments.

Guiding Principles

Four principles structure the document:

Peace Through Strength — Deterrence through overwhelming capability.
Non-Interventionism — High thresholds for foreign wars outside the hemisphere.
Flexible Realism — Friendly commercial relations without demanding political reform.
Primacy of Nations — A world anchored in sovereign nation-states.

The Trump Corollary Defined

The document’s centerpiece is the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine”:

“The United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere… We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities.”

Where Monroe said “hands off,” Trump says “we will determine what happens here.” Where Monroe rejected joint declarations, Trump rejects even cooperative multipolarity.

The document authorizes military force against cartels, targeted deployments along the border, and the rollback of Chinese and European strategic positions in Latin America. It frames the hemisphere as a zone of exclusive American responsibility—echoing Theodore Roosevelt more than James Monroe.

Migration as National Security

The strategy’s most dramatic reframing is its treatment of migration:

“The era of mass migration must end. Border security is the primary element of national security.”

Migration is grouped with terrorism, drugs, and trafficking—an elevation far beyond Monroe’s language and even beyond the Cold War’s focus on ideology.

Confrontation with Europe

The strategy openly criticizes European allies and predicts their demographic and cultural decline. It encourages “patriotic parties” in European democracies—an unusual form of ideological interference. This is a noteworthy reversal: Monroe promised not to interfere in Europe; the Trump strategy seeks to influence European domestic politics.

China and Economic Competition

China is reframed strategically, not as an existential threat but as a commercial rival. The corollary treats Chinese presence in Latin America—ports, lithium mines, telecom infrastructure—as a red line, yet it simultaneously expresses interest in mutually beneficial trade.

This duality reflects the document’s broader tension: a desire for economic engagement with Beijing while preventing its influence anywhere in the Western Hemisphere.

Middle East and Africa

The document presents the Middle East as an emerging zone of stability and partnership, declaring an end to the era in which Middle Eastern crises consumed American attention. In Africa, it proposes replacing aid with trade, emphasizing partnerships with states that welcome American commerce.

Peace Claims

The strategy claims that President Trump achieved peace in eight international conflicts. Whether these claims will withstand scrutiny remains uncertain, but their inclusion underscores the administration’s desire to frame its approach as peace-producing rather than confrontational.

Part III: Who Must Approve or Honor These Strategies?

National Security Strategies Are Presidential Declarations

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (see appendix), but it does not have the force of law. It binds no future Congress, no court, and no ally. It is authoritative inside the executive branch, but constrained by law at every turn.

Domestic Legal Limits

Congress controls war powers and appropriations.
Treaties like NATO remain binding until formally abrogated.
Courts may block executive actions, as seen in litigation over birthright citizenship.
Posse Comitatus constrains domestic military enforcement, unless Congress authorizes exceptions.

International Law and Foreign Responses

The Monroe Doctrine has always been unilateral. No nation is obligated to honor it. Latin American states—many of which now rely heavily on Chinese investment—are unlikely to welcome a 2025 revival framed as exclusionary. Europe may resist American attempts to influence its domestic politics. China can ignore American demands that it divest from hemispheric assets.

The Trump Corollary’s success therefore depends not on diplomatic persuasion but on American capacity—economic, military, and political—to enforce it.

The Feasibility Problem

A critical analytical question emerges: Does the United States currently possess the power, resources, and political consensus needed to enforce hemispheric dominance?

Several issues complicate enforcement:

A Navy struggling to meet global commitments
A defense industrial base strained by years of underinvestment
Domestic political polarization
High federal debt limiting sustained military expansion
Latin American governments with alternative economic partners (especially China)

The Trump Corollary’s ambitions may exceed available means—an imbalance that has historically undermined doctrines that promise more than the nation can deliver.

Part IV: How Would the Trump Corollary Have Changed America Since 1960?

Counterfactual analysis reveals both the appeal and the risks of the Trump Corollary.

The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

Kennedy’s blockade aligned with Monroe’s principles, but his restraint—rejecting military strikes—contrasts sharply with the Trump strategy’s willingness to use lethal force to preempt threats. A Trump-style approach might have produced the airstrikes the Joint Chiefs recommended, risking nuclear escalation.

Vietnam and Cold War Interventions

A Trump Corollary framework would likely have avoided Vietnam entirely, given its skepticism of “forever wars” outside the hemisphere. Yet it might have intensified interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, where U.S. dominance was explicitly asserted.

Immigration Policy

The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act would likely never have passed under a Trump Corollary worldview. The demographic, cultural, and economic consequences of that alternative history would be profound—yielding a more homogeneous but older and economically constrained nation.

Relations with Europe and NATO

A doctrine that treats alliances as transactional could have undermined Cold War deterrence. Europe might have developed independent nuclear forces sooner. The European Union itself may have taken a different form—or not emerged at all.

Economic Globalization

Rejecting trade liberalization would have preserved some manufacturing but at substantial economic cost. America might have had higher wages in industrial sectors but a smaller economy, reducing its ability to project power globally.

Middle Eastern Engagement

Much of America’s costly Middle Eastern involvement might have been avoided, though 9/11 demonstrated that even non-intervention cannot insulate the nation from transnational threats.

Latin America and China

A Trump Corollary applied since 1960 would have required far more sustained investment in Latin America to preempt Chinese influence—investment the United States historically has not provided.

Conclusion: Continuity, Rupture, and the Question of Endurance

The Trump Corollary is both a revival and a reinvention. Like the Monroe Doctrine, it asserts hemispheric boundaries and warns foreign powers away. But unlike Monroe, it does not promise reciprocity, restraint, or non-interference. It replaces Monroe’s defensive posture with a claim to hemispheric dominance. It critiques allies Monroe refused to criticize. It directly inserts the United States into the domestic ideological struggles of Europe. And it elevates migration—unimaginable to Monroe—as the central security issue of the age.

Ultimately, the Trump Corollary’s durability will depend on factors Monroe did not face:

a multipolar world,
a globally intertwined economy,
hemispheric partners with diversified alliances, and
a deeply polarized American electorate.

Doctrines endure only when they align national interests, national capacity, and national consensus. Monroe had that combination—though only decades later. Whether the Trump Corollary possesses the same enduring quality is uncertain.

In the end, the question is not whether the Trump Corollary represents a bold vision. It does. The question is whether it is sustainably bold—and whether future administrations will embrace or repudiate it.

Two hundred years separate Monroe from Trump. Both spoke to their time. History will determine which one better matched America’s enduring interests—and which one attempted more than the nation could ultimately sustain.

Appendix

How Presidents from Reagan to Biden
Treated the National Security Strategy Requirement

The modern National Security Strategy traces to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which attempted to bring coherence to U.S. defense planning after Vietnam, Watergate, and the early Reagan-era military buildup. The act required the president to submit a comprehensive NSS to Congress on a regular basis. Yet from its inception, the requirement carried no enforcement mechanism, no deadline penalty, and no legal force beyond the obligation to publish. Every president since has treated the NSS accordingly—not as binding doctrine, but as a statement of priorities that may or may not shape actual policy.

Ronald Reagan (1981–1989): The First to Issue an NSS—But on His Own Terms

Reagan’s administration issued the first formal National Security Strategy in 1987. It articulated themes Reagan had been voicing for years—peace through strength, rollback of Soviet influence, and the strategic defense initiative. But even Reagan’s NSS served more as a codification of existing policy than a guiding document. The administration routinely adjusted its approach to the Soviet Union as diplomacy evolved, demonstrating the NSS’s role as an informational paper rather than a directive roadmap. Reagan never treated it as binding and did not revise policies to conform to it.

George H. W. Bush (1989–1993): A Strategy Overtaken by Events

President Bush issued strategies in 1990 and 1991, but the collapse of the Soviet Union forced constant revision in practice. The Gulf War likewise illustrated how new crises often moved faster than strategic paperwork. Bush embraced the NSS as a communication tool but never suggested it constrained presidential freedom of action. Its themes—collective security, stability in Europe, and regional deterrence—reflected Bush’s worldview, but the administration’s actions consistently adapted to rapidly shifting realities.

Bill Clinton (1993–2001): From Engagement to Enlargement

Clinton’s strategies in 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 emphasized “engagement and enlargement,” humanitarian intervention, and the spread of democratic institutions. Yet major Clinton-era actions—including Bosnia, Kosovo, and the 1994 Haiti intervention—were justified by presidential decision-making rather than strict adherence to the NSS texts. The administration used the NSS to signal broad values and priorities but not as a constraint on improvisational foreign policy.

George W. Bush (2001–2009): A Dramatic Strategy That Didn’t Bind Policy

Bush’s 2002 NSS was one of the most consequential ever written, famously introducing:

preemptive action,
the war on terrorism, and
the goal of advancing freedom as a strategic priority.

But even this powerful document was illustrative, not binding. It did not legally authorize military operations in Afghanistan or Iraq, nor did it override congressional war powers or treaty obligations. Bush’s later 2006 NSS softened some earlier claims, demonstrating again that an NSS reflects presidential messaging rather than statutory guidance.

Barack Obama (2009–2017): Strategies that Acknowledged Their Own Limits

Obama’s 2010 and 2015 strategies emphasized diplomacy, multilateralism, and the avoidance of open-ended conflicts. Yet Obama’s major decisions—including the 2011 intervention in Libya, the decision not to enforce the “red line” in Syria, the pivot to Asia, and the Iran nuclear deal—often diverged from or expanded beyond the documents’ frameworks. Obama openly recognized that strategies evolve with circumstances, implicitly affirming that the NSS carries no binding force.

Donald Trump (2017–2021): A Strategy Unaligned With Presidential Action

Trump’s 2017 NSS described China and Russia as great-power competitors, yet Trump often pursued warmer personal relations with both Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin than the strategy implied. The administration’s withdrawal from the Iran deal, negotiations with North Korea, and approach to NATO frequently departed from traditional strategic guidance. Trump’s first-term NSS was more muscular than his actual foreign policy in some areas and more cautious in others—another demonstration that the NSS is aspirational, not mandatory.

Joe Biden (2021–present): Treating the NSS as Optional in Practice

Biden issued Interim Guidance in 2021, a document not envisioned in the statute but accepted without question because the NSS requirement has no enforcement. His formal 2022 NSS focused on strategic competition with China and support for democratic allies. Yet Biden’s major decisions—especially the Afghanistan withdrawal and the scale of support for Ukraine—illustrated the familiar pattern: presidents act according to events and politics, not according to NSS language. Biden’s NSS explicitly stated that it “provides direction to departments and agencies,” confirming its internal, advisory nature.

The Long Arc: A Consistent Pattern

Across nearly four decades, the pattern is unmistakable:

Presidents publish the NSS because the law requires it.
They adjust its content to reflect their broader worldview.
They frequently act outside it when circumstances require.
No president has treated it as binding—or asked that it be treated as binding.
Congress, the courts, and international partners do not view it as enforceable.

The NSS is an instrument of communication, coordination, and signaling, not a constraint on presidential power or a substitute for congressional authority.

It is in this historical lineage that the Trump Corollary appears: bold in rhetoric, sweeping in intent, but ultimately limited not by its ambition but by the same structural constraints that shaped every NSS since Reagan.